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Abstract
The study of price determination in markets has been a defining element of the science
of economics. In this dissertation, I have developed models of strategic pricing under
imperfect awareness. Imperfect awareness in this context means that decision makers
are not aware of every trader operating in the market, instead, trading is constrained
to the set of traders which the decision maker is aware of. The degree of trader’s
awareness can evolve over time. I study pricing dynamics in such markets. I show
that prices and allocations approximate perfect competition as awareness increases in
a variety of environments.
In Chapter 2, I study pricing in a dynamic duopoly. Buyers may be imperfectly
aware of operating sellers, but they can gain awareness regarding sellers through a
word-of-mouth matching mechanism. I show that there is a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium. The unique equilibrium features price dispersion with asymmetric price
posting strategies. I show that, depending on the parameters, the distribution of
prices of one seller first order stochastically dominates the prices posted by the other
seller. I also show that the price posting strategies of each seller depend on his or her
relative degree of market experience.
In Chapter 3, I extend the model developed in Chapter 2 to an infinite horizon environ-
ment with a continuum of sellers. I show that a Markov perfect equilibrium exists, is
unique, and features asymmetric price posting strategies. In this equilibrium entrants
post prices that are strictly lower than prices posted by more mature competitors,
average markups decline over time as the market for the product matures, and the
distribution of prices features substantial price dispersion at both the individual and
aggregate levels. This model explains a several deviations from competitive condi-
tions that are empirically observed in product markets as being caused by imperfect
awareness.
In Chapter 4, I study a market with a continuum of buyers and sellers (such as the
model of Chapter 3). In this case, I focus on a static setting and introduce differ-
entiated products. Consumers have imperfect awareness regarding product varieties.
Even in this market with differentiated products, I show that the equilibrium approxi-
mates perfect competition when consumers are aware about a high number of product
varieties. It concludes that, when unawareness about product varieties exist, markups
increase when the degree of product differentiation is higher, but for any degree of
product differentiation, markups vanish when unawareness about varieties vanish.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The theory of value based on competitive equilibrium remains the cornerstone
of modern economic theory (Debreu (1959)[13]). This theory of value assumes
perfect competition, but real product markets are characterized by many devi-
ations from perfectly competitive conditions. My objective in this dissertation
is to develop a theory of pricing under trading frictions that can be consistent
with these deviations but that also nests the model of perfect competition as
its limiting case when trading frictions vanish.
To develop this theory, I study a novel type of frictions of trading: frictions exist
if the decision makers have imperfect awareness of the other traders operating
in the market. In this case, the set of trading opportunities available to a
decision maker is constrained to the set of other traders in the market that the
decision maker is aware of. In the models I study in the dissertation I represent
this imperfect awareness through a random network determined by a pairwise
random matching process, and I apply these analytical tools to shed light on a
variety of problems.
A motivation for this novel way of modeling frictions of trading is that it allows
for the degree of trading frictions to be endogenous and dynamic: With the
passage of time decision makers learn about the other traders in the market.
In older, well-established markets, traders have accumulated a larger network
of contacts, so the degree of frictions is lower than in a newly established mar-
ket. This theory implies that well-established markets more closely approximate
competitive conditions than newly established markets.
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The models studied here are closely related to the literature on random match-
ing and bargaining1. In models of random matching and bargaining there are
multiple rounds of matching. At each round, decision makers are divided into
small coalitions and can interact only with other coalition members. Typically,
these coalitions are pairs of traders. The costs of awaiting for additional match-
ing rounds represents the frictions of trading.
In the class of models studied in this dissertation, at a given point in time, a
trader can trade with any other traders they are currently aware of. Frictions
of trading are represented by the fact that traders might not be aware of ev-
ery other trader that is operating in the market. In dynamic versions of these
models, decision makers can become aware of additional traders over time, ac-
cumulating more trading contacts. These contacts are available at any point in
time after being discovered. In particular, I assume that buyers become aware
of the sellers operating in the market through the word-of-mouth from other
buyers that they randomly meet.
This novel approach allows for the study of problems that have not yet been
studied in existing literature. In particular, it allows for the analysis of markets
with frictions that change endogenously over time, as decision makers discover
other buyers and sellers operating in the market. In addition, the added flexi-
bility of this approach of describing frictions of trading is that it allows for the
analysis of market frictions in a static game instead of a sequential model of
matching and bargaining.
For example, the models studied here can explain the tendency for profit mar-
gins to decline over time in specific industries: the passage of time implies in
decreasing frictions for trading as traders become more well informed about
other market participants. As buyers become aware of a greater number of
competing sellers, it becomes harder for individual sellers to extract surplus
from their customers, which more easily shift their demand to other sellers.
In addition, this class of models can explain several features of seller behavior
observed in product markets such as the fact entrant sellers tends to undercut
incumbents to accumulate demand, features replicated in the equilibrium of the
models presented in chapters 2 and 3. In Chapter 4, I show that when trad-
ing frictions are low the equilibrium approximates perfect competition even in
1E.g., Osborne and Rubinstein (1990),Gale (2000), Lauermann (2013).
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a model of product differentiation, as long as there exists a large number of
varieties and the degree of differentiation between varieties is low.
Chapter 2 presents a dynamic duopoly model where sellers compete by posting
prices and acquire customers over time as buyers gain awareness about the
sellers through word-of-mouth. There is an entrant and an incumbent seller.
The entrant will arrive at the market later than the incumbent and so will
have a smaller number of buyers who are aware of the seller, that is, a smaller
customer base. The seller with smaller customer base will have more elastic
demand because the fraction of its customers who are aware of the competitor
is larger. This does not necessarily imply that the smaller seller will post lower
prices. When the sellers grow the degree of overlap between the groups of buyers
who are aware of each seller also grows, which lowers equilibrium prices. The
seller with smaller customer base will have greater potential for growth which
means that if he or she posts lower prices than the larger seller its customer base
might grow so much that future prices will decrease profits in present value by a
greater degree than the increase in present profits. In other words, the smaller
entrant might post high prices to grow more slowly which decreases the intensity
of competition in the future, leading to higher profits.
Chapter 3 extends the model developed in Chapter 2 to an environment with
a continuum of sellers where large number of sellers enter and exit the market
every period. I show that the model’s Markov perfect equilibrium is unique and
efficient. Because there is a large number of sellers, each seller has negligible im-
pact on the distribution of prices in equilibrium. Therefore, the dynamic effects
of customer base accumulation on equilibrium prices are not taken in consider-
ation by individual sellers. As a result, in equilibrium entrant sellers who have
smaller customer bases, post strictly lower prices than incumbent sellers. Over
time, as sellers accumulate more customers, the degree of competition between
sellers increases which drives markups down, eventually to marginal cost if seller
exit rates are reduced to zero.
Chapter 4 studies a static setting, without customer capital accumulation. It
extends the environment from markets for identical goods to a market where
each seller is a producer with the monopoly of the technology to produce a par-
ticular variety of the good. I study an environment with product differentiation
and private information regarding valuations and consumer awareness. I show
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that as the average number of producers that consumers are aware of increases
to infinity then equilibrium prices converge to the competitive equilibrium. In
addition, I perform welfare analysis and I show that the allocation in equilib-
rium is efficient when constrained to the set of feasible allocations (defined in
this environment with private valuations as the set of allocations that can be
implemented by a mechanism).
Chapter 2
Price dispersion in dynamic
duopoly
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this study is to define and characterize equilibrium in a product
market in which two buyers compete by posting prices and buyers acquire in-
formation about the sellers through a process of word of mouth contagion. This
study extents the class of models originating from Burdett and Judd (1983) [5]’s
seminal equilibrium price dispersion results to an environment that features dy-
namic customer-capital accumulation.
I call a seller’s customer base the set of buyers that are aware of the seller,
which is the set of buyers that observe the seller’s posted price and can choose
to purchase from the seller. The word of mouth contagion process increases the
set of buyers who are aware of a seller and it is determined by the seller’s past
sales activity. When formulating her price posting strategy a seller considers
the effects of her strategy on future customer base accumulation besides the
present effect on sales. When a seller considers posting a lower price that will
imply in higher sales in the present and therefore higher degree of diffusion
of awareness about the seller among the buyers and hence a larger number of
potential customers in the future. However, an increase in the seller’s customer
base in the future will have ambivalent consequences for the expected profits of
the seller in future periods.
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In order to study competition between an entering seller and an incumbent
seller I assume that one seller enters the market before the other. This implies
in a dynamic competition between the two sellers that features asymmetry in
their customer bases as the incumbent seller has a longer amount of time to
accumulate customers. I show that any equilibrium in this environment is char-
acterized by price dispersion, in the sense of randomized price posting strategy
by the sellers. In this case the equilibrium features asymmetric price posting
strategies by the two sellers as it is nearly always the case that one seller’s
randomized price posting strategy will first order stochastically dominate the
strategy of the other seller. One particular feature of the equilibrium in this
environment with a finite population of sellers is that varying the parameters
the order of stochastic dominance in the equilibrium price posting strategies
shifts between the entrant seller and the incumbent.
The empirical literature has shown that when a seller enters a specific product
market it’s demand grows slowly and takes a long time for its size to close
relative to its more mature competitors (Foster et al (2008, 2016) [24, 25]).
Other studies have also shown that in product markets in a given geographical
area there is significant variation in the prices of transactions. In particular,
Kaplan and Menzio (2015) [48] decompose each transaction price into three
components: (i) a store component, the average price for transactions at a
particular store relative to all other stores, (ii) a store-specific good component,
defined as the average price for transactions of a particular good at that store
relative to the prices of all goods in that store, (iii) a transaction component,
defined as the price of a good at that particular transaction relative to the
average price for the same good of all transactions made in that store. They find
that the store-component contributes 10% of the overall variance in prices, the
store-specific good component good component contributes 25-45% depending
on how broadly they define what constitutes a “single good” and the transaction
component accounts for the remaining variance.
The model presented in this paper replicates these features. The diffusion of
awareness among the buyers caused by past sales activity explains the slow
growth in seller specific demand while the equilibrium features asymmetric ran-
domized price posting strategies between the two sellers which explains price
dispersion between different sellers and among transactions with the same seller.
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Contrasting the results of a related study, in Guthmann (2019) [36] the equi-
librium also features price dispersion in an environment with a continuum of
sellers. In this paper the supports of the distribution of the prices posted by each
individual seller are identical while in the aforementioned study in equilibrium
the supports of the price posting strategies for sellers with different customer
bases have disjoint interiors and the support of the price posting strategy a
seller type (given by it’s customer base) converges to a point if the cumulative
distribution of customer bases is continuous. This is a weakness of the theoreti-
cal framework used in that study because Kaplan and Menzio (2015) [48] found
that 45-65% of the variance in prices for transactions of the same good is due
to differences in prices for transactions made at the same store. Their findings
are consistent with this study where sellers with different customer bases post
prices according to a distribution that has the same support.
The paper is organized as follows: subsection 2.1.1 gives an overview of the
related literature. Section 2.2 presents the model where customer capital accu-
mulation occurs through contagion, subsection 2.2.1 presents the environment of
the model, subsection 2.2.2 defines the equilibrium of the model. In subsection
2.2.2.1, I solve for the equilibrium in the period 2, in subsection 2.2.2.2, I solve
for the equilibrium in period 1, and I finish characterizing the equilibrium in
subsection 2.2.2.3, solving for the trivial case of period 0. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.1.1 Related Literature
The aforementioned Burdett and Judd (1983) paper is a seminal contribution for
the concept of equilibrium price dispersion in a market for an physically identical
good. Similar studies include Stahl (1989) [72] and Menzio and Thrachter (2015)
[57], which tries to extent the concept of equilibrium with randomized price
posting strategies to environments that allow for sequential search. This study
extents the model by allowing sellers to accumulate a customer base, extending
the concept of equilibrium price dispersion to a fully dynamic environment.
Previous studies also feature customer-capital accumulation. Gourio and Rudanko
(2014) [34] and Gilbukh and Roldan (2018) [32] use directed search to analyze
customer-capital accumulation. A major discrepancy between this study and
these previously mentioned models is that customer accumulation mechanism
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used here consists of word of mouth contagion (which is explicitly defined sub-
section 2.2.1). Imperfect awareness has been previously used in model featuring
imperfect competition in Perla (2017) [63]. The model presented here also has
similarities to Fishman and Rob (2005) [23] as in both cases, from the perspec-
tive of the buyers search is assumed to be costless.
The motivation for developing a model that combines price dispersion and
customer-capital is that the empirical evidence suggests that seller’s specific
demand exists and that it is accumulated over time. Recent empirical studies
such as Foster et. al. (2008, 2016) [24] show that in product markets for homo-
geneous goods incumbent plants sell their output for higher prices than entering
plants. They also find robust evidence that incumbent plants have higher plant
specific demand than their entering competitors.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Environment
Consider a market for a single perishable indivisible good. Time is discrete and
there are three periods, indexed by t = 0, 1, 2. There is a continuum of identical
buyers of unit of measure. Each buyer has a unit demand for the good in each
period and reservation price equal to one. There are two sellers in this economy,
which I call E and I (which stand for “entrant” and “incumbent” respectively).
The sellers can produce any quantity q ∈ R+ of the indivisible good at constant
marginal cost normalized to zero. So when a seller sells the indivisible good to
a measure of buyers m ∈ [0, 1], each buyer buys one unit and hence it means
the quantity q produced and sold by the seller is q = m, and if the good was
sold at a price p the seller’s revenue is p × q which is also the seller’s profit.
See Gottardi and Serrano (2005) [33] for another example of a model that is
characterized by finitely many sellers and a continuum of buyers.
Buyers may know zero, one or two sellers. Let M jt represent the set of buyers
who are aware of seller j in period t and mjt ∈ [0, 1] be the corresponding
measure of this set of buyers. I call the set of buyers who know seller j the
customer base of j. Let mt = (mIt ,mEt ) be the pair of measures of the customer
CHAPTER 2. PRICE DISPERSION IN DYNAMIC DUOPOLY 9
bases of each seller in period t.
There is only one seller active in the market in period t = 0. That is, the other
seller’s customer base measure is assumed to be zero. When a seller begins
operating the market it’s initial customer base measure is ms ∈ (0, 1). I is the
seller who is active in period 0 while seller E is not operating in the market. In
period 1, seller E enters the market as it’s customer base grows (exogenously)
to the entry value ms.
In this model the growth of the customer-base results from buyers discovering
the seller through meeting other buyers through a random contagion mecha-
nism.1 That is, buyers learn about a seller through word of mouth from shop-
pers of that seller. For a concrete example, I am assuming that consumers
discover different brands of smartphones from noticing the brands their friends
are using. I do consider contagion through word of mouth as the main form of
customer acquisition in this study as Trusov, Bucklin, & Pauwels (2009) [74]
found that word of mouth effects in customer acquisition are much stronger
relative to other marketing tools. In particular, the elasticity of customer ac-
quisition to word of mouth effects was estimated to be 20 to 30 times higher
than promotional events and media appearances respectively. See section 2.3
for extensions that characterize the equilibrium with other forms of customer
accumulation.
I assume the awareness of each of the sellers by the buyers is independent
across buyers. That means that the probability that a buyer is aware of one of
the sellers is independent of being aware the other seller. Let −j be the seller
competing with seller j. Then the unconditional probability that a buyer knows
j is mj. The probability a buyer knows j conditional on knowing −j is then
mjm−j
m−j = m
j which is the same as the unconditional probability that a buyer is
aware of j and the probability that a buyer knows both j and −j is just the
1This “discovery” is more broader than simple finding out about the existence of the sellers:
As Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2016) state: “Our read of the evidence is that the
customer ‘learning’ that drives demand stock growth is much broader than the simple process
of buyers finding out about the existence of a producer. While spotty information about mere
existence might be consistent with the large gaps in idiosyncratic demand present at plants’
births, it seems unlikely to explain why convergence takes upwards of 15 years. We posit
that learning involves much deeper components, like details of producers’ product attributes,
the quality and quantity of their bundled services, the consistency of their operations, their
expected longevity, and so on. Having to learn about these features can impart considerable
inertia into producers’ demand stocks.”
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ME ∩M I
Figure 2.1: Customer bases of the two sellers when mj = .4, ∀j.
product of the probabilities of knowing each seller, mjm−j. Independence is just
an assumption made for simplicity of exposition. See the appendix subsection
5.1.4 for an explicit characterization of the (trivial) consequences of relaxing
independence.
Let qjt,i ∈ {0}∪N be the quantity of the indivisible good that buyer i purchases
from seller j in period t. Let qjt be the total quantity purchased by customers
of j in period t, it satisfies qjt =
∫ 1
0
qjt,idi, where buyers are indexed by i ∈ [0, 1].
Each customer has a unit demand for the good, hence qjt,i ∈ {0, 1} which imply
that qjt is equal to the measure of customers who know the seller j and choose
to buy at j. I call the customers who choose to purchase from j in a period t
the seller j’s active customers in period t.
To provide random matching-based microfoundations to the law of motion for
the customer base, suppose that buyers who are unaware of the seller can dis-
cover the seller by meeting with active customers of the seller. Let d(qjt , 1−mjt)
be the probability that a buyer who does not know j in period t meets a cus-
tomer of j by period t + 1. The discovery probability d(., .) is a function of
qjt , the number of currently active customers of the seller j, and 1 − mjt , the
population of buyers who do not know the seller. Hence, the total measure of
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new potential customers who discover the seller between period t to period t+1
is Φ(qjt , 1−mjt) = d(qjt , 1−mjt)× (1−mjt). I assume Φ is a constant returns to
scale matching function (as in DMP matching models) and it’s increasing and
concave in qjt and 1 − mjt : that is, the measure of matchings between active
customers of j and unaware buyers is increasing in the number of active buyers
and unaware buyers but with decreasing returns.
Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2016) [25] finds robust empirical evidence
that seller’s demand depreciates over time. Hence, I include in the model a
customer base depreciation factor δ ∈ [0, 1) which implies that at a given period
buyers exit the market and are be replaced by new buyers at a rate δ. 2
Taking in consideration both the discovery of the seller by buyers and depreci-
ation of the customer base the stock of potential customers of seller j evolves
according to the following law of motion:
mjt+1(q
j
t ,m
j
t) = (1− δ)mjt + Φ(qjt , 1−mjt). (2.1)
Note that Φ(., .) is only a function of j’s sales and not of −j’s which implies
that an increase in the competing seller sales does not affect the probability
of discovery of firm j. However, an increase in the competing seller −j’s sales
implies in a larger fraction of j’s potential customers choosing to buy from −j.
Hence j’s sales will decrease. Thus the probability of a buyer discovering j
decreases next period if −j sales are higher in the current period.
Seller compete by posting prices. A seller j chooses at each period to post
a price p ∈ (−∞, 1] = A, so A is seller j’s action set which is assumed to be
identical across sellers. At each period sellers choose which price to post for that
period while buyers can choose which seller among those they are aware of to
purchase the perishable good from. I assume that buyers always purchase from
the lowest-price seller they know. Sellers can also mix strategies in their action
set A. Let σjt be a cumulative distribution that characterizes j’s mixed strategy,
σjt : [0, 1]→ F([0, 1]), where σjt (mt, p) specifies the probability that seller j will
post a price equal or lower than p in period t and mt = (mIt ,mEt ) ∈ [0, 1]2 is the
pair of customer base measures in period t.
This is a game with finitely many players (2 players which are I and E), where
2Or alternatively, it can be interpret that buyers forget about seller j at a rate δ.
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each player’s action set is a compact metric space and the payoff functions fea-
ture discontinuities (since equation 2.2 will be discontinuous at atom’s of the
competitor’s distribution of prices posted). As Simon and Zame (1990) [70]
shows that Nash equilibrium in games with discontinuous payoffs with endoge-
nous sharing rules always exists. Here I assume a specific tie-breaking rule. In
period 2, if both sellers post the same price the buyer will always purchase from
the seller with the smallest customer-base. In period 1 if both sellers post the
same price the buyer will always purchase from the seller with the highest pj(m)
as defined by equation 2.19.
As I will show, this tie-breaking rule is sufficient to guarantee the existence and
uniqueness of equilibrium. It is a tie-breaking rule that only depends on the
state of the market, which is described by the pair of customer bases.
I assume that each seller knows the measure of the customer bases of both sellers
operating in the market but does not know whether their potential customers
knows the competitor or not. I restrict attention to uniform pricing posting
strategies which means the seller’s posted price is not conditioned on individual
customer types. Where “type” means whether the customer knows the compet-
ing seller of not. I do so because for this environment posting the same price
for all buyers is an optimal truth telling mechanism.
Proposition 2.1. An optimal sales mechanism for the seller is characterized
by a uniform price for the buyers.
Proposition 2.1 follows from the reasoning that in any type revealing mecha-
nism where the price paid for the good varies with the type of customer some
customers will have the incentive to lie to pay the lowest price in exchange for
the good. Considering that valuations do not vary among buyers and the fact
that the good is indivisible means that any form of discrimination of the buyers
by the sellers is not feasible.
Let P j(p, σjt ,mt) be the probability that a potential customer of the seller j
purchases from the seller given j posts price p, −j is posting prices according
to a distribution σjt and the state of the market is mt = (mIt ,mEt ). A buyer
will always purchase from the seller j if that is the only seller he or she knows.
If the buyer knows both sellers then he or she will always purchase from the
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lowest-price seller. Therefore P jt (p) is equal to the probability that the potential
customer is not part of the competing seller −j’s customer base measure m−jt
plus the probability the buyer knows the competing seller and that the seller’s
posted price is lower than the competing seller’s. 3 Therefore, assuming σ−jt
doesn’t have an atom at p, P j(p, σ−jt ,mt) satisfies
P j(p, σ−jt ,mt) = (1−m−jt ) + (1− σ−jt (p))m−jt (2.2)
= 1− σ−j(p)m−jt .
If σ−j has an atom at price p then P j(p, σ−jt ,mt) satisfies
P j(p, σ−jt ,mt) =
1− σ−j(p)m
−j
t if the tie-breaking rule favors -j
1− limpˆ↑p σ−j(pˆ)m−jt if the tie-breaking rule favors j
,
where “the tie-breaking rule favors j” means that buyers will buy the good from
j in case of a tie in posted prices.
There are two possible quantities that the seller j can sell, qjt = m
j
t if j undercuts
−j and all it’s customer base purchases from the seller, and qj
t
= (1−m−jt )×mjt
if j is undercut by −j. For a continuous distribution σ−jt the probability of qjt
being realized is (1−σ−jt (p)) while the probability of qjt being realized is σ
−j
t (p).
The expected quantity to be sold in the present period by a seller posting p,
E[qj(p, σjt ,mt)] is
E[qj(p, σjt ,mt)] = (1− σ−jt (p))mjt + σ−jt (p)(1−m−jt )mjt (2.3)
= mitP
j(p, σjt ,mt) (2.4)
= m−jt (1−m−jt σ−jt (p)).
Let γj(p, σ−j,mt) be the expected profits of the seller j by posting price p
in period t given a vector of customer measures m = (mIt ,mEt ) and that the
competing seller is posting prices distributed according to a distribution σ−j.
3If σ−jt has an atom at p then there is a positive probability of a tie in posted prices and
hence P jt (p) will also depend on the specific tie-breaking rule.
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Since marginal cost is zero expected profits are just the expected quantity sold
multiplied by the posted price:
γj(p, σ−j,mt) = p× E[qj(p, σjt ,mt)]. (2.5)
Sellers care about profits in the future therefore I need to explicitly determine
the seller’s present value for actions taken in each period to determine the
payoffs of each subgame of this game. I assume that sellers discount future
profits according to a discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). Let Eujt be the present value
of discounted expected profits of seller j in period t.
Period 2: The present value of expected profits in period 2 if j post a price pj is
the value of current profits since it is the last period. Hence, the present value
of discounted expected profits Euj2(.) of a seller j in period 2 posting p
j
2 is just
the current profits
Euj2(p
j
2, σ
−j
2 ,m2) = γ
j(pj2, σ
−j
2 ,m2),
where σ−j2 is the competitor’s distribution of prices and m2 = (mI2,mE2 ) is the
vector of customer bases.
Period 1: From equation 2.1, we know that the client bases in period 2 depend
on sales quantity in period 1. For a seller j ∈ {I, E} there exist two period
2 nodes: if pj < p−j, than sales quantity is qj = mj and if pj > p−j, then
qj = mj(1 − m−j). Hence, given a vector of customer bases m1 in period
1 there exists only a pair of possible vectors of customer base measures in
period 2, (mI2,mE2 ) and (mI2,mE2 ), where m
j
2 and m
j
2 are the customer base
measures associated with being undercut or undercutting the competing seller,
respectively. They satisfy:
mj2 = (1− δ)mj1 + Φ(mj1, 1−mj1) (2.6)
mj2 = (1− δ)mj1 + Φ(mj1(1−mj1), 1−mj1). (2.7)
Let P (mj2|pj1, σ−j1 ) be the probability of (mj2,m−j2 ) being realized in the second
period conditional on j posting p and −j posting prices according to a distri-
bution σ−j1 .
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Suppose that seller j ∈ {E, I} posts pj1 in period 1, pj2(mj2) in period 2 if
(mj2,m
−j
2 ) is realized and p
j
2(m
j
2) if (m
j
2,m
−j
2 ) is realized. Let
pj,1 = (pj1, (p
j
2(m
j
2), p
j
2(m
j
2)))
be this triple of prices.
That seller −j prices posting strategy consists of distributions
σ−j,1 = (σ−j1 , σ
−j
2 (m
j
2), σ
−j
2 (m
j
2))
be the corresponding triple for −j. Then given a pair of customer base measures
m1 in period 1 the present value of expected profits in period 1 of seller j satisfies
Euj1(p
j,1, σ−j,1,m1) = (2.8)
γj(pj1, σ
−j
1 ,m1) + β[P (m
j
2|pj1, σ−j1 )γj(pj2(mj2), σ−j2 (mj2),m2) + P (mj2|pj1, σ−j1 )γj(pj2(mj2), σ−j2 (mj2),m2)].
(2.9)
Period 0: In period 0 only seller I is operating in the market so buyers will
always choose to purchase from I hence for any price p ∈ AI that I posts the
quantity sold will be mI0 = ms, therefore it’s period 0 I’s profits will be
γI0(p
I
0) = p
j
0 ×ms
and it’s customer-base in period 1 will grow to a measure mI1 which satisfies
mI1 = (1− δ)ms + Φ(ms, 1−ms). (2.10)
Therefore the present value of expected profits in period 0 for j = I given that
that −j’s strategy profile when he enters the market in period 1 is σ−j,1, posting
a price pj0, a profile of prices pj,1 beginning in period 1 is
Euj0(p
j
0, p
j,1, σ−j,1) = pj0 ×ms + βEuj1(pj,1, σ−j,1,m1)
where m1 = (mI1,mE1 ) = (mI1,ms), where mI1 satisfies 2.10.
If j = E, then he has not entered the market yet so he doesn’t post prices in
period 0 while −j = I and so −j posts prices according to σ−j0 in period 0 and
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σ−j,1 beginning in period 1. Therefore j’s present discounted payoffs are just
Euj0(σ
−j
0 , p
j,1, σ−j,1) = βEuj1(p
j,1, σ−j,1,m1),
with m1 = (mI1,ms).
2.2.2 Equilibrium
The solution concept used here is subgame perfection. That is, at every period
the sellers maximize the present value of expected profits.
Definition 2.1. An equilibrium is a set of strategy profiles {(σIt , σEt )}t=0,1,2
where σjt : [0, 1] × [0, 1] → F+((−∞, 1], [0, 1]), where F+([−∞, 1], [0, 1]) is the
space of cumulative probability distributions on (−∞, 1], such that posting
prices on the support of σjt maximizes the present value of expected profits
Eujt for every t ∈ {0, 1, 2} and j ∈ {I, E}.
In words, an equilibrium is a triple {(σEt , σIt )}t=0,1,3, such that it is present dis-
counted expected profit maximizing for the sellers to post prices in the supports
of these distributions for each period. Since subgame perfection is the solution
concept I characterize the equilibrium by solving it’s last period’s subgame and
work our way by backward induction.
Consider period 2. Let vj2(m2) be the value for a seller j ∈ {I, E} where
m2 = (m
I
2,m
E
2 ). It satisfies:
vj2(m2) = max
p∈(−∞,1)
γj(p, σ−j2 ,m2), (2.11)
wherem2 = (mE2 ,mI2) is the vector of customer bases and σ
−j
2 is the competitor’s
equilibrium price posting strategy.
Let vj0(m0) and v
j
1(m1) the seller’s value function for periods 0 and 1. They
satisfy
vj1(m1) = max
p∈(−∞,1)
γj(p, σ−j1 ,m1) + βE[v2|p, σ−j1 ,m1] (2.12)
vj0(m0) = max
p∈(−∞,1)
γj(p, σ−j0 ,m0) + βE[v1|p, σ−j0 ,m0], (2.13)
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where E[vt+1|p, σ−jt ,mt] is the period t + 1 expected value in subgame perfect
equilibrium considering j posts p,−j posts prices according to σ−jt and the
present pair of customer base measures is mt.
The equilibrium implied by this tie-breaking rule is unique. It is characterized
by the following properties: In the period 0, the incumbent I posts the monopoly
price 1. The entrant enters the market in period 1 and the equilibrium in that
period is characterized by a pair of distributions with the same support but
where the firm with the greatest potential for gain in profits in period 2 will post
prices according to a distribution that is first order stochastically dominated by
the distribution of prices posted by the competing seller. In period 2 the seller
with the largest customer base will post prices that first order stochastically
dominate the prices posted by the smaller seller.
In the next subsections I will explicitly characterize the unique equilibrium.
Since it’s subgame perfect I first characterize the equilibrium in the last subgame
in period 2 and by backward induction characterize the equilibrium in earlier
periods.
2.2.2.1 Period 2
Period 2 is the last period hence the solution concept in the subgame starting
in this period is just the Nash equilibrium where each seller maximizes present
revenues given a pair of customer bases m2 = (mE2 ,mI2) ∈ [0, 1]2, accumulated
from previous periods. Each seller maximizes profits taking in consideration the
state of the market and the competitor’s price posting strategy.
Proposition 2.2. Suppose mE2 ,mI2 ∈ (0, 1). Let h ∈ {E, I} such that mh2 =
max{mE2 ,mI2}. The unique equilibrium in the subgame starting in period 2 is
characterized by:
(i) A pair of distribution of prices {σh2 , σl2} such that
supp(σh2 (m2)) = supp(σ
l
2(m2)) = [p2(m2), 1] (2.14)
where
p
2
(m2) = 1−ml2. (2.15)
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(ii) For a price p in the interior of the support [p
2
, 1] the pair of distributions
satisfies:
σl2(m2, p) =
1
ml2
(
p− p
2
(m2)
p
)
(2.16)
σh2 (m2, p) =
1
mh2
(
p− p
2
(m2)
p
)
, (2.17)
and σh2 (m2) has an atom at 1 with mass 1− m
l
2
mh2
.
Proposition 2.2 states that in the equilibrium of the period 2 the seller with the
largest customer base will post prices according to a distribution that first order
stochastically dominates the distribution posted by the seller with the smaller
customer base (i.e. σh2 (m2, p) < σl2(m2, p),∀p ∈ (p2(m2), 1) if mh2 > ml2). The
economic reasoning underlying this result is that the smaller seller will have
fewer potential customers hence a smaller fraction of the buyers will known the
smaller seller. Therefore, if both sellers are posting prices according to a com-
mon distribution σ, when the large seller raises it’s price the expected decrease
in sales is smaller than for the smaller seller because a smaller proportion of
their potential customers knows the competitor. Therefore, to sustain the equi-
librium by making both sellers indifferent between any two prices on the support
of the distribution each seller posts a different distribution from the other seller
and one distribution will first order stochastically dominates the other. Since
both distributions have the same support and first-order stochastic dominance
doesn’t vanish as p ↑ 1 it is implied that there will be an atom of mass at the
upper bound of the support for one of the distributions.
Proposition 2.2 implies, from equation 2.15 that the profits realized in the 2
period for a seller j with customer base measure mj2 are m
j
2(1−ml2).
Therefore, the 2 period value vj2 satisfies
vj2(m2) = m
j
2(1−min(mj2,m−j2 )). (2.18)
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2.2.2.2 Period 1
The environment in period 1 will be similar to period 2’s with the exception
that sellers will take into account the dynamic gains from posting higher or
lower prices. In this period, if a seller posts lower prices than his competitor
the seller will obtain a larger customer base in period 2. This introduces an
dynamic element that will affect the equilibrium prices.
The gains in future customers from undercutting prices in the present will be
stronger for the smaller seller because the accumulation of new customers is
logistical: If the number of customers who don’t know the seller in period 1 is
higher the growth rate of the customer base from posting lower prices in the
present is also higher.
There are two channels by which that the accumulation of future customers
affect seller’s profits. First, profits depend on the number of potential customers
the seller has. So more potential customers in the future implies in greater
profits. Second, by undercutting the larger seller in period 1 and accumulating a
larger customer base, the smaller seller will increase the intensity of competition
in period 2 by a higher degree than if she posted higher prices than the larger
seller. By accumulating more customer the smaller seller will lower the expected
markup level from the prices posted in equilibrium in the period 2. Therefore,
if the smaller seller undercuts the larger seller in period 1 will imply in lower
equilibrium profit margins for both sellers in the future compared to a situation
where the smaller seller posts higher prices.
The second effect can dominate the first for certain parameter values and make
the entrant, who has the smaller customer-base, to post higher prices than if
the dynamic effect wasn’t present. That is, consider a pair of customer bases
(mI ,mE) with mI > mE at the beginning of a period which might be either
period 1 or 2. In equilibrium seller E might post higher prices in period 1 than
in period 2. And for certain parameter values the seller with a smaller customer
base will post prices according to a distribution that first order stochastically
dominates the distribution of prices posted by the competing seller, which in-
verts the equilibrium outcome in period 2.
Let mj2 be the measure of the customer base of seller j ∈ {E, I} in period 2 if
qj = mj, that is, if j sells to all it’s potential customers. Let mj2 be the measure
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of the customer base of j if qj = mj(1−m−j), that is, the seller j only sells to
the potential customers that do not know the competing seller−j. Clearly, in
period 2 we have only two possible pairs of customer base measures, (mE2 ,mI2)
and (mE2 ,mI2).
Let v¯1(p, σ−j, (mj1,m
−j
1 )) be the first period value of a seller posting p, with a
customer base of measure mj and suppose the competing seller has a customer
base of measure m−j and post prices according to a distribution σ−j. For
non-atomic points of σ−j (which have zero probability of a tie in prices), the
discounted present value satisfies
v¯j1(p, σ
−j ,m1) = p×mj1×(1−m−jσ−j(p))+β[(1−σ−j(p))vj2(mj2,m−j2 )+σj(p)vj2(mj2,m−j2 )].
Let ∆j(m1) be the change in discounted period 2 profits for j normalized by
the current measure of the seller j’s customer base, that is
∆j(m1) =
β
mj1
(vj2(m
j
2,m
−j
2 )− vj2(mj2,m−j2 )).
The assumed tie breaking rule implies that in case of a tie in posted prices the
seller with the highest m−j1 + ∆j(m1) will sell the good with probability one to
the potential customers who also know the competitor. In the case that both
sellers have the same m−j1 + ∆j(m1) then each seller sells the good with the .5
probability if a tie occurs.
I will construct a pair of candidate equilibrium strategies and then I will show
they are an equilibrium and that the equilibrium is unique.
Proposition 2.3. For a pair of customer base measures (mI1,mE1 ) ∈ (0, 1)2 the
unique equilibrium in the subgame beginning in the first period is characterized
by a pair of distributions (σE1 , σI1) posted by E and I respectively, with common
support [p
1
, 1] which satisfies the following properties:
(i) The common support satisfies:
pj(m1) =(1−m−j1 )−∆j(m1), (2.19)
p
1
(m1) = max{pE, pI}.
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(ii) Each of the distributions satisfies:
σj1(m1, p) =
p− p
1
mj1(p+ ∆
−j(m1))
. (2.20)
for p ∈ [p
1
, 1) and for j ∈ {E, I}.
2.2.2.3 Period 0
In the period 0 only seller I is operating in the market. She has a starting
customer base ms. Hence the buyers will always buy from the seller as long as
the price is lower than the reservation price, hence the seller’s profits are just
msp for p ∈ A the quantity sold is equal to ms. The seller’s period zero value
function is, for a p ∈ (−∞, 1]:
vI0(m0) = max
p∈A
ms × p+ βv1(m1),
where
mI1 = (1− δ)ms + Φ(ms, 1−ms). (2.21)
It is easy to see that the equilibrium in this period is for the seller to post the
monopoly price.
We then arrive at the following proposition regarding the characterization of
the equilibrium in this environment:
Theorem 2.1. There is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium and it satisfies
the following conditions
(i) Period 0: Seller I posts a price equal to 1 while seller E is not operating in
the market.
(ii) Period 1: The sellers have a pair of customer base measures (mI1,mE1 ) and
sellers post prices according to Proposition 2.3.
(iii) Period 2: Given a pair of customer base measures (mI2,mE2 ), which can
be (mI2,mE2 ) or (mI2,mE2 ), the seller’s price posting strategy satisfies Proposition
2.2.
Note that if buyers do not exit the market and for a fast enough awareness dif-
fusion, the description of the customer accumulation 2.1 implies that in period
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2 both (mI2,mE2 ) converge to 1. That implies that in period 2 the distribution
of posted prices converges in probability to marginal cost, as in Bertrand com-
petition two firms compete by posting prices attain price equal to marginal cost
in equilibrium. This fact implies the following corollary, which shows that, in
the present environment, that perfect competition can be obtained as the limit
of the non-cooperative equilibria of a sequence of markets.
Corollary 2.1. Suppose that δ = 0, and let {dn} be a sequence of discovery
functions that satisfy limn→∞ dn(x) = 1 for all x ∈ (0, 1]2, then the sequence
of equilibrium price distributions posted by both sellers in period 2 converges in
probability to the marginal cost.
2.2.2.4 Properties of Equilibrium
For this subsection I am assuming that ms and the function Φ are such so that
(1− δ)ms + Φ(ms, 1−ms) > ms is always satisfied. That is, buyers do not exit
the market at a rate so fast that the seller’s customer base cannot grow after
the seller begins operating in the market.
In period 2 the equilibrium is always characterized by the property that the
seller with the larger customer base will post prices according to a distribution
that first order stochastically dominates the distribution of the smaller firm.
Hence, if I, the incumbent seller, is larger than E, the entrant, by period 2 then
I will post higher prices in the period 2.
Both sellers enter the market with the same customer base measure ms and I’s
client base in period 1 will be mI1 = (1−δ)ms+Φ(ms, 1−ms) = mE2 . Therefore
even if E undercuts I in period 1 in period 2, unless the customer base measure
depreciation parameter δ is very large, I’s customer base will grow and hence
will be larger than E’s, that is, in equilibrium mE2 < mI2.
Example 2.1. In any case mE2 < mI2 for customer depreciation parameter δ
that is not very large, equation 2.18 implies that the expected value of period
2’s profits will be v2(m2) = mE2 (1−mE2 ), hence
∆E(m1) = β
(
mI1
mE1
)
(mE2 (1−mE2 )−mE2 (1−mE2 )).
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For example, suppose the matching function Φ satisfies Φ(q, 1 −m) = qα(1 −
m)1−α with α = 2/3, β = .95, δ = .05 and starting customer base measure
ms = .35. Then mI1 and mE2 are both .668 while mI2 = mI2 = 1 and mE2 = .497.
Hence,
∆E(m1) = −.11
∆I(m1) = .24,
so equation 2.19 implies in (pI
1
, pE
1
) = (.408, .439).
Hence, proposition 2.3 implies that E’s distribution of prices will first order
stochastically dominate I’s distribution in period 1 even though I’s customer
base is almost twice as large as E’s. Note that in any equilibrium the sellers will
post asymmetric distribution of prices however the relation of stochastic domi-
nance is not always that the incumbent’s distribution stochastically dominates
the entrant’s.
There are two channels that generate heterogeneity in the price posting strate-
gies in this model. First, there is the static channel: the seller with with smaller
customer base will have a more elastic demand for it’s product. Second, the
dynamic effect, which is the channel through the seller’s future customer base
alters the future equilibrium price distributions. This dynamic effect can have
a positive or negative effect on the prices posted in the present equilibrium. On
one hand, firms in the present have the incentive to post lower prices to increase
their customer base and hence profits in the future. On the other hand, if sell-
ers post a lower price in the present which entails a higher customer base in
the future which could increase competition and lower future prices and hence
future profit margins.
This negative effect can dominate the positive effect and imply in a positive
effect on prices posted by the entrant in the period 1. That is, entrants post
higher prices than they would otherwise to not accumulate too many potential
new customers and increase the intensity of competition in the future. Under
certain parameters (as shown in example 2.1) the positive dynamic effect of
present prices can even overcome the static effect in equilibrium which implies
that the entrant will post higher prices than the incumbent in the first period.
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Hence, when the dynamic channel is taken into consideration the entrant seller
does not always posts a distribution of prices that is first order stochastically
dominated by the distribution posted by the incumbent seller.
There is an important assumption that makes this dynamic competition channel
on prices significant. It is the assumption that each seller has a significant share
of the total awareness. If sellers can attain a significant share of the awareness
their customer accumulation dynamics will substantially affect the future prices
posted in the equilibrium. It’s simple to verify that if the entrant’s initial
customer base is small relative to the total measure of buyers then it’s price
posting strategy will be first order stochastically dominated by the incumbent
for both period 1 and 2.
It’s seems to be a trivial conjecture that in an environment where individual
sellers customer bases consist of small share of the market the seller’s effect on
the market’s aggregate distribution of prices will be small. In addition, studying
a market with a large number of sellers might provide interesting insights re-
garding the assumptions required for the aggregate distribution of prices posted
in equilibrium to approximate the distributions of prices observed in Kaplan
and Menzio (2015). In a related paper (Guthmann (2019) [36]) I show that
when we have a large number of sellers the sellers that have been operating
in the market for a smaller amount of time will always post lower prices than
the veteran sellers and that under reasonable assumptions the density of the
distribution of posted prices for transactions in the market is continuous and
approximately symmetric.
2.3 Extensions
2.3.1 Extension: Exogenous awareness process
In the previous sections I assumed that awareness of a seller evolves according
to a random matching process between buyers who are unaware and buyers who
are active customers of the seller. Following Luttmer (2006) and Perla (2017),
here I postulate a customer accumulation process where all buyers who know
the seller randomly meet and tell other buyers about the seller. With such type
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of contagion process it’s relatively simple to compute the value functions and
the equilibrium strategies in this environment. The equilibrium price posting
strategies are the same as in period 2 of the finitely many periods environment
as the evolution of the seller customer bases does not depend on the current
price posting strategy.
Given a pair of customer bases m = (mI ,mE) ∈ [0, 2]2. The buyers who are
unaware of seller j match with buyers who are aware of j according to the
matching function Φ(1−mj,mj), where 1−mj is the population of buyers who
are unaware of seller j and mj is the population of buyers aware of seller j. The
customer base measure evolves according to the law of motion:
mj+ = (1− δ)mj + Φ(mj, 1−mj). (2.22)
The seller’s future customer base does not vary relative to the price posted in the
present. Hence the seller’s equal profit condition can be written with just the
current profits. To construct the equilibrium I first construct a pair of candidate
supports for the equilibrium strategies. Let [pj(m), pj(m)] for j ∈ {I, E} be a
candidate support with pj(m) = 1 for each j ∈ {I, E} and pair of client bases
m. For each seller j, let the lower bound pj satisfy the following equal profit
condition:
mj × pj(m) = mj × 1× (1−mj).
Let p(m) = max{pI(m), pE(m)} and let σ−j(m) be a −j price posting distri-
bution when the pair of customer bases is m, then the equal profit condition
satisfies:
mj × p× (1− σ−j(m)m−j) = mj × p(m).
This equal profit condition is identical to the equal profit condition of the period
2 in the finite horizon model 5.1 and hence the equilibrium distribution of prices
is identical.
The seller’s value functions satisfies for p ∈ [p(m), p(m)],
vj(m) = γj(p, σ−j(m),m) + βvj(m+) = p(m)×mj + βv(m+),
where m+ is the next period pair of customer bases measures implied by the
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law of motion for customer accumulation 2.22.
2.3.2 Extension: Advertising
Instead of assuming that awareness diffuses across decision makers through ran-
dom contagion or through an exogenous awareness process here I assume aware-
ness of seller j among buyers expands due to advertising efforts made by the
seller. Customer accumulation occurs due to advertising activities, and are not
affected by the magnitude of present sales, hence there is no change in intertem-
poral payoffs from changing prices posted in the present. Therefore, in this case
the equilibrium price posting strategies are also the same as in period 2 of the
finitely many periods environment.
Let Aj ≥ 0 be the expenditures on advertising, they discovery of the seller by
buyers is a function ΦA of the expenditures on advertising Aj and population
of buyers who don’t know the seller 1 − mj. I assume that ΦA is monotone
increasing in both arguments and satisfies constant returns to scale. Therefore
the law of motion for the customer bases satisfies
mj+ = (1− δ)mj + ΦA(Aj, 1−mj).
With advertising the seller’s problem becomes
vj(m) = max
p,Aj
γj(p, σ−j,m) + βvj(m+(Aj, A−j))− Aj.
The FOC for the seller’s advertising is
β
∂vj
∂mj+
∂mj+
∂Aj
= 1.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
This is a study of a market for a homogeneous perishable good characterized by
identical buyers and ex-ante identical sellers. The sellers are only differentiated
by the size of their customer base measures which evolve over time thanks to
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diffusion of knowledge about the sellers through a random matching mechanism
between informed and uninformed buyers. I have succeeded in computing the
equilibrium and showing it is unique. The unique equilibrium is characterized by
the following two features: dispersion of prices for transactions and asymmetric
price posting strategies with one of the sellers posting higher expected prices
than the other seller, this typically being the incumbent seller.
The finite horizon environment has three periods in order to exhibit all dynamic
channels that affect the equilibrium. The first channel is the static competition
involving price dispersion in the equilibrium of the period 2. The second channel
is the inclusion for the dynamic effects of prices posting policies when we have
competition between sellers that occurs in the period 1. Thirdly, to include
incumbent sellers and entrant sellers in the model I include period 0 and assume
that one seller, I enters the market in period 0 while E enters the market in
period 1.
I show that it is possible to find an equilibrium in this environment that features
mixed pricing strategies. In equilibrium, the price posting strategy of the in-
cumbent seller can first order stochastically dominate the price posting strategy
of entering sellers but the inverse can occur as well if the effects of the second
channel are strong enough. The smaller seller will post higher prices to not grow
too much in the future as that will reduce future profits due to the increased
intensity of competition.
Chapter 3
Price dispersion in dynamic
equilibrium
3.1 Introduction
In the textbook model of perfect competition each decision maker of the econ-
omy has access to the same linear price vector that allows him or her to trade
any quantity of goods desired at fixed prices, which are equal to the marginal
costs of production. The current state of the empirical evidence paints a very
distinct picture in product markets: There exists substantial dispersion in the
prices for transactions of identical goods 1. After entering a market, sellers
slowly accumulate demand for their product and as a result prices for transac-
tions with incumbent sellers tend to be higher than with entrants 2. Further,
markups over marginal cost are substantial, and in a given a product category,
average markups tend to decline over time 3. This chapter develops a theory of
dynamic industry pricing that explains these deviations from competitive con-
ditions as results from a single fundamental friction and it nests the model of
perfect competition as its frictionless limit.
Standard models of equilibrium price dispersion in product markets (as in Bur-
dett and Judd (1983) [5] and Stahl (1989) [72]) feature symmetric price posting
1Sorensen (2000) [71].
2Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008,2016) [24, 25].
3De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018) [10], Perla (2017) [63].
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strategies for all sellers and a cross-sectional distribution of prices posted with
a strictly decreasing density. In the data, price posting depends on the seller’s
market experience and the cross-sectional distribution of prices is roughly sym-
metric around the mode (see Kaplan and Menzio (2015) [48]). Fitting the
predictions of such models to the empirical data on price dispersion can only be
made using implicit assumptions of product heterogeneity, such as postulating
that buyers assign different reservation prices to the good if purchased from
different sellers.4
There are directed search models that do explain why incumbent sellers post
higher prices than entrants (such as Paciello, Pozzi and Trachter (2019) [62] and
Gilbukh and Roldan (2018) [32]). But these models do not feature price disper-
sion at the firm level and do not allow for customers to accumulate information
about the sellers over time. As a result, this class of models cannot explain how
average markups in a product category can be decreasing over time while the
average age (measured as time since entry) of sellers operating in the market is
increasing.
The model of dynamic price formation presented here is essentially a dynamic
version of Burdett and Judd (1983) [5] based on a novel theoretical approach
to customer-capital accumulation. I consider a product market for a single in-
divisible good populated by a continuum of buyers and sellers. Buyers have
imperfect awareness of the sellers, that is, each buyer is aware of only a subset
of the sellers from which she can purchase the good. Over time the buyers gain
awareness of additional sellers through a process of word of mouth contagion:
a matching process between the customers of the seller and buyers who are un-
aware of the seller. Past sales activity of a seller determines the evolution of its
customer base. The model’s equilibrium features price dispersion, with mixed
pricing strategies for all sellers, where incumbent sellers post higher prices than
entrants. In equilibrium, the cross-sectional distribution of prices for transac-
tions closely approximates the form of the price dispersion observed in the data.
As in Paciello, Pozzi and Trachter (2019) [62], incumbents have incentives to
extract higher surplus from their customers while entrants have lower customer
4Some authors explain this assumption of heterogeneity by using the concept of “ameni-
ties” provided by individual sellers, which can be used to explain different average levels of
expensiveness of different sellers (see, e.g., Sorensen (2000) [71] and Kaplan and Menzio (2016)
[49]).
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base and so they post lower prices to increase their customer-capital. In equi-
librium, the average distribution of prices for transactions is characterized by
declining markups as the product market matures. That is because, the average
customer base of the sellers is increasing over time and so awareness of different
sellers by their customers is also increasing, which implies that the intensity of
competition is increasing over time.
3.1.1 Summary of contributions
There exists a well-developed literature of random matching and bargaining
games that provide noncooperative foundations for perfectly competitive equi-
librium 5, but this literature is not primarily concerned with explaining the ob-
served deviations from competitive conditions, instead they ask if competitive
equilibrium arises as the limit of the set of equilibria in a sequence of noncoop-
erative games as frictions are reduced to zero. In this article, I am concerned
both with convergence to perfect competition in noncooperative games and to
explain how these deviations observed in the data can arise in equilibrium.
This study considers a product market for a single good. There is a contin-
uum population of buyers and sellers. Buyers are infinitely lived, and sellers
randomly exit the market at each period and are replaced by entering sellers.
All buyers have identical reservation price for the good and all sellers have the
same constant returns to scale production technology. Buyers have unit demand
for the perishable good at each period and at a point in time they might be
aware only of a subset of the sellers. I call the population of buyers who are
aware of a particular seller that seller’s customer base. Over time sellers expand
their customer base through their sales activity while buyers gain awareness of
additional sellers.
Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008,2016) [24, 25] use the term ‘demand
accumulation by doing’ to mean the effect of past sales activity on the present
demand for a seller’s product, as opposed to ‘demand accumulation by being’,
5E.g., Novshek (1985) [61], Rubinstein Wolinski (1985) [66], Gale (1987, 2000) [29, 30],
Lauermann (2013) [51] and more recently Lauermann et. al. (2018) [52]. For a more specific
example, Duffie et. al. (2005) [19] proves convergence to Walrasian equilibrium for over
the counter markets while providing broad analysis of the effects of market frictions on the
model’s equilibrium.
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which represents the accumulation of demand due to the continued presence
of the seller in the market. They show that seller’s ‘demand accumulation by
doing’ is the dominant factor in customer-capital accumulation. This assertion
is also corroborated by studies in the marketing literature such Trusov et. al.
(2009) [74]. The customer-capital accumulation mechanism used here is similar
to the mechanism used in other studies such as Luttmer (2006) [54] and Perla
(2017) [63] but in this study the seller’s previous sales activity directly influences
the awareness process (that is, the diffusion of information regarding sellers in
a product market among the buyers in the market) to incorporate the empirical
finding of FHS that what they call seller’s ‘demand accumulation by doing’ is
the dominant factor in customer-capital accumulation.
The particular trading mechanism that is used in this study proceeds as follows:
At each period sellers choose which prices to post and buyers choose whether
to purchase the good among the set of sellers that they are aware off. I only
examine rational expectations symmetric Markov perfect equilibria where sellers
know the distribution of the number of other sellers that their customers might
know. Sellers choose prices to post as to maximize expected discounted lifetime
profits at every period and the sellers price posting strategies are symmetric for
sellers with the same customer base size.
In this model sellers have access to more information than buyers. Buyers
only observe the vector of prices among the sellers that they know (a subset of
measure zero of the sellers in the market) while sellers know the distribution of
seller’s customer bases across the whole market as well as their price posting
strategies. Still, I find it is a reasonable assumption to suppose that firms
in an industry know more about their competitors than their customers do.
As done in a search model in Lauermann et. al. (2018) [52], an interesting
avenue for further research is, assuming that upon entry that sellers do not know
the population and the distribution of customer bases of competitors operating
in the market, to describe the equilibrium evolution of their beliefs, and the
resulting allocation and prices.
I demonstrate that the model’s equilibrium is unique. It is characterized by
price dispersion as the sellers randomize the prices they post (as in Burdett and
Judd (1983) [5]) and the distribution of prices posted depends on the seller’s
customer base: sellers with larger customer bases post prices according to a
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distribution that always first order stochastically dominates the distribution of
prices posted by the sellers with smaller customer bases. Well established incum-
bents post higher prices because the scope for further growth in their customer
bases is smaller than for entering sellers, instead they focus on maximizing cur-
rent profits while entering sellers with smaller customer bases focus on growing
their customer base by posting lower prices which will entail higher sales and
hence, higher profits in the future. Finally, I show that the non-steady-state
equilibrium converges to the steady-state equilibrium as the number of trading
periods converges to infinity.
This study describes several equilibrium properties of the model. I show that
any symmetric equilibrium is constrained efficient in the sense that equilibrium
strategies maximize aggregate surplus among feasible allocations at each period
(as Gilbukh and Roldan (2018) [32], this model can also be interpreted as a
theory of efficient markups). It is shown that the average markup for trans-
actions is strictly decreasing over time in the non-steady-state equilibrium as
it converges to the steady-state. Finally, it is shown that as market frictions
vanish the distribution of prices for transactions in the steady-state equilib-
rium converges weakly in probability to the competitive price. In addition, the
model is extended with free entry of sellers: the population of sellers is mono-
tone decreasing on the cost of entry and hence there is a unique steady-state
equilibrium for each entry cost. As the entry cost decreases the steady-state
equilibrium approximates the perfectly competitive equilibrium.
I also perform quantitative analysis of the model to see how substantial its
predictions are when its parameters are calibrated to match moments found in
empirical studies. The model predicts that from the date of its creation a prod-
uct market for a physically identical good takes several decades to converge to
it’s steady-state, where it more closely approximates the conditions of perfect
competition. Even in it’s steady-state the equilibrium still features significant
deviations from competitive conditions with price dispersion and substantial
markups. The distribution of prices for transactions converges to a distribution
that is roughly symmetric around the mode which replicates the data, while
other models do not exhibit that property without the addition of specific as-
sumptions. The average markup for transactions in a industry starts at ca.
110% above marginal cost when the industry has just been created and they
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slowly decrease as the industry converges to its steady-state. Yet, in the steady-
state of the industry, after a convergence process that takes over 50 years, the
model still predicts average markups at 40% above marginal cost in market for
a homogeneous good with a continuum of identical buyers and sellers.
For comparison, De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018) [10] estimate the average
global markups in 2016 at 59% above marginal cost, De Loecker et al (2018) [11]
estimate then at 61% for the US in 2016. According to Perla (2017) the median
industry age in the US is a little less than 20 years, which implies in average
markup of 60% in the equilibrium of the calibrated model for an industry aged
at 20 years. This means that this model can replicate the substantial markups
observed in the data through this single friction. De Loecker et al (2018) [11]
also argue that markups in the US have increased substantially since 1980. This
increase in average markups can be explained by this model as being due to
increase in frequency of product creation and, hence, a lowering in the average
age of product markets, a point also made in Perla (2017) [63], in addition to an
increase in market-frictions (which can be represented in the model as increasing
costs of entry, which is consistent with the reported decrease in entrepreneurship
rates in the US economy). Finally, this study has an important normative
implication. It implies that the positive level of markups found in the data does
not imply that there is inefficiency: given the existence of frictions, markets
will always feature prices that deviate from marginal cost but they still can be
efficient relative to the set of feasible allocations.
3.1.2 Related literature
A recent empirical literature has argued that product markets are characterized
by the following features: (1) There exists significant dispersion in the prices
for transactions for physically identical goods over a small period of time in
a geographical area. (2) The distribution of prices for transactions tends to
be approximately symmetric and leptokurtic. (3) A substantial fraction of the
variance in prices (ca. 45%) is due to transactions involving the same seller. (4)
When a seller enters a market the demand for his or her product grows slowly,
and it takes a long time for the gap to close relative to the seller’s more mature
competitors. (5) Active demand accumulation driven by seller’s past supply
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decisions quantitatively dominates passive demand accumulation. (6) Entrant
sellers also typically post lower prices than well-established competitors. (7)
In an industry, the growth rate of a seller tends to decline with the size of the
seller’s sales. (8) Finally, product markets tend to exhibit higher markups when
the respective product category has been recently introduced and markups tend
to decline over time as the market matures.6
Kaplan and Menzio (2015) [48] studies the shape and structure of the distri-
bution of prices at which an identical good is sold in a given market and time
period. They conclude that the distribution of prices for transactions is approx-
imately symmetric and leptokurtic, and only 10% of the variation in prices is
due to variation in the expensiveness of the stores at which a good is sold while
90% is due in approximately equal parts, first, to variation in the average price
of a good sold across equally expensive stores and, second, due to variation in
prices of a good sold across transactions in the same store. In addition, Gilbukh
and Roldan (2018) [32] have found that across all stores selling the good at the
week and geographical market of interest the standard deviation of prices at the
barcode level is 15.7% of the average price. Corroborating this evidence, using
a different source, Kaplan et al (2016) [50] find that the standard deviation of
prices is 15.3% of the average price for the same good in the same week and
market.
There is a recent empirical literature tying productivity to firm survival by ex-
plicitly accounting for demand side effects (Das et. al. (2007) [8], Eslava et. al.
(2008) [21], Foster et. al. (2008) [24], Roberts et. al. (2011) [64], De Loecker
and Goldberg (2014) [12] and Foster et. al. (2016) [25] are examples of this ap-
proach). Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008,2016) have studied US census
data of industries for physically identical goods where they observe producer-
level quantities and prices separately. They found that in markets for physically
identical goods entrant producers charge lower prices than incumbents. They
also found that entering producers have slightly higher physical productivity
and hence slightly lower marginal costs than incumbent firms. They conclude
that the role of demand variation in explaining plant size is paramount in in-
6(1) is reported in many studies, Sorensen (2000) [71] for example, (2) and (3) are reported
in Kaplan and Menzio (2015) [48], (4), (5) and (6) are presented in Foster, Haltiwanger and
Syverson (2008,2016) [24, 25], (7) are presented in Almus, Nerlinger (2000) [1], Yatsuda (2005)
[75], Perla (2017) shows evidence for (8).
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dustries with physically homogeneous products, where one would expect that
demand variation would be of smaller consideration than in industries with
highly differentiated products.
These empirical findings challenge the underlying assumptions and many of the
implications of the theoretical literature inspired by the seminal studies of Jo-
vanovich (1982) [47] and Hopenhayn (1992) [43] which explain firm selection
on the basis of differences in productivity (for more recent examples, refer to
Melitz (2003) [56] and Asplund and Nocke (2006) [2]). In these studies, price
dispersion for identical products does not exist and hence differences in pro-
ductivity among industry producers can be measured solely by input costs and
revenues. However, later empirical studies have shown that there exists substan-
tial variation in prices posted by different firms in the same industry, so revenue
measures of productivity will differ from physical measures of productivity (see
Haltiwanger (2016) [37]).
Perla (2017) [63] provides evidence that, as an industry ages, it’s markups tend
to decline over time. He argues that when a new product category is introduced,
the firms have small absolute demand but high markups. Over time competition
intensifies and markups are driven to razor thin margins and simultaneously
market concentration increases. That study assumes frictions in the consumer’s
choice sets for new products to explain firm growth, industry life cycle, and
aggregate profits. Consumers are aware of a fraction of the products and hence
have incomplete choice sets in a given product category. The model replicates
the empirical finding that average markups decrease as industries age while the
industry concentration increases. I also borrowed from Perla the use of term
“awareness” in this dissertation.
Theoretically, the model described in this study is also related to search models
that feature equilibrium with price dispersion generated by randomized price
posting strategies. These include the aforementioned Burdett and Judd (1983)
and Stahl (1989) [72] seminal contributions and more recently by Menzio and
Trachter (2015) [57]. The studies of Head et. al. (2012) [41], Kaplan and
Menzio (2016) [49], Kaplan et. al. (2016) [50] and Burdett and Menzio (2018)
[6] represent some recent applications of such models.
Paciello, Pozzi and Trachter (2019) [62] and Gilbukh and Roldan (2018) [32]
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have also studied a model of customer-capital accumulation using a search
framework. In both studies, buyers can either be matched to one seller or
be searching for a seller. While this study allows buyers to trade with multiple
sellers simultaneously. In Gilbukh and Roldan (2018), their equilibrium yields
that the price a seller posts increases with firm’s customer-capital. A result that
this study also replicates.
There are important differences from the previous literature on equilibrium
price dispersion in that this study incorporates dynamic considerations through
a distinct mechanism of information diffusion. These differences lead to novel
equilibrium results. In this study awareness regarding the sellers is diffused
through buyers through a random matching process between customers (who
are the buyers who are aware of a particular seller) and uniformed buyers.
The customer accumulation mechanism I use in this study has some parallels
with Luttmer (2006) [54], who uses consumer search to understand firm growth
dynamics.
The use of the expression “buyer awareness of the sellers” borrows from the
theoretical literature on unawareness (Modica and Rustichini (1994,1999) [58,
59], Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (1998), [15], Heifetz, Meier and Shipper
(2006) [42], Li (2009) [53] and Galanis (2013) [26]). Conventional decision theory
under uncertainty interprets uncertainty to mean ignorance about the particular
realization of the state of the world but it assumes that the description of the
world in the mind of the decision makers is complete. Unawareness means
ignorance regarding the state space itself. In this study stating that the buyers
are unaware of all sellers means that they do not known all sellers and don’t
know that they don’t know them. Hence, the discovery of additional sellers by
the buyers is not the outcome of a conscious decision to search but exogenous to
the buyer’s decisions. The practical implication of buyers being unaware of the
sellers is that it justifies the assumption of the buyer’s search for sellers being
exogenous 7 as the buyers are not aware that the description of the market they
have in their minds is incomplete. Instead of expressing the discovery of the
sellers by the buyers as a result of conscious search effort here it is assumed
that the past sales activity of the sellers are the main drivers in the diffusion
7Which is commonly made in many studies, e.g., Fishman and Rob (2003, 2005) [22, 23]
and the aforementioned Kaplan and Menzio (2016) [49] and Burdett and Menzio (2018) .
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of awareness about the sellers among the buyers. The assumption of exogenous
search is consistent with the empirical literature on demand accumulation by
the sellers.
Another contribution to understanding search as being partly expansion of
awareness of the decision makers instead of being fully controlled by conscious
decisions is that it solves Diamond’s (1971) [16] paradox in an elegant manner.
Diamond’s paradox is the conclusion that, in a simple price posting sequential
search model, if search costs are strictly greater than zero the equilibrium will
feature monopoly pricing. In equilibrium all sellers will post monopoly price
and buyers will only search for one seller. If sellers posted lower prices than
the monopoly price the other sellers would find optimal to deviate by posting
higher prices than the market average but still low enough to keep their cus-
tomers from searching for additional sellers. But, if search costs are equal to
zero, then buyers search for many sellers and Bertrand competition holds which
implies that equilibrium is competitive. That is, equilibrium prices move dis-
continuously from monopoly price to competitive price as search costs converge
to zero. Instead, if we relax the assumption that buyers have full control of their
search activity then even if buyers don’t choose to search more than one seller
some of them end up discovering multiple sellers. In this case, even with strictly
positive search costs, there is no discontinuity in the equilibrium as search costs
converge to zero.
3.1.3 Paper organization
The description of the formal model beings in section 3.2 which describes the en-
vironment of the model. Section 3.3 describes the game and the Markov perfect
solution concept used by this model. Section 3.4 contains the existence proof
for equilibrium and subsection 3.4.1 characterizes the properties of the unique
symmetric steady-state equilibrium. In subsection 3.4.2 I construct an equilib-
rium outside of the steady-state that converges to the steady-state equilibrium.
In section 3.5 I show that the equilibrium is efficient, that the equilibrium con-
verges to a steady-state and I describe and prove a set of sufficient conditions
for the equilibrium in steady-state to converge to perfect competition. Section
3.6 presents a quantitative analysis of the model. Section 3.7.1 discusses an ex-
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tension for the model to incorporate endogenous entry of sellers. While section
3.8 presents concluding remarks.
3.2 Environment
3.2.1 Physical environment
Consider a market for a single, indivisible and perishable good. Time is discrete
with periods indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. There is a continuum of buyers and
sellers in the market. Let I be the set of buyers and J be the set of sellers. Both
sets are represented by closed unit intervals with Lebesgue measure (naturally)
of 1. At each period each buyer i ∈ I has unit demand for the good and
reservation price equal to 1. At any period each seller j ∈ J can produce any
quantity q ∈ R+ of the good with constant marginal cost which is normalized
to 0.
Buyers have imperfect awareness of the sellers: at a given period t, an individual
buyer i ∈ I can only be aware of a finite subset of the sellers, with cardinality
k ∈ N ∪ {0}, from which she can purchase the good. Let pikt ∈ [0, 1] be the
measure (or fraction, as the set of buyers is measure 1) of the buyers aware of
k different sellers. The seller awareness profile {pikt }∞k=0 satisfies
∑∞
k=0 pi
k
t = 1.
Let cjt ∈ [0, c] be the size of j’s customer base which represents the population
of buyers who are aware of seller j ∈ J in period t. This population is bounded
above by c. 8
Let cˆt be the average customer base of all sellers in period t, that is,
cˆt =
∫ 1
0
cjtdj. (3.1)
8Which represents the idea that demand accumulation by a seller is bounded. Note that
without this condition the customer base of an individual seller would be unbounded since
individual sellers have zero weight on the average customer base of all sellers.
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I assume the following consistency condition9
cˆt =
∑
k
kpikt . (3.2)
Equation 3.2 states that the average number of customers of the sellers cˆt is
equal to the average number of sellers that the customers know
∑
k kpi
k
t . This
condition is satisfied in a finite economy when the number of buyers and sellers
is the same: with ns ∈ N sellers and nb ∈ N buyers, if each seller has on average
cˆ ∈ R+ customers then each buyer is aware of cˆns/nb sellers. The state of the
market in period t is described as a pair ({cjt}j∈J , {pikt }∞k=0), profile of customer
bases {cjt}j∈J and a profile of buyer populations by number of sellers that they
are aware of {pikt }∞k=0, that satisfy the consistency condition 3.2.
In subsection 3.2.3 I construct the random matching mechanism between buyers
and sellers that satisfies the consistency condition 3.2. The mechanism yields a
unique awareness profile {pikt }∞k=0 from the profile of customer bases {cjt}j∈J and
{pikt }k distributed according to a Poisson with parameter cˆt (so that in period t
the distribution of {pikt }k is generated by a Poisson process where buyers discover
sellers at arrival rate cˆt/t as in Diamond (1987) [17]). That is, the higher the
average number of customers is the higher is the expected number of sellers that
buyers know, hence, cˆt is a measure of the degree of market friction.
At each period a fraction α of sellers exits the market and are replaced by
new sellers, keeping the seller population constant at 1 while buyers stay in the
market forever. When a new seller enters the market it’s starting customer base
size is c ∈ (0, c). I assume all sellers in period 0 have customer base of zero.
At period 1 the product market is “created” and the first cohort of sellers with
non-zero customer base enters the market, replacing a population α of sellers
with customer base 0. In period t there will be t seller cohorts {J1t , J2t , . . . , J tt}
of ages {1, . . . , t} with non-zero customer bases, as described in table 3.1 for an
example of 5 periods.
9Note that each seller j customer base is an infinitesimal fraction of all customer bases
in the market as there is a continuum of sellers, so each individual cjt does not affect pikt .
Therefore, cjt represents the “density” of buyers which have j in their choice sets.
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Cohorts operating
Date age = 1 2 3 4 5
1 J11
2 J12 J22
3 J13 J23 J33
4 J14 J24 J34 J44
5 J15 J25 J35 J45 J55
Table 3.1: Seller cohorts over 5 periods
Seller’s exit rates is constant at α. As a measure α of new sellers enter, therefore,
in a period t the measure of sellers of age a ∈ {1, . . . , t}10, is
na = α(1− α)a−1. (3.3)
Therefore, for t→∞ the population of sellers of ages a ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .} converges
to na for each “age” a ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .}, and the population of sellers is in a steady-
state.
3.2.2 Dynamics of seller’s customer bases
The customer base cjt is a variable of seller j’s demand, the assumption that c
j
t
represents a continuum of customers allows both seller demand and the evolution
of customer bases to be deterministic. That is, if each seller has a large number
of customers and if the customers purchase with some probability ι then by
the Law of Large Numbers there will be a deterministic quantity qjt = ιc
j
t of
purchases from seller j in period t.
This subsection introduces a law of motion for customer accumulation that
determines the growth of a seller’s customer base by the current sales of the
seller, its customer base size and the degree of market congestion (represented
here by the average size of the seller’s customer bases). I assume that customers
of a buyer retain the memory of the seller they discovered in the past and can
shop there as long as the seller is operating in the market hence cjt+1 ≥ cjt if
j doesn’t exit, when the seller exits it is replaced by a new seller who starts
10Age is what I call the total number of periods that the seller has been operating in the
market.
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with a customer base size c. Hence, the seller’s customer base follows the law
of motion
cjt+1 =
c
j
t + Φ(q
j
t , c− cjt) if j doesn’t exit at t+ 1
c if j exits and is replaced,
(3.4)
where Φ : R+ × [0, c] → R+ is a awareness diffusion function that specifies the
population of buyers who discovers a seller in a given period. Φ is a function of
the seller’s sales qjt , the size of his or her customer base c
j
t . Note also that c
j
t+1
is bounded above by c, the upper bound in the customer base size.
The customer-capital accumulation function Φ satisfies the following assump-
tions:
Assumption (1). Φ is non-decreasing in qjt and c−cjt and satisfies Φ(qjt , c−cjt) > 0
for cjt ∈ (0, c) and qjt ∈ (0, cjt).
Assumption (2). Φ is strictly increasing and strictly concave in qjt and concave
in c− cjt .
Assumption (3). For any cˆ ∈ [0, c], any c ∈ [0, c) and q ∈ [0, c], Φ(q, c − c) <
(c− c).
The first condition states that as the number of customers who purchase from
the seller 11 in the current period increases the number of people who became
aware of the seller in the next period increases. That represents the “word
of mouth” between buyers who are aware of the sellers and the buyers who
are not (as in Fishman and Rob (2003,2005) [23, 22] buyers learn about the
seller through word of mouth). The second condition states that the scope for
increase in the seller’s customer base has diminishing returns on the quantity
sold and is reduced when the seller’s customer base is larger, that is, the larger
the seller already is, the smaller is the number of new customers he or she can
acquire. This is consistent with the empirical evidence that small firms grow
faster than larger ones. 12 Finally, the third condition states that the upper
bound of customer base is never reached. This last condition is imposed to keep
the equilibrium unique, but it’s not required for existence as it is not satisfied
in the calibration of the model in quantitative analysis section 3.6.
11Which is the same as the quantity sold since individual buyers have unit demand.
12See, e.g., Caves (1998) [7] and Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007) [65].
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To construct a matching process that microfounds the customer accumulation
function Φ consider the interval [0, c] that represents the population of buyers
who can become aware of seller j. Let cjt ∈ (0, c) and qjt ∈ (0, cjt ]. As buyers
have unit demand for the good the quantity sold by the seller is the same as
the population of buyers who decide to purchase from j. The population who is
not aware of the seller is a set of buyers of measure c− cjt . Consider a matching
process where buyers who do not know j randomly meet customers of j who
just purchased from j and then become aware of j through word of mouth (as
in Fishman and Rob (2005) [23]). Suppose the probability that a buyer i who
is not aware of j meets a customer is a strictly increasing and concave function
f(qjt ) ∈ [0, 1] of the number of customers of j. Then the measure of buyers in
[cjt , c] who meet customers who purchased the good from j is described by a
logistical matching function
µ(f(qjt ), c− cjt) = (c− cjt)f(qjt ),
which is concave and strictly increasing on both arguments, and f satisfies
f(qjt ) < 1 for all q ∈ [0, c). Let Φ be Φ(qjt , c − cjt) = µ(f(qjt ), c − cjt), then it is
easy to see that Φ satisfies assumptions (1)-(3).
Example 3.1. Consider f with functional form
f(qjt ) = A
(
qjt/c
)ζ
, (3.5)
where A ∈ (0, 1), ζ ∈ (0, 1). Assumptions (1) and (2) are trivially meet. Note
that qjt ∈ [0, cjt ] hence qjt < c if cjt < c, therefore
(
qjt/c
)ζ
< 1 and hence
µ(qjt , c − cjt) < (c − cjt). Therefore Φ(qjt , c − cjt) = µ(f(qjt ), c − cjt) described by
3.5 satisfies assumption (3).
3.2.3 Distribution of buyer’s awareness
Subsection 3.2.2 described the determination of the evolution of the seller’s
customer base profile. In this subsection, from the sellers customer base profile
I construct a random matching mechanism that determines the degree in which
customer bases of different sellers overlap, which yields the buyer’s awareness
profile {pikt }k. That is, it determines the probability customers of a seller also
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know k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} other sellers from the average customer base size of the
sellers.13
To provide a description of the matching process that yields a unique awareness
profile from the profile of customer bases in the environment with a continuum
of buyers and sellers I consider an environment with finitely many buyers and
sellers and replicate it, postulating that its properties at the limit to hold in
the continuum. Let I and J be the sets of buyers and sellers and nb, ns ∈ N be
the number of buyers and sellers, respectively. Consider a vector (cjt)n
s
j=1 that
represents a customer base profile which assigns a value cjt ∈ N ∪ {0} for each
seller j ∈ {1, . . . , ns}, let cˆt =
∑ns
j=1 c
j
t/n
s and consider the matching process
described as follows.
Let ν be a positive integer such that
νnb >
ns∑
j=1
cjt .
Consider a ν-replica of the market with set of buyers Iν with νnb buyers and a
set of sellers Jv with νns sellers. Jv consists of ν identical replicas {J1, . . . , Jν}
of J (in the sense that the profile of customer bases of the sellers in each subset
is {cjt}nsj=1).
Consider a matching process with ν rounds. In each round n ∈ {1, . . . , ν}, as
each seller j ∈ Jn is matched with cjt buyers. Each seller in Jn in sequential order
takes a simple random sample of cjt buyers from the set of buyers Iν without
replacement. Hence, in each round buyers can match with at most one seller
and therefore the sellers of subset Jn are matched with
∑ns
j=1 c
j
t different buyers
among the νnb buyers.
More formally, let Sν be the set of states that specifies a state for each profile of
customer bases {Cjt }j∈Jν drawn by the set of sellers Jν . Let m : Iν×Jν×Sν →
{0, 1} be a matching function (as in Duffie and Sun (2012) [20]) where for each
seller j ∈ Jn, m(i, j, s) ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether buyer i and seller j were
13This mechanism shares similarities with Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007,2008) [67, 68]
in being a multilateral matching procedure that is characterized by one side of the market
being matched with a deterministic number of individuals from the other side while the
number of agents matched to each agent in the other side is stochastic and follows a Poisson
distribution.
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matched in round n if state s is realized (with 0 not matched and 1 if matched).
The matching function m satisfies for every state s ∈ Sν , for each n ∈ {1, . . . , ν}
and j ∈ Jn, that ∑
i∈Iν
m(i, j, s) = cjt , (3.6)
and for every i ∈ Iν and n ∈ {1, . . . , ν},∑
j∈Jn
m(i, j, s) ∈ {0, 1}. (3.7)
Consider the probability space (Sν ,Sν , Pν) where Sν is a σ-algebra on the set
of states Sν and Pν is a probability measure on Sν . Let i ∈ Iν , consider round
n ∈ {1, . . . , ν} and the event pii,n ∈ Sν such that for every s ∈ pii,n, there exists
a seller js ∈ Jn such that m(i, js, s) = 1 (note that equation 3.7 implies that
∀j ∈ Jn{js},m(i, j, s) = 0). The probability Pν (pii,n) is
Pν (pii,n) =
∑
cjt/νn
b. (3.8)
That is, Pν (pii,n) is the probability that a (arbitrary) buyer i is matched to a
seller in round n. Equation 3.8 implies that Pν (pii,n) is identical for all n ∈
{1, . . . , ν} and for all i ∈ Iν . To simplify notation, let piν = Pν (pii,n), hence,
the probability a seller is not matched to a buyer in any round n ∈ {1, . . . , ν}
is just 1− piν .
Since the random matching process involving each set Jn, n ∈ {1, . . . , ν} is a dif-
ferent round they are independent by construction. Let i ∈ Iν , k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ν}.
Let Ei(k) ∈ S be the event where ∀s ∈ Eki ,
∑
j∈Jν m(i, j, s) = k, then indepen-
dence of matching between rounds and equation 3.8 implies
Pν(Ei(k)) =
(
ν
k
)
(piν)k(1− piν)ν−k, (3.9)
that is, Pν(Ei(k)) is the unconditional probability that a (arbitrary) buyer is
matched with k different sellers. Where
(
ν
k
)
is the binomial coefficient which
means that the probability i is matched to k sellers is distributed according to
the binomial distribution with parameters piν and ν.
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Let j ∈ Jn be a seller and Pν(Ei(k + 1)|i ∈ Cjt ) be the probability that buyer
i ∈ Iν has matched with k + 1 sellers over the ν matching rounds conditional
on being matched to seller j in round n. Equation 3.9 and the independence
between the matching rounds imply that Pν(Ei(k + 1)|i ∈ Cjt ) satisfies
Pν(Ei(k + 1)|i ∈ Cjt ) =
(
ν − 1
k
)
(piν)k(1− piν)(ν−1)−k. (3.10)
Note that Pν(Ei(k + 1)|i ∈ Cjt ) is the same for all sellers letting ν → ∞ the
Poisson limit theorem implies that both Pν(Ei(k)) and Pν(Ei(k + 1)|i ∈ Cjt )
converge to the probability mass function at k of a Poisson distribution with
parameter
∑ns
j=1 c
j
t/n
b14. Setting nb = ns implies that both Pν(Ei(k)) and
Pν(Ei(k + 1)|i ∈ Cjt ) converges to a Poisson distribution with parameter cˆt.
Example 3.2. Consider J = {j1, j2} where cj1t = 1, cj2t = 2 and I = {i1, i2}.
Consider the ν-replica with ν = 2, of the market with set of sellers Jν =
{J1, J2} = {(j11, j21), (j12, j22)} and set of buyers Iν = {I1, I2} = {(i11, i21), (i12, i22)}
hence there are 4 buyers and 4 sellers.
In round n ∈ {1, 2}, a total of 3 buyers are matched to sellers, hence the
probability that a buyer is matched to a seller in round n is 3/4. Hence, there
are (4 × 4 × 3)2 states of the world where a state s ∈ S specifies a matching
function between buyers and sellers such as the one depicted in the graph in
figure 3.1.
The matching process just described generates a Poisson distribution for buyer’s
awareness with parameter cˆt for a finite set of seller types each with a finite cus-
tomer base. To approximate the environment where each seller has a continuum
of customers that is studied in the rest of the paper, consider a profile of cus-
tomer bases {cjt}, cjt ∈ R+ with j ∈ [0, 1], with ns ∈ N types of sellers {cat }nsa=1,
each type with the same measure. Hence, cˆt =
∑
a c
a
t /n
s.
The profile of customer bases {cat } can be approximated by the profile of cus-
tomer bases of a sequence of sequences of finite markets {Iµ,ν , Jν , {ca,µt }µ}ν
where Iµ,ν is a µ × ν-replica o I and Jν = {J1, . . . , Jν} is a ν-replica o J such
14It’s trivial to note that the sequence
{
ν ×∑nsj=1 cjt/νnb}
ν
converges to
∑ns
j=1 c
j
t/n
b as
ν →∞, so the conditions to apply the Poisson limit theorem are satisfied.
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Buyers
Sellers
i11 i12 i21 i22
j11 j12 j21 j22
Figure 3.1: Example of a graph that represents buyer’s awareness
that, for each a ∈ {1, . . . , ns}, the sequence of customer bases {ca,µt } satisfies
lim
µ→∞
ca,µt n
s
µnb
= cat . (3.11)
Note that as µ→∞, ca,µt converges to infinity.
This µ × ν-replica of the market has µνnb buyers and νns sellers and each
seller has ca,µt customers. By analogous argument to the matching process de-
scribed above, by taking ν to infinity, the distribution of buyers matched to
k ∈ {1, . . . , ν} different sellers converges to a Poisson with parameter
cˆµt =
∑
a
ca,µt /µn
b, (3.12)
which converges to ∑
a
cat /n
s = cˆt
as µ→∞.
3.3 The game and equilibrium
The section describes the game that is played in this market environment.
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3.3.1 Players
The players in this game are the sellers. Buyers are assumed to be not strategic.
That is, in each period they always purchase from the lowest-priced seller that
they are aware of if this seller’s price is lower than their reservation price.
3.3.2 Strategies and action sets
At the beginning of each period sellers choose prices to post. A buyer who
knows k different sellers observes a vector of prices posted by the buyers he or
she knows. The buyers choose whether to purchase their unit of the good from
among these sellers. The good is produced by the sellers and sold to the buyers
who purchase the good and is consumed. By the end of period the profile of
quantities sold {qjt}j and the entry and exit of sellers determine the profile of
customer bases of the next period {cjt+1}j.
No rational seller would post a price higher than the customer’s reservation
price of 1 so attention is restricted to prices posted in (−∞, 1]. Sellers can post
prices according to a randomization mechanism. Hence a seller j’s price posting
strategy for period t is a cumulative distribution σjt : (−∞, 1]→ [0, 1] hence the
action set of the sellers is ∆((−∞, 1], [0, 1]), the set of cumulative distribution
functions on (−∞, 1].
I assume that when sellers offers a non-degenerate price posting distribution
each customer of the seller will observe sequentially prices drawn from the dis-
tribution σjt . Hence, a buyer who is aware of j observes a price drawn according
to σjt in period t. Note that prices posted might be different for each customer
of seller j. A buyer i who knows a set of k sellers in period t will observe a
vector of prices (pi,tj1 , . . . , p
i,t
jk
), where pi,tj is a price drawn from the distribution
of prices posted by seller j ,σjt . The buyer i chooses to purchase at the lowest
price from the vector of k prices he or she observes from those k different sellers.
The set of sellers that buyers know is private information. Therefore, sellers do
not know which and how many other sellers their customers know. However, I
assume that sellers know the profile of customer bases {cjt}j∈J of the sellers in
the market. A seller form beliefs on the probability that their customers to be
in contact with other sellers based on the average customer base cˆ implied by
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j′′′
pi2(c)
pi1(c)
Figure 3.2: Beliefs of seller j about the number of competing sellers that it’s
customer i might be aware off.
{cjt}j∈J and they know the random matching mechanism that determines {pikt }k
as a function of cˆt (that is described in subsection 3.2.3). The matching mech-
anism implies that for a given customer i of seller j, j assigns the probability
pik(cˆt) that buyer i is aware of k other sellers besides j in period t.
Let i be a buyer in seller j’s customer base. Seller j also does not know who
are the particular competing sellers that i might be aware of so j forms beliefs
regarding the prices posted by the other sellers that i might know. Let σ−jt =
{σht }h6=j be the profile of distributions of prices posted by j’s competitors. Let
σˆt be the weighted average of the profile of price posting strategies of the other
sellers σ−jt , weighted by their customer base size. With a continuum of sellers
σˆt(.) is expressed as
σˆt(p) =
∫ 1
0
(
cht
cˆt
σht (p)
)
dh. (3.13)
In a market with a continuum of sellers, each seller has negligible share of the
aggregate customer base and hence σˆt(.) is independent of j. I call σˆt the average
distribution of prices and it’s the distribution of prices that each seller assigns
to prices posted to its customers by competing sellers.
The weights of the other sellers in σˆt is determined by the relative size of each
seller’s customer base. Since sellers do not know which specific competing seller
their customers might be aware off they form beliefs that assign a weight to the
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seller based on relative size of each seller’s customer base. For example, consider
a market with only three sellers, j1, j2, j3. For a customer i of j1, if i is aware
of another seller the beliefs of seller j1 assign a probability cl/(c1 + c2) that
the competing seller is jl for l ∈ {2, 3}. That is, j1 beliefs assign a probability
that conditional on j1’s customer knowing another one seller that seller is l
with probability determined by l’s relative fraction of the customer bases of all
competing sellers.
3.3.3 Payoffs
To determine payoffs from strategies I need to determine the quantity sellers will
sell in a given period considering their price posting strategy and the strategies
of the other sellers. Note that since A is bounded above by 1, I assume that in
any period a buyer that is aware of at least one seller will always purchase the
good as no seller will post a price above their reservation price.
Let ξ(p, σˆt, cˆt) be the probability that a customer chooses to purchase from a
seller that posts price p, if the average distribution of prices posted by the sellers
is σˆt and the average customer base is cˆt. The probability of purchase if σˆt does
not have an atom at p is
ξ(p, σˆt, cˆt) = pi
0(cˆt) + pi
1(cˆt) [1− σˆt(p)] + pi2(cˆ) [1− σˆt(p)]2 + ..., (3.14)
where pik(cˆ) [1− σˆt(p)]k is the probability a customer of seller j knows k other
sellers times the probability that the price posted by j is lower than all k other
prices. Note that {pik(cˆt)}k is a Poisson probability mass function, therefore the
expression 3.14 can be written as
ξ(p, σˆt, cˆt) = exp(−cˆtσˆt(p)). (3.15)
I assume a tie-breaking rule such that when there is a positive probability of
a tie in prices between two or more sellers each seller has equal probability
that a buyer will purchase from him. Then, the probability of sale at p with a
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probability of a tie in posted prices (that is, σˆt has an atom at p) is
ξ(p, σˆt, cˆt) =
∑
k
pik(cˆt)
[
1−
(
lim
pˆ↑p
σˆt(pˆ) +
1
2
(
σˆt(p)− lim
pˆ↑p
σˆt(pˆ)
))]k
. (3.16)
Since sellers have a continuum of customers the law of large numbers implies
that the quantity sold is deterministic and given by cjt times ξ(p, σˆt, cˆt). Let
q(p, σˆt, c
j
t , cˆt) be the quantity sold if the seller posts p, the average distribution
of prices is σˆt, the seller’s customer base is cjt and the average customer base is cˆt.
As marginal costs are normalized to zero, profits are equal to the quantity sold
times the price. Let γt(p, σˆt, cjt , cˆt) be seller j’s profit if for the corresponding
variables.
Hence the realized quantity sold and profit in period t for seller j are given by
q(p, σˆt, c
j
t , cˆt) = c
j
tξ(p, σˆt, cˆt), (3.17)
γ(p, σˆt, c
j
t , cˆt) = pq(p, σˆt, c
j
t , cˆt). (3.18)
The payoff for a seller is the present discounted profit stream, with discount
factor β ∈ (0, 1). In the beginning of period t, the sequential problem of a
seller j of age a is to choose a sequence of prices {pk}k in A that maximizes the
discounted present value of the future profits
sup
{pk}k∈A
∞∑
k=t
[β(1− α)] k−tγk(pk, σˆk, cjk, cˆk) (3.19)
s.t. cjk+1 = c
j
k + Φ(qk(pk, σˆk, c
j
k, cˆk), c− cjk).
Note that the seller’s payoff function incorporates the exogenous probability of
exit after k−t periods in operation∏k−tz=1(1−αa+(k−t)) as the seller cannot make
profits after it exits the market.
Let vt(cjt) be the value of the solution to the sellers problem 3.19 for a seller with
customer base cjt in period t. The value function has a t subscript because the
state of the market in which the seller operates, given by the profile of customer
bases and price posting strategies, can change over time.
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3.3.4 Equilibrium
The solution concept used here is Markov perfect equilibrium. It is implicit in
the model that sellers are anonymous: as sellers have a negligible fraction of
the aggregate customer bases the probability that their customers might know
any particular competing seller is zero. That implies that seller’s equilibrium
strategies do not depend on the past actions of any individual seller. Instead
price posting policies can only depend on the current state of the market which
is described by the profile of customer bases.
I study symmetric equilibrium where sellers with the same customer base post
prices according to the same distribution.
Definition 3.1. A symmetric equilibrium is a sequence of customer base profiles
{(cjt)j∈[0,1]}t and sequence of strategy profiles {(σjt )j∈[0,1]}t such that:
(i) For each period t and for each seller j ∈ [0, 1] posting a sequence of prices
{pjk}∞k=t such that for each k ≥ t, pjk is in the support of the distribution of prices
σjk, solves the seller’s maximization problem 3.19 given the sequences of average
distribution of prices and customer bases {σˆk, cˆk}∞k=t implied by the sequence of
strategies and customer bases profiles.
(ii) The sequence of customer base profiles {(σjt )j∈[0,1]}t satisfies 3.4.
From the definition of symmetric equilibrium and the assumption that entrants
start with the same customer base the following proposition follows:
Proposition 3.1. In symmetric equilibrium sellers of the same cohort have the
same customer base.
3.4 Equilibrium: Existence and characterization
To construct and characterize equilibrium, this section first proves existence,
uniqueness and characterizes a steady-state equilibrium where the distribution
of seller’s population by cohorts is in steady state and the profiles of strategies
and customer bases are both stationary. Then, using the unique value functions
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from the steady-state equilibrium, the non-steady-state equilibrium is character-
ized, which is an equilibrium where the profile of seller’s population by cohorts
is evolving towards a steady-state.
To articulate the characterization of the equilibrium I introduce additional no-
tation. Proposition 3.1 states that sellers of the same cohort have the same
customer base and in symmetric equilibrium sellers with the same customer
base post the same prices so from this point onward I distinguish sellers only by
age. Let cat be the customer base of a seller of age a in period t. In a symmetric
equilibrium, all sellers of the cohort of age a have the same customer base and
therefore post prices according to the same distribution σat . In this case, the
average distribution σˆt is the weighted average of the price posting strategies of
all cohorts weighted by the customer share of each cohort. The customer share
of each cohort is the population of each cohort na multiplied by the customer
base of sellers in the cohort cat . Let
ωat =
nacat∑t
h=1 n
hcht
(3.20)
be the weight of cohort a in period t. Equation 3.20 implies that the average
distribution of prices σˆt(.) can be written as
σˆt(.) =
∑∞
a=1 n
acatσ
a
t (.)
cˆt
, (3.21)
=
∑
a
ωat σ
a
t (.). (3.22)
Let
ωat =
a∑
h=1
ωht (3.23)
be the cumulative customer share of all cohorts up to age a.
3.4.1 Symmetric steady-state equilibrium
In period t the population of each age cohort (nat )ta=1 is, by construction, the
same as the next period (nat+1)ta=1. As t→∞ the population of sellers reaches a
steady-state distribution by age. The steady-state equilibrium is the equilibrium
that corresponds to the steady-state of the seller’s population.
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Definition 3.2. A steady-state symmetric equilibrium is a stationary profile of
customer bases {ca}∞a=1, and a stationary profile of strategies {σa}∞a=1 such that
{ca, σa}∞a=1 is a symmetric equilibrium in the environment with a steady-state
population of sellers by cohort {na}∞a=1.
In a steady-state symmetric equilibrium the price posting strategies and the
customer bases of the sellers are stationary and hence the distribution of prices
posted and prices for executed transactions are also both stationary. Since the
average distribution of prices and the average customer base is constant for
variables in the steady-state I drop the t subscripts from cˆ, pik, the probability
of purchase from a customer P (., .), the quantity sold to cohort a, qa and the
associated profit function γ.
Note that when t is finite in the environment under study (with fixed exogenous
entry and exit rates) we cannot have a steady state equilibrium. That is because
the customer base of sellers with age a > t is “zero” as no seller has reached this
age yet but in future periods there are sellers of this age with non-zero customer
bases. In the next subsection it is shown that the steady state equilibrium is
approximated by the non-steady-state equilibrium as t becomes large.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that Assumptions (1)-(3) are satisfied. Then there
exists a unique steady-state symmetric equilibrium {ca, σa}∞a=1 and it has the
following properties
(i) The price posting strategies of sellers {σa}a are atomless.
(ii) For cohorts of ages a, b if a > b, then ca > cb and every seller of cohort a
posts higher prices than every seller of cohort b with probability 1.
Theorem 3.1 states that in equilibrium entrant sellers have smaller customer
bases, post lower prices than incumbents and post prices according to non-
degenerate distributions. The proof of theorem 3.1 is constructive: I construct a
steady-state equilibrium and show that it is the unique steady-state equilibrium.
The following lemmas are used in the proof of existence and the characteriza-
tion of symmetric steady-state equilibrium. First, I show that for an arbitrary
average distribution of prices σˆ there exists a corresponding value function v
that satisfies the recursive formulation of the seller’s problem. Value function
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v : [0, c]→ R satisfies
v(c) = sup
p∈(−∞,1]
γ(p, σˆ, c, cˆ) + β(1− α)v(c+(p, c)), (3.24)
s.t. c+(p, c) = c+ Φ(q(p, σˆ, c, cˆ), c− c). (3.25)
The law of motion for customer bases 3.25 implies that Φ maps [0, c] into itself,
combined with β(1−α) ∈ (0, 1) and γ(p, σˆ, c, cˆ) ≤ c implies that the sequential
problem 3.19 with stationary σˆ and cˆ and recursive problem above are equivalent
(see Theorems 4.2-4.4 of Stokey and Lucas (1989) [73]).
Next there are the statements of three lemmas regarding the properties of the
value function v, properties which I will use to show existence and describe
the properties of the steady-state equilibrium. These properties are that, in
symmetric equilibrium, v is non-decreasing. If σˆ is atomless, then v is strictly
increasing and strictly concave. These properties are intuitive enough: the
expected profits of a seller are increasing in the size of his or her customer
base and they are strictly concave because the growth of the customer base is
logistical.
Lemma 3.1. If assumption (1) is satisfied, then, for every stationary average
distribution of prices σˆ and stationary average customer base cˆ ∈ [0, c], the value
function v exists and is unique.
The next pair of lemmas characterizes the value function.
Lemma 3.2. If assumptions (1)-(3) are satisfied, then, for every stationary
average distribution of prices σˆ and stationary average customer base cˆ ∈ [0, c],
the value function v is non-decreasing and strictly concave.
The next lemma states that if σˆ is atomless then v is also strictly increasing
and continuous:
Lemma 3.3. If assumptions (1)-(2) are satisfied, then, for every stationary
and atomless average distribution of prices σˆ and stationary average customer
base cˆ ∈ [0, c], the value function v is continuous and strictly increasing.
The next lemma states properties that any steady-state equilibrium σˆ has con-
vex support, sellers with larger customer bases post higher prices with proba-
bility 1.
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Lemma 3.4. If v is strictly increasing, continuous and strictly concave, then
the steady-state symmetric equilibrium has the following properties:
(i) The price posting strategies for all sellers are atomless.
(ii) σˆ has a convex support.
(iii) The supports of the price posting strategies for sellers with different cus-
tomer bases have disjointed interiors and sellers with larger customer bases post
prices equal or higher than smaller sellers.
(iv) The upper bound of the support of the average distribution of prices σˆ is
equal to 1.
Now we are ready to prove the main proposition that characterizes the steady-
state equilibrium of this model:
Proposition 3.2. If assumptions (1)-(3) are satisfied, the unique steady-state
symmetric equilibrium has the following properties
(i) A profile of sales for sellers of each cohort {q(ca)}a satisfying for each a ≥ 1,
q(ca) = ca exp
[
−cˆ
(
ωa−1 +
1
2
ωa
)]
. (3.26)
(ii) A profile of price posting strategies for each cohort {σa}∞a=1 with support
[pa, pa] for each seller cohort a, where pa = pa+1 for all a ≥ 1 (so the interiors
of the supports are disjointed), and
lim
a→∞
pa = 1, (3.27)
where each distribution σa satisfies for each p ∈ [pa, pa],
capξ(p, σˆ, cˆ) + β(1− α)v [ca + Φ(q(p, σˆ, ca, cˆ), ca)] = v(ca). (3.28)
(iii) The average price distribution σˆ is atomless and has support [p, p] = ∪∞a=1[pa, pa],
such that p > 0 and satisfies for p ∈ [pa, pa],
σˆ(p) = ωa−1 + σa(p)ωa.
Proposition 3.2 implies in theorem 3.1. Note that the steady-state symmetric
equilibrium is characterized by price dispersion across cohorts of sellers, each
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cohort of sellers randomizing the prices they post and the price posting strat-
egy of incumbent sellers first-order stochastically dominates the price posting
strategy of the entering sellers. Properties that are found in the data by several
empirical studies.
3.4.2 Non-steady-state equilibrium
Consider a product market that is created in period 1 when the first cohort
of sellers enters the market and such that Φ satisfies assumptions (1)-(3). This
subsection describes the construction and the uniqueness of the symmetric equi-
librium of this product market. The equilibrium is such that at any period t,
prices posted by sellers entrant sellers are lower than prices of posted by in-
cumbents with probability 1, the randomized price posting strategies of the
sellers are non-degenerate, individual sellers accumulate customers over time,
increasing the prices they post while (as shown in section 3.5) average prices for
transactions in the market are decreasing over time.
To construct and characterize the non-steady-state equilibrium I proceed ac-
cording to the following strategy: I construct a candidate equilibrium in sub-
section 3.4.2.1, a sequence of strategy profiles {(σat )ta=1}t and it’s corresponding
sequence of customer base profiles from a sequence of (arbitrary) value functions
{vt}. In subsection 3.4.2.2 it is shown that this sequence of strategy profiles and
corresponding sequence of customer bases profiles implies in a unique sequence
of value functions {vt} that converges to the steady-state value function v and
that the strategy and customer base profiles {(σat , cat )ta=1}t are consistent with
symmetric equilibrium. Finally, in subsection 3.4.2.4 it is shown that the sym-
metric non-steady-state equilibrium is unique.
3.4.2.1 Candidate equilibrium strategy profile
Consider period t and seller cohort of age a ∈ {1, . . . , t} and let [pa
t
, pat ] be the
support of a price posting strategy σat (.). Hence, in period t there is a profile of
supports {[pa
t
, pat ]}ta=1 for the profile of strategies {σat }ta=1. Suppose the profile
of supports of the randomized strategies {[pa
t
, pat ]}ta=1 have disjoint interiors and
assume that {σat }ta=1 are atomless. In this case equations 3.21 and 3.23 imply
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that σˆt(.) satisfies
σˆt(p) = ω
a−1
t + ω
a
t σ
a
t (p). (3.29)
To construct the profile of supports and distributions the following equal profit
conditions are used. Let ptt = 1 and for each a ≥ 1, pat = pa+1t and pat satisfies
pa
t
cat ξ(p
a
t
, σˆt, cˆt)+[β(1− α)] vt+1
[
ct+1(p
a
t
, cat )
]
= pat c
a
t ξ(p
a
t , σˆt, cˆt)+[β(1− α)] vt+1 [ct+1(pat , cat )] ,
(3.30)
where
ct+1(p, c
a
t ) = c
a
t + Φ(c
a
t ξ(p, σˆt, cˆt), c− cat ), (3.31)
ξ(p, σˆt, cˆt) = exp
[−cˆt (ωa−1t + ωat σat (p))] , (3.32)
where the right hand side of 3.32 follows from the definition of ξ(p, σˆt, cˆt) and
3.29.
Let pat = pa+1t for a < t which implies that the profile of supports has disjoint
interiors and that the average distribution σˆt satisfies
supp(σˆt) = [p1t , 1].
For p ∈ (pa
t
, pat ) the distribution σat satisfies the following equal profit condition
pcat ξ(p, σˆt, cˆt)+[β(1− α)] vt+1(ct+1(p, cat )) = pat cat ξ(pat , σˆt, cˆt)+[β(1− α)] vt+1(ct+1(pat , cat )).
(3.33)
Since all sellers of cohort of age a will post prices according to the same distri-
bution these sellers will sell the same quantity. Let qat be the quantity sold by
seller of age a in period t, it satisfies
qat = c
a
t exp
[−cˆt (ωa−1t + (1/2)ωat )] . (3.34)
Equation 3.34 follows from: (1) Cohorts older than a will post strictly higher
prices than the prices in the support of the distribution of cohort a, so the
probability of sale is at least exp [−cˆtωa−1]. (2) Cohorts younger than a will
post strictly lower prices than cohort a’s support, making the probability of sale
not higher than exp [−cˆtωa]. Sellers of cohort a will be only competing against
sellers from the same cohort. Since sellers in a post the same distribution of
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prices the probability of undercutting other sellers is .5. Hence, the probability
of sale satisfies exp [−cˆt (ωa−1 + (1/2)ωa)]. See the proof of Proposition 3.2 for
a formal derivation of equation 3.34.
Equation 3.34 implies in a sequence of customer bases profiles {(cat )ta=1}t where
c1t = c,∀t and for all t and a ∈ {1, . . . t},
ca+1t+1 = c
a
t + Φ(q
a
t , c− cat ). (3.35)
To show that this strategy profile and implied sequence of customer bases is in
fact an equilibrium it is first required to show that there exists sequence of {vt}
implied by problem 3.19 that is consistent with this profile of strategies.
3.4.2.2 Candidate equilibrium value functions
To construct an equilibrium when the distribution of customer bases and prices
posted changes in each period using the candidate equilibrium strategies and
customer bases constructed above I construct a sequence of value functions {vt}t
that converges to v as t → ∞. Then I show that this candidate equilibrium
strategies and customer bases {(σat , cat )a}t is indeed a Markov-perfect equilib-
rium, that is, it is optimal for sellers of cohort a to post prices according to σat
in period t.
Note that in subsection 3.4.1 that a steady-state equilibrium and the correspond-
ing steady-state value function v exists and is unique. I construct a sequence
of value functions {vt} that as t → ∞ converges to the value function v that
corresponds to the steady-state. Suppose that the value function in period t+1,
vt+1, exists and is concave, continuous and strictly increasing. Let vt satisfy for
ct ∈ R+,
vt(ct) = max
p∈A
γ(p, σˆt, ct, cˆt) + β(1− α)vt+1 [ct+1(p, ct)] , (3.36)
where σˆt is constructed according to equations 3.30 and 3.33. Since vt+1 is well
defined, concave, continuous and strictly increasing, then σt is atomless and so
γt is continuous. Therefore the function vt exists and is continuous, concave and
strictly increasing.
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Pick a T > 1 and suppose that
vT = v. (3.37)
It’s easy to see that the profile of seller cohort populations converges to {na}∞a=1
as t→∞.
If seller cohorts follow the symmetric price posting strategy {σat }ta=1 equation
3.34 implies that the profile of customer bases converges to {ca}a≥1 and cˆt → cˆ
as t→∞. Consider vt and v, note that vt and v are bounded, then since cˆt → cˆ
and customer base profiles converges to {ca}a≥1, then equation 3.36 for  > 0
there is a T large enough such that
||vT−1 − vT || = maxm∈R+ |vT−1(c)− vT (c)|
c
< . (3.38)
Let (v1, . . . , vT ) be a profile of value functions defined by 3.37 and 3.36, for
T → ∞ equation 3.38 implies that limT vT = v. Let {vt}t be the sequence
of value functions implied by taking the limit limt→∞{(v1, . . . , vT )}. Note that
since vT−1 converges to v such a sequence exists. This will be our candidate
sequence of equilibrium value functions for each period.
To see that {vt}t is consistent with the seller’s problem defined in 3.19 note that:
γ is bounded above by c, β(1− α) ∈ (0, 1) and ct+1 ∈ [0, c]. The conditions for
applying Theorems 4.2-4.4 of Stokey and Lucas (1989) are satisfied which imply
that the sequential problem 3.19 and the functional equation 3.36 are equivalent
if posting prices in the support of {(σat )a}t is optimal for the sellers.
3.4.2.3 Consistency of candidate strategies and value functions with
the non-steady-state equilibrium
It remains to show that this construction of strategy profiles {(σat )a}t, value
functions {vt} and its associated sequence of customer base profiles are in fact
a symmetric equilibrium.
Theorem 3.2. The sequences of strategy profiles and associated customer base
profiles {(σat )a, (cat )a}t described by 3.30 and 3.33 are an equilibrium.
Note that the desired properties of the symmetric equilibrium for a general en-
vironment have not been proven yet. I have constructed a sequence of value
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functions given a equilibrium sequences of price posting strategies and cus-
tomer base profiles and showed that this sequence of value functions implies in
an unique equilibrium sequence of price posting strategies and customer base
profiles. It was not shown yet that this is the only Markov perfect symmetric
equilibrium of this model.
3.4.2.4 Uniqueness
The following theorem states that the equilibrium we have just constructed is
the unique symmetric equilibrium for this environment.
Theorem 3.3. Given assumptions (1)-(3), the non-steady-state equilibrium is
unique.
The proof of theorem 3.3 utilizes additional notation which is introduced here.
It’s possible to represent the state of the market in any period t by a sequence
of customer bases {ca}∞a=1 such that ca = cat for all a ∈ {1, . . . t} and ca = 0 for
a > t (that is, cohorts which haven’t entered the market yet). Let KN([0, c])
be the set of all sequences in [0, c]. Let V (c, {ca}∞a=1) be a value function that
maps the space of customer base profiles {ca}∞a=1 ∈ KN([0, c]) and the seller’s
customer base c ∈ [0, c] into a real number. I want to show that in symmetric
equilibrium the value function V is unique. Subsection 3.4.1 already has shown
that in a steady-state symmetric equilibrium, when {ca, σa}∞a=1 are constant,
then V is unique, here I generalize this proof.
Let F([0, c]×KN([0, c])) be the space of functions that map [0, c]×KN([0, c]) into
R+ that are strictly increasing and concave on [0, c]. Consider the operator T
that maps F([0, c]×KN([0, c])) into a functional space. T (V ) for V ∈ F([0, c]×
KN([0, c])) satisfies
T (V )(c, {ca}∞a=1) = sup
p
γ(p, σˆ, c, cˆ) + β(1− α)V (c+(p, c), {ca+}∞a=1), (3.39)
where σˆ is an average distribution of prices determined from a symmetric profit
maximizing strategy profile {σa}∞a=1, where p ∈ supp(σa) satisfies
γ(p, σˆ, ca, cˆ) + β(1− α)V (ca+, {ca+}∞a=1) = T [V (ca, {ca}∞a=1)] ,
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and c+(p, c), {ca+}∞a=1 are, respectively, the next period customer base of the
seller with customer base c if she posts p and {ca+}∞a=1 is the next period profile
of customer bases that is determined by the strategy profile {σa}∞a=1.
A fixed point of T is a value function V that is consistent with equilibrium
for any profile of customer bases. The following lemma states that such value
function will imply in a unique profile of strategies for the sellers.
Lemma 3.5. For a fixed point V of T that is strictly increasing and strictly
concave on c, then there is a unique equilibrium symmetric strategy profile that
is consistent with V .
Theorem 3.3 implies that the only non-steady-state equilibrium is the equilib-
rium constructed here, which converges to the unique steady-state equilibrium.
Therefore, Theorem 3.3 implies in the following corollary:
Corollary 3.1. The non-steady-state equilibrium converges to the steady-state
equilibrium.
3.5 Properties of the equilibrium
This section provides a characterization of the dynamic behavior of the distri-
bution of prices posted, the volume of transactions and prices for transactions in
the symmetric equilibrium as it converges to the steady-state equilibrium from
an initial state where all sellers have zero customer base and cohorts of new
sellers enter at the rate α with positive customer base c and where Φ satisfies
assumptions (1)-(3). It also shows the symmetric equilibrium is efficient and
that it converges to perfect competition as frictions vanish.
3.5.1 Decreasing markups
In the symmetric non-steady-state equilibrium that is being studied the aver-
age price for transactions is strictly decreasing over time as the equilibrium
converges to the steady-state. To show that, first I show that the average num-
ber of sellers that buyers know is strictly increasing on time. Second, I show
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that that the distribution of prices for transactions is monotone decreasing on
time if the average number of sellers that buyers know is strictly increasing on
time.
Lemma 3.6. In symmetric equilibrium the average number of sellers that buyers
are aware of cˆt is strictly increasing on the “age” t of the product market.
Let AMt be average price or markup (as marginal cost is normalized to zero)
for transactions in equilibrium in period t. The average markup AMt in period
t is a function of σˆt and cˆt, as a buyer who knows k sellers buys at the lowest
price among these k sellers who post prices according to σˆt. Note that the
average markup for transactions is the average price paid in transactions in
this model since marginal costs are normalized to zero. Let F kt , be the the
cumulative distribution of prices paid by a buyer who knows k sellers in period
t, the expected markup paid by all the buyers in the market is
AMt =
(∑∞
k=1 pi
k(cˆt)
1− pi0(cˆt)
)∫
pdF kt (p), (3.40)
where
F kt (p) = Probt(p ≥ min{p1, . . . , pk})
= 1− Probt(p ≤ min{p1, . . . , pk})
= 1− Probt(p ≤ p1)× . . .× Probt(p ≤ pk)
= 1− [1− σˆt(p)]k .
The following theorem states that the prices for transactions are decreasing over
time.
Theorem 3.4. In symmetric equilibrium the average markup for transactions
is strictly decreasing in t.
3.5.2 Efficiency
A property of the symmetric equilibrium is that it is efficient. Efficiency here
means that at any period t, the aggregate flow surplus is maximized for any
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feasible trajectory of customer bases and sales quantities. That is, the seller
customer base growth is such that it maximizes the possible aggregate market
surplus to be realized while at any period all opportunities to realize the surplus
from transactions are realized.
When a buyer and seller exchange the good they generate 1 unit of surplus. The
aggregate market surplus is the average quantity sold in the market,
∫
J
qjtdj. In
equilibrium buyers always purchase the good if they know at least one seller
therefore the aggregate market surplus in period t is the population of buyers
who know at least one seller, 1− pi0t .
First I define the set of feasible allocations then I define efficiency. An allocation
is a sequence of sales profiles {{qjt}j∈J}∞t=1.
Definition 3.3. An allocation is feasible if
∫
J
qjtdj ≤ 1 − pi0t , each buyer pur-
chases from only one seller in each period (so that two sellers cannot sell to
the same buyer), qjt ∈ [0, cjt ],∀j ∈ J and the profile of customer bases for each
period {cjt}j∈J is consistent with the profile of sales and customer bases in the
previous period and the law of motion for customer bases described by equation
3.4.
Example 3.3. Consider a market in period t where
cjt =
1 if j ∈ [0, 1/2]2 if j ∈ (1/2, 1] ,
hence cˆt = 3/2 and therefore
pikt =
(3/2)k exp(−3/2)
k!
,
consider a profile of sales
qjt =
1
(∑
k pi
k
t
[
2
3
+ 1
3(k+1)
])
if j ∈ [0, 1/2]
2
(∑
k pi
k
t
[
1
3
+ 2
3(k+1)
])
if j ∈ (1/2, 1]
,
this profile of sales is feasible: if customers of seller j know only j they shop at
j, if customers knows multiple sellers they shop first at sellers with customer
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base of 1 then at sellers with customer base of 2. Hence, the sales profile {qjt}j∈J
satisfies all the conditions for being a feasible allocation in period t.
An efficient allocation in this environment is a feasible trajectory of sales profiles
for each seller such that that it maximizes the sequence of aggregate market
surpluses.
Definition 3.4. A sequence of sales profiles {{qjt}j∈J}∞t=1 is efficient if it is
feasible and yields a sequence of market surpluses {∫
J
qjtdj}∞t=1 such that there
is no feasible sequence of sales profiles that implies in equal or higher market
surpluses for all periods with strict inequality in at least one period.
Theorem 3.5. The symmetric equilibrium is efficient.
Efficiency is obtained by a feasible profile of sales among sellers that maximizes
cˆ. The equilibrium is efficient because price posting strategies by the sellers
implies that buyers always purchase from the sellers with smallest customer
base among the sellers that they know. In an efficient allocation, buyers should
always purchase from these sellers as they have the greatest potential for growth
and in equilibrium it is such that sellers with smaller customer base never grow
to become larger than sellers with larger customer base (hence, there is no
excessive growth of smaller sellers). The symmetry of equilibrium is essential
for the efficiency result: efficiency requires that sellers with the same customer
base should sell the same quantity, otherwise the strict concavity of Φ implies
that it’s possible to improve efficiency by reallocating sales between sellers with
the same customer base, increasing the size of the average customer base next
period.
In standard search models efficiency is not so easily obtained (Diamond (1982)
[18] and Mortensen and Wright (2002) [60]). The reason why the efficiency
result is more robust here is that only the ordering of the pricing strategies
matter for determining whether the equilibrium is efficient or not: there exists
a continuum of efficient pricing strategies in this environment. On the other
hand, in a standard random search model efficiency can only be obtained in the
knife-edge case when the relative bargaining power of each side of the market
exactly matches the relative marginal gains from search effort, as there are
congestion externalities otherwise.
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3.5.3 Convergence to perfect competition in the steady-
state symmetric equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium that corresponds to the physical environment de-
scribed in section 3.2 satisfies the following properties: First, in every period,
all sellers post a price equal to the marginal cost, 0, second, all buyers purchase
each a unit of the good, hence, the aggregate quantity sold is 1.
Consider a steady-state equilibrium with pi0 = 0. In this case it’s simple to
check that the steady-state symmetric equilibrium has the same properties as
the competitive equilibrium as it is Bertrand competition: All customers of a
seller will know a competing seller thus for any non-degenerate price distribution
σˆ with support above marginal cost, no seller would like to post a price at
the upper bound of the support of the distribution as they would make zero
sales while they could make non-zero expected profits by posting a price in the
interior of the distribution. Which implies a non-degenerate σˆ is inconsistent
with equilibrium. Therefore, in equilibrium, the distribution of prices posted is
degenerate and for any price above 0, sellers will have an incentive to undercut
each other.
Proposition 3.3 states that as α→ 0 and c→∞ then in the steady-state cˆ→∞
(which implies that pi0 → 0). Theorem 3.6 states that as cˆ → ∞ then the
symmetric steady-state equilibrium converges to the competitive equilibrium:
the prices posted in the symmetric equilibrium converge in probability to the
competitive price while the fraction of buyers that purchase the good converges
to 1.
Proposition 3.3. Let {cn}∞n=1 be a strictly increasing sequence in R++ that
diverges to infinity, {αn}∞n=1 be a monotone decreasing sequence in (0, 1) such
that limn αn = 0, and let {{can}a}n and {cˆn} be respectively the sequence of
steady-state equilibrium profiles of customer bases by seller age and the average
customer base corresponding to the sequences of upper bound on customer bases
{cn} and seller entry/exit rates {αn}. Then {cˆn} converges to infinity and
limn→∞ pi0(cˆn) = 0.
That is, in a sequence of environments where the upper bound of the customer
base diverges to infinity and the exit rates converge to zero the sequence of av-
erage customer bases in the steady-state equilibrium converges to infinity.
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The following theorem states that as the average customer base of sellers in-
creases to infinity then the equilibrium distribution of prices for transactions
converges weakly in probability to the marginal cost.
Theorem 3.6. For a steady-state distribution of seller by age cohorts {na}∞a=1,
let {{cak, σak}∞a=1}k be a sequence of steady-state equilibria such that
lim
k
cˆk =∞
then for all p ∈ (0, 1), limk→∞ pξ(p, σˆk, cˆk) = 0, where ξ(p, σˆk, cˆk) is the proba-
bility that a customer purchases from a seller posting p in the steady-state equi-
librium corresponding to {(cak, σak)}a and for p ∈ (0, 1) the equilibrium average
distribution of prices satisfies
lim
k
∑
l
pil(cˆk)
[
1− σˆk(p)]l = 0.
That is, in equilibrium, when the average customer base increases to infinity
the probability that the prices for transactions are higher than marginal cost
converges to 0 as k → ∞ and the fraction of buyers who do not purchase the
good from any seller converges to zero.
Theorem 3.6 is intuitive: when the average customer base increases the average
number of sellers that customers know also increases, which increases the in-
tensity of competition between sellers, driving prices down. When cˆ→∞, the
increased intensity of competition between sellers drives prices down to marginal
cost, the discounted value of the profit stream converges to zero and the price
dispersion equilibrium converges to perfect competition.
3.6 Quantitative analysis
This section brings the model to the data by performing exercises comparative
statics using parameter values derived from empirical studies to better under-
stand the implications of the model. The quantitative analysis is exploratory,
as this model is too stark to capture a substantial portion of the features of the
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data. Nevertheless, I believe that these findings may still be useful as back-of-
the-envelope calculations. The next subsection shows the results of a simulation
for the evolution of customer bases, distribution of prices for transactions and
the distribution of prices posted at different points in time and the evolution of
average markups.
3.6.1 Parameter values
Let the period length represent a quarter. I assume a constant seller exit rate
α = .02 to be consistent with the empirical evidence that average exit rate is
approximately 8% per year (Siegfried and Evans (1994) [69]), a discount factor
β = 1 − .0125, corresponding to a annual discount rate of about 5%. Set the
upper bound of the customer base c = 5 and the initial size of the customer
base c = .001.
The functional form for the customer-capital accumulation Φ function is de-
scribed by 3.5 but removing the term (c− c), which is a Cobb-Douglas,
Φ(q, c− c) = A (qζ(c− c)1−ζ) . (3.41)
Note that a Cobb-Douglas does not satisfy assumptions (2)-(3) but the simu-
lation still yields a continuous, strictly concave and increasing value function
which makes the equilibrium computed unique. This implies that Assumptions
(1)-(3) are sufficient conditions for uniqueness but not all are necessary condi-
tions. There is an upper bound for the customer base, so assume that cjt follows
the law of motion
cjt+1 = min{cjt + Φ(qjt , c− cjt), c},
if the seller does not exit the market.
I assume ζ = 3/4 and removed the term (c− c) from 3.5 to reflect the empirical
findings that active demand accumulation through sales effort is the dominant
factor in demand accumulation (Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2016)). I
choose A = .06 so that sellers reach 90% of the upper bound of their customer
base after 15 years (Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2016) [25] find as the
approximated expected duration for the process of demand accumulation after
entry).
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In this calibration, I target the standard deviation of prices measured in Kaplan
et al. (2016) [50], who measured price dispersion for consumer goods using the
Kielts-Nielsen Homescan Dataset. They find that the standard deviation of
prices is 15.3% and the variance is 2.34%. They also find that 85% of the
variance in prices is due to differences in prices for transactions for stores which
are equally expensive on average, which means that standard deviation of prices
excluding the store-expensiveness component is approximately 14.1%, which is
the value that I target.
According to Perla (2017) [63], the median age of US industries is approximately
20 years, so I set a marginal cost that implies that the standard deviation of
prices for transactions is approximately 14.1% in the equilibrium of a product
market after 20 years. Which implies in a marginal cost of .929.
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Figure 3.3: Average price posted and customer base of sellers by cohort in steady
state equilibrium
3.6.2 Results
Expected prices posted and the evolution of the customer bases by cohort age in
the steady-state. Note that the price posting policy is the same for all cohorts
who reached the upper bound of the customer base.
Note also that the distribution of prices in the steady-state equilibrium is
roughly symmetric around the mode of the distribution, such a result is not
easily attained in other models. Empirical aggregate data on price dispersion
shows a similar pattern (Kaplan and Menzio (2015) [48]). Also, since all sellers
have the same constant marginal cost functions the distribution of prices for
transactions in equilibrium approximates the distribution of average markups
for sellers if the number of seller cohorts is large. In this simulation with a few
hundred cohorts it is already possible to approximate the empirical evidence for
the distribution of markups as shown by De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018a,b)
[11, 10].
The distribution of prices in the steady-state equilibrium and the average markup
for transactions is very close to the steady-state level after about 65− 70 years.
The average standard deviation (in relation to the average price) for prices for
transactions first increases as prices move away from monopoly and then it starts
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of prices in the equilibrium converging to a steady-state
distribution, t = 60,120
Figure 3.5: Distribution of prices in the equilibrium converging to a steady-state
distribution, t = 180,240
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Figure 3.6: The average markup level for transactions in the market
to decrease as competition intensifies and prices are pressed in the direction of
marginal costs.
Lowering market frictions, for example, by increasing A (keeping every other
variable constant), moves the distribution of prices of the steady-state equilib-
rium closer to perfect competition.
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Figure 3.7: Variance of prices for transactions
Figure 3.8: Limiting distributions (1)
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Figure 3.9: Limiting distributions (2)
3.7 Extensions
3.7.1 Endogenous entry
In previous sections seller entry was assumed to be exogenous. In this subsec-
tion, I relax that assumption, instead allowing sellers to choose whether to enter
the market by spending e > 0 in start-up costs. Allowing for endogenous entry
implies that the population of sellers is endogenous and so new assumptions for
the properties for the accumulation of new customers have to be made to take
into consideration market congestion. Let ns ∈ R+ be the measure of sellers
entering the market at each period. The measure of sellers operating in the
market in the steady-state of the seller’s population is s = ns/α.
The new assumptions should imply that if a market is well established with
many sellers that have well established customer bases then it becomes harder
for a new seller to grow their customer bases. The original set of assumptions is
already characterized by this property in regards to the average size of the com-
petitor’s customer bases but not explicitly in regards to the potential measure
of sellers that could operate in the market since that parameter was exogenously
fixed at 1. Let cˆt be the average size of the customer base, s be the aggregate
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measure of sellers in the market and
sˆt = scˆt, (3.42)
be the average number of sellers that buyers know, hence pikt = pik(sˆt) is dis-
tributed according to a Poisson with parameter sˆt. In addition, the seller’s
beliefs regarding the distribution of prices posted competing sellers that their
customers might be in contact, that is the “average distribution of prices” σˆt(.),
satisfies
σˆt(p) =
∫ s
0
cjtσ
j
t (p)dj
scˆ
.
The steady-state equilibrium has the property that in each period the measure
of sellers that enters the market α is such that it equalizes the entry cost e with
the expected lifetime profits of the seller at the entry period which are v(c).
For example, the results in the quantitative exercise 3.6 imply in v(c) = 5.27
so setting entry costs e = 5.27 implies that the steady-state equilibrium of
population of sellers equal to one.
Theorem 3.7. For a set of parameter values and e > 0 is there always a unique
entry rate ns that is consistent with a steady-state equilibrium where v(c) = e if
ns > 0 or v(c) < e if ns = 0.
Consider the parameters from the simulation 3.6, with A = .06. In this case
the average markup and the initial value of a seller in the market in the steady-
state equilibrium as a function of the population of sellers s is described by the
figure below. Note that average markups can become negative if the population
of sellers in the market is large enough, even though the entry value remains
positive. The reason for that is that entrants will price below marginal cost and
the majority of transactions will be with entering sellers but older sellers will
turn out a profit.
As described in figure 3.11 and figure 3.12, the entry cost converges to zero the
population of sellers in the steady-state symmetric equilibrium increases and
the distribution of prices approximates the perfectly competitive price.
CHAPTER 3. PRICE DISPERSION IN DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM 75
Figure 3.10: Markups and present value of entry as functions of ns
Figure 3.11: Limiting distributions of prices as functions of ns (1)
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Figure 3.12: Limiting distributions of prices as functions of ns (2)
3.7.1.1 Endogenous entry and efficiency
Based on proposition 3.5 we know that at a given population of sellers in the
market the distribution of the quantity sold among different seller cohorts is
efficient. However, is the equilibrium population of sellers efficient?
An entry cost of e implies in the aggregate flow cost of entrants of nse = αse
which in turn implies in a steady-state equilibrium level sˆ and hence in pi0(sˆ).
The aggregate flow surplus in the market in the steady-state equilibrium is just
1 − pi0(cˆ). Therefore, the efficient population of sellers s∗ is obtained when
the marginal gain in surplus is equal to the marginal cost of increasing the
population of sellers. The marginal cost of seller entry is constant at e.
While the marginal increase in surplus in some period t in increasing the seller
population s satisfies:
∂(1− pi0(sˆt))
∂sˆt
∂sˆt
∂s
=
∂(1− pi0(sˆt))
∂sˆt
[s (∂cˆt/∂s) + cˆt] ,
where
∂(1− pi0(sˆ))
∂sˆ
= exp(−sˆ) = pi0(sˆ).
If the customer bases are exogenous (they do not depend on sales) then WLOG
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assume that seller’s customer bases are constant, hence cˆ = c, then the equi-
librium price posting strategies of all cohorts have the same support and hence
the initial value of a seller operating in the market satisfies
v(c) =
pi0(sˆ)c
1− β(1− α) ,
and the marginal increase in aggregate market surplus from the entry of a
additional seller is pi0(sˆ)c, therefore for a central planner the discounted flow
value of entry of a seller is also v(c) while the cost is e. This leads me to
conjecture that in steady-state equilibrium the population of sellers is efficient.
Conjecture 3.1. For an entry cost e > 0 , the resulting steady-state equilibrium
population of sellers is efficient for a central planner with the same discount
factor as the sellers.
3.7.2 Seller heterogeneity
So far I have assumed all sellers have identical marginal costs. In this extension
I extend the model by allowing for heterogeneous production technology. A
fraction  ∈ (0, 1) of the sellers have high cost ch and a fraction 1−  of sellers
have low cost cl with 1 > ch > cl = 0.
In this case profits of seller j with high costs if he or she posts a price p are
γ(p,mjt , σˆt, mˆt) = (p− ch)mjtξ(p, σˆt, mˆt).
In equilibrium, sellers with cost c ∈ {ch, cl} and age a ∈ {1, . . . , t} post prices
according to a non-degenerate distribution σa,ct with support [pa,ct , p
a,c
t ], where
pa,ct > p
a,c
t
and pa,ch
t
≥ pa,clt . These equilibrium properties imply that sellers with
higher costs will post higher prices with probability 1. The reason for that for
a distribution σa,c
l
t that makes low cost sellers indifferent between prices in his
or her support means that the increase in quantity by posting lower prices that
makes a low cost seller indifferent between prices is smaller than the required
increase in order to make a high cost seller indifferent. Therefore, the profile of
equilibrium price posting strategies {σa,ct }a∈{1,...,t},c∈{ch,cl} satisfies the property
that all sellers post prices according to non-generate distributions, older sellers
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post higher prices than younger sellers with probability 1, and that higher cost
sellers with the same age post higher prices than lower cost sellers also with
probability 1. A formal proof would be very similar to the proof of theorem 3.1
and its extension to this environment is left as an exercise for the reader.
3.7.3 Heterogeneity of exit rates
Empirical evidence suggests exit rates fall as firms become older and more es-
tablished, so allowing exit rates to vary depending on seller age in this model
is an important extension. Suppose that seller exit rates are not constant over
time but given by a sequence {αa}∞a=2 that determines the fraction of sellers
who exit based on age: a fraction αa of sellers age a exits the market by the
beginning of the current period. In this case a seller’s value function depends
on his or her age besides the size of customer base, vt(c, a) satisfies
vt(c, a) = max
p
γ(p, c, σ, cˆ) + β(1− αa+1)vt(c+(p, c), a+ 1).
It is a simple reproduction of the proofs by replacing α with αa+1. Nearly all
theorems still hold except Lemma 3.4 which might not hold if αa > αa+1 by a
high enough to degree for some cohort a which would imply that price posting
strategies of cohort a will first order stochastically dominate the distribution of
cohort a+ 1.
3.8 Concluding remarks
This is a theoretical study of dynamic industry pricing that takes in consider-
ation the effects of imperfect awareness and learning through word of mouth
among buyers in the market. It extends the theory of equilibrium price disper-
sion of Burdett and Judd (1983) [5] by incorporating dynamic customer-capital
accumulation. This study approaches customer-capital accumulation in a dis-
tinct way from other studies such as Gorio and Rudanko (2014) [34] and Paciello,
Pozzi and Trachter [62], which both use directed search mechanisms, where cus-
tomers can only interact with a single seller at each point in time. Instead, here
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I use a mechanism for the accumulation of potential customers through word of
mouth contagion.
The environment of this model implies in a unique symmetric Markov perfect
equilibrium. The properties the equilibrium include price dispersion as sellers
randomize their price posting strategies, entrant sellers post lower prices than
incumbents and in the non-steady-state equilibrium the average markup level
falls over time as it converges to the steady-state level of markup. Quantitative
analysis of the model shows that the model closely replicates the empirical data
on price dispersion for transactions without recourse to specific assumptions.
In this environment market frictions are represented by the seller’s exogenous
exit rates, upper bound in the size of the seller’s customer base and the existence
of entry costs. As the market frictions converge to zero (either by lowering
costs of entry to zero or by simultaneously lowering the exit rates to zero and
the upper bound of the customer bases to infinity) the steady-state equilibrium
converges to the allocation that corresponds to perfect competition. This is not
a trivial result as demonstrated in numerous studies such as Diamond (1971)
[16], Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) [66], Gale (1986,1987,2000) [30, 27, 29]
and Mortensen and Wright (2002) [60]. These studies show that the choice of
trading mechanisms and particular details of the environment can imply that
markets might not converge to perfect competition as matching frictions vanish.
In particular, Gale (2000) [30] shows that the assumption of anonymity, that is,
that traders do not condition their strategies on a particular individual agent in
the market, is critical for the convergence to perfect competition to occur when
market frictions converge to zero. Lauermann (2013) [51] provides a general
approach to the set of conditions required for random matching and bargaining
games to converge to the competitive outcome as frictions vanish.
This study assumes a trading mechanism where the sellers post prices to anony-
mous buyers who purchase from the cheapest priced seller they know, which is
similar to the trading mechanism used in the aforementioned studies of Sat-
terthwaite and Shneyerov (2007, 2008) [67, 68] and Lauermann et al (2018)
[52], where agents trade through first price auctions: buyers post offers, and the
seller sells to the highest posted offer. A candidate avenue for further research
would be to extend the model to other trading mechanisms beyond price post-
ing by the sellers. However, classic results obtained in cooperative game theory
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(e.g., Debreu and Scarf (1963) [14] and Aumann (1964) [3]) and the mecha-
nism design literature (e.g., Hammond (1979) [38]), suggest that in large (i.e.
continuum of agents) economies without frictions and restrictions on specific
trading mechanisms will arrive at allocations that correspond to competitive
equilibria. These results appear to suggest that satisfactory models that de-
scribe market frictions should utilize a trading mechanism that implies in an
equilibrium allocation that converges to the competitive allocation as frictions
vanish, as already is the case in this paper.
It is important to emphasize that this study does not present a model for firm
growth (unlike Luttmer (2006) [54]). For example, instead of representing firms,
the sellers in the model can be interpreted to be individual stores or brands in a
market for a homogeneous good while firms can own several stores or brands in
the same market as well as the fact that firm grow tends to involve expansion of
the firms activities into additional markets besides the expansion of their sales
in markets in which they currently operate. However, this study provides a
model of market consolidation and entry that can be used to construct a model
of firm growth.
Finally, in the endogenous entry extension of the model, I showed existence and
uniqueness of the equilibrium that corresponds to a steady-state with constant
population of sellers. An empirical application for the model is that is establishes
a positive relationship between the average level of markups and entry costs.
The increase in average markups globally since 1980 (shown in De Loecker
and Eeckhout (2018) [10]) can also be explained, besides an shift to shorter
product life cycles, as result of the shift from industries such as commodity
like industries, where most costs are variable, to industries such as information
technology and pharmaceuticals where R&D costs are a substantial fraction of
the total costs of a product while marginal costs are relatively low. An avenue
for future research would be to solve the non-steady state version of model with
free entry: as profit margins are higher when an industry is young, one would
expect initially a high entry rate that would decrease as the industry converges
to the steady-state equilibrium.
A shortcoming of the model presented in this study is that the degree of ran-
domization of the price posting strategy of individual sellers depends on the
relative size of the seller’s type to the aggregate customer base of sellers oper-
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ating. This is an issue because it implies that if the cumulative distribution of
customer bases is continuous the model then it does not yield an equilibrium
in randomized price posting strategies for individual sellers and the empirical
evidence is that price dispersion among prices with transactions with individual
sellers is substantial in product markets. In a related study, Guthmann (2019)
[35] constructs an equilibrium in a dynamic duopoly game where the incum-
bent and the entrant sellers post prices according to a pair of distributions that
have the same support even though one distribution first order stochastically
dominates the other. However, this kind of asymmetric price posting strategies
can only be implemented when some sellers have a non-negligible share of the
aggregate market. I conjecture that another avenue to expand the degree of
individual seller price randomization in equilibrium would be to allow for dif-
ferent cost functions. Decreasing marginal costs might result in an equilibrium
where sellers with smaller customer bases have, simultaneously, incentive to
post prices that are higher and lower than prices posted by a competitor with
a larger customer base.
Another important shortcoming of this model is the assumption that individual
sellers can produce arbitrary quantities of the good with constant marginal cost.
This implicitly means that sellers have access to frictionless factor markets that
enable then to replicate the scale of supply to any desired level. Hence, this
model describes the equilibrium with frictions in a single market but implicitly
assumes that its intermediary input markets are frictionless.
Chapter 4
Vanishing market power
In many markets no two suppliers are identical: even two shops that sell iden-
tical products are located at different addresses and might offer slightly dif-
ferent selections of goods, which differentiates then to a certain degree. The
prevalence of differentiation among sellers in many markets might be a problem
for the broad applicability of the model of competitive equilibrium. For the
competitive model to have broad empirical relevance it must be provided with
strategic foundations from models where terms of trade are not taken as given,
that incorporate differentiated sellers, and that converge to perfect competition
as market frictions vanish. Hart (1979) [39] provides strategic foundations for
perfect competition in an economy with differentiated commodities. He shows
that prices converge to marginal cost as each firm becomes small relative to
the aggregate economy but does so without incorporating explicit market fric-
tions. Models that do provide convergence results to perfect competition and
incorporate explicit trading frictions study markets for identical commodities.1
This chapter argues that monopolistic competition and market frictions are
related: Decision makers might be small relative to the aggregate economy but
large relative to the small coalition of other decision makers that are in contact
with them. As market frictions become smaller traders can more easily contact
each other and market power vanishes, even in an environment where firms have
1See, e.g., Noshek (1985) [61], Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) [66], Gale (1986a,1986b,
1987, 2000) [27, 28, 29, 30], Sonnenschein and McLennan (1991) [55], De Fraja and Sákovics
(2001) [9], Satterthwaite and Schneyerov (2007, 2008) [67, 68], Lauermann (2013) [51], Lauer-
mann, Merzyn and Virag (2018) [52].
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a monopoly on the variety they supply. I show this result holds as long as the
degree of product differentiation varies continuously and there is a large number
of varieties available.
I study a market for a product category where there are many producers and
consumers, and each producer holds a monopoly on the supply of a variety of
a good. There are many imperfect substitutes whose degree of substitutability
varies continuously.2 Each consumer in this market has different tastes for
different varieties. There are market frictions that might prevent consumers
and producers from trading. Market frictions are represented here by consumers
being imperfectly aware of the varieties available. The number of varieties that
a consumer is aware of is determined by a random matching process.
This study develops a way of representing market frictions in a fully static
setting. Usually, random matching games are used to explicitly represent market
frictions as a dynamic sequential of process of random matching and bargaining.
In this study, there is a random matching process which yields a network, and all
trading is done simultaneously through the network. It is a mechanism similar
to Perla (2017) [63], and has similarities with models that assume exogenous
search 3. This makes the model easily tractable. In addition, both the degree
of awareness of individual consumers as well as their preferences are private
information.
Under certain conditions this model features a unique Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies, where all producers post a price between the marginal cost and the
monopoly price for their product. As the frictions of trading decreases, the
equilibrium price converges to a Walrasian price and each consumer purchases
a variety offered in the market that is arbitrarily close to the variety most
2Note that it is common in macroeconomics to assume that every producer holds a
monopoly on the supply of its product and the output of all other producers has exactly
the same elasticity of substitution (as in Gali’s (2015) [31] popular textbook). It is more
accurate to say that product differentiation is better represented by a continuum of degrees of
differentiability instead of the assumption of constant elasticity of substitution between any
pair of product varieties. For example, economy class flights from a particular airline can
be imperfectly substituted by bus or train rides, more closely substituted by a flight from a
low-cost airline or high-speed rail and almost perfectly substituted by a flight from another
airline of the same category. This is the case in Hart (1979), Jones (1984) as well as in this
paper.
3E.g., Diamond (1987) [17], Kaplan and Menzio (2016) [49], Burdett and Menzio (2018)
[6].
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congruent to their tastes. That is, the equilibrium allocation converges to the
perfectly competitive allocation.
The space of varieties is a compact metric space. The degree of product differ-
entiation is the degree of variation in utility relative to distance between two
varieties. In a specific example where the degree of product differentiation is
fixed, I show that the degree of product differentiation affects market prices
when there are frictions: the higher the degree of product differentiation, the
higher is the level of markups over marginal cost. However, for any degree
of product differentiation, when market frictions vanish market power vanishes
as well. An important implication of this study is that imperfectly competitive
behavior observed in markets is not fundamentally caused by product differenti-
ation but by the existence of market frictions. However, the degree of deviation
from competitive outcomes caused by market frictions are magnified by the
existence of product differentiation.
In addition, I study the welfare implications of equilibrium. When there are
frictions the equilibrium is not necessarily Pareto efficient due to the presence
of asymmetric information. But, by performing the optimal mechanism design
for this environment, I show that the equilibrium in this market is constrained
efficient.
An important observation on the equilibrium concept of this model is that, un-
like in standard search models (see Lauermann et. al. (2018) [52]), equilibrium
is not premised on the assumption that consumers and producers have informa-
tion about the aggregate supply capacity of the producers in the market, which
determines the competitive equilibrium price. Producers formulate their best
response strategies from the distribution of prices posted by other producers
(described by s∗) and the distribution of customer types in their customer base.
The fact that in this model the Nash equilibrium strategy profile approximates
the Walrasian equilibrium when frictions are low provides strategic foundations
for the model of competitive equilibrium without assuming that decision makers
know ex-ante what the competitive equilibrium price should be.
In this case decision makers do not need to form beliefs regarding what the
competitive equilibrium price must be. That is, they do not need to form be-
liefs about aggregate supply capacity of the whole market to formulate their
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price posting strategies, instead they only need “local” information which is the
distribution of types of their customers and the prevailing distribution of prices
s∗. Therefore, this model provides another example of Hayek’s (1945) [40] idea
that markets prices allow decision makers to act as if they had information
about the relative scarcity of a good without being in actual possession of this
information. As proven by Jordan (1982) [46], competitive equilibrium prices
are uniquely informationally efficient, this study extends the logic that prices
transmit information from the competitive environment to a strategic environ-
ment, where prices are chosen by the decision makers instead of being taken as
given.
4.1 Environment
I study a market for a product category. This product category is represented
by a one-dimensional compact metric space of varieties, the closed unit inter-
val. Two varieties in [0, 1] which are close will be regarded as having similar
properties and yield similar utility to the consumers.
I study a market for a product category. There is a continuum of producers and
consumers, both sets of measure 1 and are uniformly distributed on the unit
interval. Each producer j ∈ [0, 1] produces variety j at marginal cost normalized
to 0 and has a capacity constraint q > 0. Each consumer i has unit demand for
the product category with valuation v(i, l) ∈ [0, 1] for variety l. The function
v : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] is continuous and satisfies v(i, i) = 1, v(i, l) < 1,∀l 6= i. That
is consumers have a favorite variety and valuation across different varieties and
consumers varies continuously.4
Each consumer is aware of a finite subset of producers Ai, that she can trade
with. Let ai = |Ai|. Each producer j has a continuum aj ∈ R+ of consumers who
are aware of him (which I call j’s customer base), which satisfies the following
consistency condition with the cardinality (i.e., ai) of consumer’s awareness∫ 1
0
aidi =
∫ 1
0
ajdj. (4.1)
4These preferences are a simple example of preferences the one-dimensional case of Hart
(1979) [38] or Jones (1984) [45].
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The cardinality of the sets {Ai}i is distributed according to a Poisson distri-
bution with parameter a =
∫ 1
0
ajdj, with probability mass function pik(a) for
k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. The following subsection describes the random matching pro-
cess between consumers and producers that generates the sets {Ai}i and pik(a)
from a profile of consumer bases {aj}j.
4.1.1 Matching process that determines buyers’ aware-
ness
The distribution of the cardinality of Ai is determined by a random matching
mechanism where each producer’s customer base is a simple random sample
from the interval [0, 1]. As in Guthmann (2019) [36], to provide a description of
the matching process in the environment with a continuum of consumers and
producers, we consider an environment with finitely many buyers and producers
and replicate it to infinity, postulating that its properties at the limit to hold
in the continuum economy. Let I and J be the set of consumers and producers
and nc and np be its cardinalities, respectively.
Let µ, ν ∈ N. Consider a µν-replica of this economy, with set of customers Iµν
which is µ× ν replica of I and set of producers Jµν , a ν-replica of J , with each
replica indexed as Jµν = {J1, . . . , Jν}, and each producer is known by ajµ ∈ N
consumers. Let ν be large enough so that
νnc >
np∑
j=1
ajµ
and suppose that the sequence {ajµ/µ}µ converges to some aj ∈ R+ for each j ∈
{1, . . . , np}. Therefore, the sequence {∑ ajµ/µnp}µ converges to a = ∑npj=1 aj.
Consider a matching process of {1, . . . , ν} rounds between consumers in Iν and
producers in Jν such that in round n ∈ {1, . . . , ν} matching is described by a
matching function g : Iν × Jν ×Sν → {0, 1}, where Sν is the set of states of the
world, number 0 denotes matched and 1 not matched. The matching function
CHAPTER 4. VANISHING MARKET POWER 87
satisfies ∑
j∈Jn
g(i, j, s) ∈ {0, 1}, (4.2)∑
i∈Iµν
g(i, j, s) = µaj,∀j ∈ Jn. (4.3)
Condition 4.2 states that consumers can only match with at most one producer
in Jn. Condition 4.3 states that the number of consumers matched to producer
j is the size of j’s customer base.
The matching probabilities are described by the probability space (Sν ,Sν , Pν),
where Sν is a σ-algebra on Sνand Pν is a probability measure on Sν . Consider
the event pii,n ∈ Sν , where consumer i is matched to a producer in round n ∈
{1, . . . , ν}, the probability measure Pν satisfies
Pν(pii,n) =
∑nP
j=1 a
jµ
νnc
. (4.4)
Note that Pν(pii,n) is invariant to i ∈ Iµν and n ∈ {1, . . . , ν}. Consider event
pii,j where i is matched to a producer j ∈ Jn, Pν satisfies
Pν(pii,j) =
ajµ
νnc
. (4.5)
Let Ai(s) = {j ∈ Jµν : g(i, j, s) = 1} be the set of producers that i is matched
with, that is, the set of producers that i is aware of given state of the world s.
The matching technology 4.4 implies in that after all ν rounds the distribution
of the number of producers known to a consumer (the distribution of |Ai|)
follows a binomial distribution with parameters Pν(pii,n) for the probability of
success and ν for the number of experiments. Let nc = np and taking ν → ∞,
by the Poisson limit theorem, the binomial distribution converges to a Poisson
distribution with parameter a, and Ai is sampled from [0, 1] according to a
Poisson point process.
In addition, consider the probability that an arbitrary consumer i is aware of n
other producers conditional on being matched to j in some round, this probabil-
ity follows a binomial distribution with parameters Pν(pii,n) or the probability
of success and ν − 1 for the number of experiments. Taking ν → ∞, it is ob-
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Figure 4.1: Diagram represents a consumer i is aware of 3 different sellers so
Ai = {j, j′, j′′}.
vious that this distribution converges to the same Poisson as the unconditional
probability.
From the perspective of the consumers, a can be interpreted as the discovery
rate as they are searching in a market in continuous time, where each consumer
discovers a producer in the market at Poisson rate of a for one period, while
producer j accumulate potential customers at the rate aj, but instead of a
accumulating a discrete number of consumers, aj is a continuum flow rate.
After the search and matching period, consumers can trade with any producers
they meet during their search.
4.2 The Game
Producer j ∈ [0, 1] strategy is a contract specified by a price p ∈ R in exchange
for a unit of variety j of consumption good. A strategy profile s : [0, 1] → R
assigns a price s(j) posted by producer j. Since consumer’s types are private
information, the producers cannot make contracts that discriminate among con-
sumers in their customer base.
The consumer chooses whether to trade or not. If she chooses to trade, she
can choose among contracts posted among producers that she is aware of, that
is contracts posted by producers in Ai. I assume that consumers choose the
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contract that yields the highest valuation, conditional on it being preferred to
no trade.
A producer does not observe the valuations of the consumers who are aware
of him and also does not observe the set of other sellers their consumers are
aware of (the Ai of their customers). They form beliefs about the consumer’s
types based on the distribution of consumers and producers on the unit interval
and on the distribution of the cardinality of the consumer’s awareness sets Ai.
Producers’ beliefs are consistent with rational expectations: producer j’s belief
of a random consumer’s valuation is v(i, j) with i uniformly distributed over the
unit interval. A producer j’s beliefs regarding the number of other producers
a consumer might be aware of is a Poisson with parameter a. The producer
assumes that the awareness set of the consumer, Ai, is a random sample from
the unit interval with distribution weighted by aj/a (see 4.5) as producers are
distributed uniformly in the unit interval but aj varies on j. Which means that
for an arbitrary consumer i, the probability that producer j ∈ Ai is in [0, x] is
described by the cumulative distribution G, given by
G(x) =
∫ x
0
ajdj
a
, (4.6)
as producers more well known by consumers have a higher probability of being
in Ai.
Let Pj(p, s) be the probability that a random consumer accepts producer j’s
contract, given posted price p, strategy profile s of other producers, and a > 0.
Pj satisfies
Pj(p, s) = pi
0(a)P 0j (p, s) + pi
1(a)P 1j (p, s) + pi
2(a)P 2j (p, s) + . . . , (4.7)
where P nj (p, s) be the probability that a random consumer prefers j’s contract
over the contracts posted by n competing producers and to no trading, and
pin(a) is the producer j’s belief that a consumer who knows j is aware of n
other producers. As each producer has a continuum of consumers who are
aware of then, producer’s profits are deterministic and given by
Πj(p, s) = pmin{ajPj(p, s), q}, (4.8)
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where q is the producer’s capacity constraint.
4.2.1 Derivation of a closed form Pj
Consumers are distributed uniformly over the unit interval, so P n(p, s) is given
by
P nj (p, s) =
∫
[0,1]n+1
I{v(i,j)−p≥max{(v(i,jk)−s(jk))nk=1,0}}(i, j
1, . . . , jn)d(i, G(j1), . . . , G(jn)),
(4.9)
where
I{v(i,j)−p≥max{(v(i,jk)−s(jk))nk=1,0}}(i, j
1, . . . , jn) ∈ {0, 1} (4.10)
is the indicator function of whether the contract (j, p) is preferred by i over
not trading (i.e., v(i, j)− p ≥ 0), and over the profile of contracts (jk, s(jk))nk=1
posted by producers j1, . . . , jn (i.e., v(i, j)−p ≥ v(i, jk)−s(jk),∀k ∈ {1, . . . , n}).
As the indicator function satisfies
I{v(i,j)−p≥max{(v(i,jk)−s(jk))nk=1,0}}(i, j
1, . . . , jn) (4.11)
= I{v(i,j)−p≥0}(i)× I{v(i,j)−p≥v(i,j1)−s(j1)}(i, j1)× . . .× I{v(i,j)−p≥v(i,jn)−s(jn)}(i, jn),
(4.12)
then P n(p, s) satisfies
Pnj (p, s)
=
∫ 1
0
I{v(i,j)−p≥0}(i)
[∫ 1
0
I{v(i,j)−p≥v(i,j1)−s(j1)}(i, j1)dG(j1)× . . .×
∫ 1
0
I{v(i,j)−p≥v(i,jn)−s(jn)}(i, jn)dG(jn)
]
di
(4.13)
=
∫ 1
0
I{(j,p)iR}(i)
[∫ 1
0
I{v(i,j)−p≥v(i,j′)−s(j′)}(i, j′)dG(j′)
]n
di, (4.14)
from Fubini–Tonelli theorem.
Substituting P n in equation 4.7 by the left hand side of 4.14, implies that the
probability of sale to a random consumer Pj(p, s, a) satisfies
Pj(p, s) =
∫ 1
0
I{v(i,j)−p≥0}(i) exp
[
−a
(
1−
∫ 1
0
I{v(i,j)−p≥v(i,j′)−s(j′)}(i, j′)dG(j′)
)]
di.
(4.15)
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4.3 Equilibrium
Definition 4.1. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile s∗ : [0, 1] → R+ such
that for each producer j posting s∗(j) is a best response to s∗, that is s∗(j)
maximizes Πj(p, s) over p given strategy profile s∗.
4.3.1 Convergence to competitive equilibrium
Before characterizing properties of the equilibrium, I define a competitive equi-
librium for this market to compare it with the Nash equilibrium. A competitive
equilibrium is a profile of prices for varieties such that demand for varieties
is equal to supply, where consumers have full awareness of all varieties in the
market and can choose any variety from the unit interval. Demand for vari-
eties is defined as the limiting ratio of the measure of consumers that choose to
purchase a subset of varieties divided by the measure of the subset when that
subset converges to a point.
Formally, a profile of prices for varieties is a function p : [0, 1] → R+. Con-
sumers can randomize their consumption: for example, consume variety l with
probability α and not-consume any variety with probability 1− α. The reason
for why I allow for randomization is to convexify demand: although there is a
continuum of consumers in this economy (Aumann (1966) [4]) there is only one
consumer i with preferences given by valuation function v(i, .) and i’s demand
is indivisible.
Let ∆ = {x ∈ [0, 1]l : ∑k x(k) ≤ 1, l ∈ N} be the consumption set of consumers,
∆ is the set of probability distributions with assign positive probability mass of
consuming a finite subset of l ∈ N different varieties and probability zero for all
other varieties. The consumer problem is to choose a finite subset of varieties
which maximizes their utility, consumer i’s Walrasian demand xi satisfies
xi ∈ arg max
x∈∆
∑
{j:xi(j)>0}
x(j)[v(i, j)− p(j)].
Let X be the aggregate demand implied by a profile of individual consumption
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bundles (xi)i∈[0,1], it satisfies
X(j) =

∑
{i:xi(j)>0} xi(j) if {i : xi(j) > 0} <∞
∞ else.
(4.16)
Producer j choice of output Y (j) of variety j satisfies
Y (j) ∈ arg max
z∈[0,q]
p(j)z. (4.17)
The pair ((xi)i∈[0,1], Y ) represents an allocation of consumption profiles (xi)i∈[0,1]
and output profile Y .
Definition 4.2. A competitive equilibrium is an allocation ((xi)i∈[0,1], Y ) profile
of prices pW : [0, 1]→ R+ such that X(l) = Y (l) for all varieties l ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 4.1. The unique competitive equilibrium price pW : [0, 1] → R+
satisfies for all l ∈ [0, 1],
pW (l) =
0 if q > 11 if q < 1. (4.18)
Note that in competitive equilibrium the prices are the same for almost every
variety. The reason for that property is that supply is by construction symmetric
across varieties and if prices are identical then all consumers will purchase their
favorite variety (which is, for consumer i, variety j = i, which is consistent with
equilibrium if pW (l) ≤ 1) or will not purchase anything (which is consistent
with equilibrium if pW (l) ≥ 1), which is consistent with equilibrium.
Consider the case where q > 1, then supply for varieties will be always strictly
greater than 1 for strictly positive prices while demand for at least a some
variety will be less or equal to 1. Consider the case where q < 1, if prices are
higher than 1 for some variety j then demand for j will be zero and supply
will be q > 0, not consistent with equilibrium, if prices are lower than 1 for
a positive measure of varieties demand for those varieties will be higher than
supply, which is also not an equilibrium.
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Theorem 4.1. Consider a sequence {an}n of producer awareness profiles an =
(ajn)j∈[0,1] such that limn→∞ ajn = ∞ for all j ∈ [0, 1] with max{ajn/aj′n : j, j′ ∈
[0, 1]} < A for some A > 0 for all n, then the Nash equilibrium pricing strategy
s∗(j,an) must satisfy for almost every j ∈ [0, 1]
lim
n→∞
s∗(j,an) =
1 if q < 10 if q > 1,
and the competitive equilibrium allocation converges in probability, for almost
every variety, to a competitive equilibrium allocation ((xi)i∈[0,1], Y ).
Theorem 4.1 shows that the Nash equilibrium converges to the competitive
equilibrium as the parameter a converges to infinity (that is, as market frictions
vanish and the market network becomes perfectly “thick”). Even though each
producer is a monopolist of their specific variety the elasticity of demand con-
verges to infinity as a converges to infinity. The reason is that the probability
that customers of a producer j are aware of competing producers producing a
variety at a distance  > 0 converges to 1 as a → ∞, therefore undercutting
competing producers becomes profitable. The competition between producers
implies that as a → ∞ the Nash equilibrium pricing strategy s∗ : [0, 1] → R+
must converge to 0 almost everywhere.
4.3.2 Existence
In this subsection I show a set of sufficient conditions for the existence of equi-
librium. In particular sufficient conditions for symmetric equilibrium to exist:
a price p∗ such that posting p∗ is a best response for any producer if all other
producers are also posting p∗.
Let
Λji(x) = m({i ∈ [0, 1] : v(i, j) ≥ x})
(where m is the Lebesgue measure) for x ∈ [0, 1], be the fraction of consumers
whose reservation price for j’s product is higher than x. Let
Λjij′(x) =
∫ 1
0
I{v(i,j)−v(i,j′)≥x}(i, j′)dG(j′)
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be the consumer base weighted fraction of producers such that j’s variety is
preferred conditional on its price being x higher than other producer’s prices.
The assumptions below state “symmetry” conditions on v which are part of
sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric equilibrium.
Condition 1: For all j, j˜ ∈ [0, 1], x ∈ [0, 1],
Λji(x)
Λji(x′)
=
Λj˜i(x)
Λj˜i(x
′)
.
Condition 2: For all j, j˜ ∈ [0, 1], x ∈ [0, 1],
Λjij′(x)
Λjij′(x)
=
Λj˜ij′(x)
Λj˜ij′(x)
.
Condition 3: For all j ∈ [0, 1], aj = a.
Let p be the monopoly price which solves
max
p∈R
pΛji(p). (4.19)
Note that p that solves 4.19 is the same for all producers if Condition 1 is
satisfied.
Theorem 4.2. If v satisfies conditions 1, 2 and 3, is piecewise concave on i
and j, and satisfies P nj (p′, p) > 0 for all p′, p ∈ (0, p), and n > 0, then there
exists a symmetric equilibrium price p∗.
4.4 Analytical example
Consider the functional form for the valuation function of each i ∈ [0, 1],
v(i, j) = 1− λδ(i, j) (4.20)
where
δ(i, j) = min{|i− j|, 1− |i− j|}
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and λ ∈ (0, 1]. That is [0, 1] represents a circle and δ is the distance between
two points in the circle and consumers prefer varieties closer to their location
in the circle (as in Hotelling’s (1929) [44] model of geographical differentiation).
Suppose that all producers have the same aj so G(x) = x.
As λ ≤ 1, the monopoly price is p = 1−λ/2, which implies all consumers prefer
to trade at the monopoly price rather than not trade. Consider a price p ≤ p.
Then, suppose other producers are all posting a price p′ (that is, s(j) = p′,∀j ∈
[0, 1]). Let
 =
p′ − p
λ
,
 is the undercut factor, that is the degree that j’s price is above or below the
price posted by the other producers relative to the degree of product substi-
tutability. In this case a contract (j, p) if preferred over a competing contract
(j′, p′) if and only if δ(i, j) −  ≤ δ(i, j′). The symmetry of the circle implies
that ∫ 1
0
I{v(i,j)−v(i,j′)≥−}(i, j′)dj′ = min{1, 1− 2 (δ(i, j)− )}.
I drop the j subscripts from P n and P as the valuation function implies that
P n and P are the same for all j. Which implies that the probability that a
consumer purchases conditional on being aware of n other producers satisfies
for n ≥ 0,
P n(p, p′) =
∫ 1
0
[∫ 1
0
I{(j,p)i(j′,s(j′))}(i, j
′)dj′
]n
di
=
∫ 1
0
{[1− 2 (δ(i, j)− )] ∩ [0, 1]}n di
= 2
∫ 1/2
0
{[1− 2 (x− )] ∩ [0, 1]}n dx
=
2
{∫ 1/2

[1− 2 (x− )]ndx+ 
}
if  > 0
2
{∫ 1/2+
0
[1− 2 (x− )]ndx
}
if  < 0
=
 1n+1(1− 2)n+1 + 2 if  > 01
n+1
(1 + 2)n+1 if  < 0.
(4.21)
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Substituting in 4.8,
P (p, p′) =
2+ 1a [exp(−2a)− exp(−a)] if  > 01
a
[exp(2a)− exp(−a)] if  < 0.
(4.22)
The proposition below states that the symmetric Nash equilibrium exists for
a ∈ R+[a, a] and is unique. Where a and a are positive real numbers such
that a < a .
Theorem 4.3. If consumer valuations satisfy 4.20 there is a pair a, a ∈ R+
where 0 < a < a, such that if a satisfies
a /∈ [a, a],
then there exists a corresponding unique symmetric Nash Equilibrium price p∗ ∈
(0, 1]. The quantity sold by each producer in equilibrium is
min{q, 1− pi0(a)}. (4.23)
If p∗ < p then p∗ is given by
p∗ =
λ
2a
. (4.24)
If the quantity sold is smaller than 1− pi0(a), the capacity constraint is hit and
the equilibrium price is given by
p∗ = 1− λ
a
(log(1− exp(−a))− log(1− exp(−a)− q)) . (4.25)
Note that equilibrium does not always exist here. The reason is that, under
some values of a, the condition Pj(p′, p) > 0 is not satisfied if p′ is too high
relative to p.
4.4.1 Numerical example
Let λ = .5 then for a ∈ R+[0.50, 0.72] and q ≥ 1, p∗(a) satisfying equation
4.24 is the unique equilibrium. For awareness parameter a in [0.50, 0.72] a
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symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist. The figure below
plots the equilibrium price as a function of a. Note that it converges to marginal
cost as a converges to infinity.
aa
p
a
p
0
p∗(a)
Suppose that the capacity constraint is smaller than 1, for example, q = 3/4,
then for a > 1.39 the capacity constraint is binding, so the equilibrium price
jumps from 0.18 to 0.75 at a > 1.39 and from equation 4.25 converges to 1 as
a → ∞. This discontinuity in price posting arises when the supply constraint
is hit and producers cannot undercut their prices as they lack the capacity to
supply the additional demand.
4.5 Welfare analysis
In this section I use mechanism design techniques to define constrained efficiency
in this environment and to compare it to the equilibrium found in the model.
There are two purposes for the welfare analysis performed in this section. First,
note that it is easy to see that the trading mechanism that was assumed in
this environment (sellers post prices and buyers choose their favorite contract
among the set of contracts they are aware of) is a incentive-compatible direct
mechanism. Second, I show that a pure strategy equilibrium is a constrained
efficient mechanism. Equilibrium allocations are not necessarily efficient in the
sense that they maximize market surplus on the set of allocations constrained
by imperfect awareness. They are constrained efficient in the sense that there
does not exist any implementable mechanism that Pareto dominates it. That
is, if agents were free to choose any trading protocol, there does not exist an
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alternative trading protocol that, ex-post, makes some decision makers better
off without making others worse off. Therefore, the trading protocol of price
posting by the producers/sellers that is observed in most product markets with
product differentiation is consistent with an optimal allocation mechanism that
is constrained by asymmetric information.
I show that the allocation implied by an equilibrium price posting strategy
s∗ : [0, 1] → R+ is always efficient5. Constrained efficiency is obtained because
the pricing strategies yield an ex-post profile of producer and consumer utilities
that is not Pareto dominated by any other feasible allocation. The set of feasible
allocations is defined here to be the allocations that can be implemented by a
feasible allocation mechanism.
By the revelation principle if an allocation can be implemented by an arbitrary
mechanism in this static environment it can be implemented by a incentive-
compatible-direct-mechanism, so I restrict attention to direct revelation mech-
anisms. Let A be the set of finite subsets of [0, 1], that is the set of possible
awareness profiles of a particular consumer. Let θ ∈ Θ be a consumer of type θ,
who has preferences indexed by  (θ) ∈ [0, 1], and is aware of a set of producers
A(θ) ∈ A, where Θ = [0, 1]×A is the set of consumer types.
I define a direct revelation mechanism F as
F : Θ→ [0, 1]× R (4.26)
that maps a consumer of announced type θ into a variety j(θ) ∈ A(θ) ⊂ [0, 1]
the consumer consumes (where j(θ) = ∅ represents not trade) and numeraire
transfers t(θ) ∈ R the consumer receives. Given a profile of announced types,
F also implements an allocation where producer of variety j receives transfer
t(j) and produces quantity q(j).
Definition 4.3. A mechanism F is feasible if and only if F satisfies:
(i) (Incentive compatibility) For a consumer of type θ ∈ [0, 1],
F (θ) i(θ) F (θˆ),∀θˆ ∈ Θ s.t. j(θˆ) ∈ A(θ). (4.27)
5I note that this result holds without assumptions 1 and 2, which are used to provide
sufficient conditions for existence.
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(ii) (Physical feasibility) For each producer j, the quantity produced is given by
q(j) = a
∫ 1
0
[
I{j=j(θ(i))}(i)
]
di,
where θ(i) is the type of i ∈ [0, 1] and satisfies the capacity constraint (q(j) ≤ q).
(iii) (Non-negative net balance) The transfers add up to zero∫ 1
0
t(θ(i))di+
∫ 1
0
t(j)dj = 0.
Definition 4.3 states that a direct revelation mechanism F is feasible if it is phys-
ically feasible, so each consumer consumes only the product from one producer
that she actually knows (that is, j(θˆ) ∈ A(θ)), producers produce a feasible
quantity, the transfers involving consumers and producers add-up, and it is
incentive compatible.
Pareto-dominance is defined ex-post for the economy: given a profile {Ai}i of
awareness among consumers an allocation Pareto-dominates another if there
exists another feasible allocation that Pareto dominates it.
Definition 4.4. A mechanism F is Pareto-dominated by another mechanism
F ′ if F ′ is feasible, and for every consumer type θ, F (θ)  F ′(θ) and for all
producer j ∈ [0, 1], profits are equal or higher under F ′ than F , with at least a
strict inequality for a subset of consumers and or producers of strictly positive
measure.
From definitions 4.3 and 4.4, Pareto-efficiency is defined
Definition 4.5. A mechanism F is constrained efficient if it is feasible and
there is no mechanism that Pareto-dominates it.
Theorem 4.4. The incentive-compatible-direct-mechanism F ∗ which is implied
by a Nash equilibrium price posting profile s∗ is constrained efficient.
Constrained efficiency follows from the fact that in equilibrium producers post
the same price to all their consumers and maximize profits. Any incentive
compatible mechanism must satisfy the property that for any set of consumers
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who consume the same variety the transfers are the same for all these consumers
as otherwise they will choose to misreport their type. Any mechanism that
implements an allocation that yields a higher aggregate market surplus than the
allocation implied by the Nash equilibrium will have to pay higher information
rents to certain consumers and, hence, to all the consumers who consumer the
same varieties, which either reduces profits of the producers of these varieties
or violates the non-negative net balance condition.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter presented a theory of industry pricing with a continuum of degrees
of product differentiation, market frictions (represented by imperfect product
awareness), and asymmetric information. I show that, under certain assump-
tions, the model has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
and the equilibrium price depends both on the degree of product differentiation
as well as on the degree of market frictions.
The equilibrium price was shown to be strictly increasing in the degree of prod-
uct differentiation and on the degree of market frictions. But, for any degree
of product differentiation, I also show that when market frictions converge to
zero the equilibrium price converges to a price consistent with Walrasian equi-
librium. This is an important result because this study provides a justification
of the use of the model of competitive equilibrium even in markets which are
characterized by product differentiation as long as market frictions are low. It
also suggests that the presence of product differentiation amplifies the effect of
market frictions on market prices. Finally, I perform welfare analysis and I show
that the trading mechanism used in the model (price posting by the producers)
is an efficient incentive compatible mechanism.
The work done here can be extended to include endogenous matching costs (for
instance, advertising costs such as in Perla (2017)). In addition, providing proof
of convergence to perfect competition in more general differentiated product
spaces (as described by Jones (1984) [45]) and the characterization of more
general conditions for existence and uniqueness could be helpful.
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Chapter 5
Appendix
5.1 Appendix to Chapter 2
5.1.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof. Consider the following mechanism: let I be the set of buyers who know
seller j and they can participate in a mechanism with the seller. The buyer
i ∈ I of type θi chooses to report a type θˆi to the mechanism and the mechanism
allocates the perishable good produced by the seller to the buyers xi(θˆ) ∈ {0, 1}
and transfers to the seller and the buyers {tj(θˆ), {ti(θˆ)}i∈I} where tj = −
∑
ti(θˆ)
given a profile of reported types θˆ = {θˆi}. In such mechanism the buyer would
report it’s type θˆ ∈ {0, 1} where θˆ = 0 means the buyer claims it doesn’t know
the competitor and θˆ = 1 means that the buyer claims it knows the competitor.
The seller’s marginal cost of production is normalized to zero and the seller
designs the mechanism. So I assume that the mechanism maximizes the seller’s
revenue. Since the seller wants to maximize revenue it’s easy to see she will set
xi = 1 for all buyers to induce the highest fraction of buyers into participating
in the mechanism and hence to maximize her net transfers tj(θ). Suppose
that ti(0, θˆ−i) > ti(1, θˆ−i), then it’s obvious that all buyers who participate in
the mechanism would choose to report 1, by analogous argument, ti(0, θˆ−i) <
ti(1, θˆ−i) is also not IC. Hence the seller has to post the same price for every
buyer for the mechanism to be IC. The revelation principle them implies that
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an optimal sales mechanism for the seller is characterized by the seller posting
a uniform price for the buyers.
5.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proof. First, I show that the pair of distributions that satisfy equations 2.16,
2.17 and 2.14 is an equilibrium. Then I will show there does not exist any other
pair of distributions that satisfy the conditions for equilibrium.
If h posts the lower bound of the support of the distribution the probability of
sale is 1 so the expected profit per unit measure of customer base is p
2
. Hence,
equilibrium implies in following equal profit condition for a price p ∈ (p
2
, 1) for
seller h:
p(1−mlσl2(m, p)) = p2(m) = 1−ml2. (5.1)
To keep h indifferent between prices in (p
2
, 1), the distribution σl1 has to satisfy
5.1, so for p ∈ (p
2
, 1),
σl1(m, p) =
1
ml
(
p− p
2
p
)
.
And the equal profit condition for the seller with smaller customer base is for
prices in the interior of [p
2
, 1],
p(1−mhσh2 (m, p)) = p2
⇒ σh2 (m, p) =
1
mh
(
p− p
2
p
)
.
Note that if mh > ml for all p ∈ [p
2
, 1],
σl1(m, p) > σ
h
1 (m, p),
lim
p↑1
σh2 (m, p) < 1.
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Hence, σh2 (.) has an atom at p = 1 with mass
σh2 (m, 1)− lim
p↑1
σh2 (m, p) = 1−
1
mh
(
1− p
2
(m)
1
)
= 1− m
l
mh
.
Then seller l will be indifferent between posting 1 or prices in the support but
lower than 1 because the endogenous tie-breaking rule implies that l will be
selling the good with probability
1−mh2 lim
p↑1
σh2 (p) = 1−mh2
ml2
mh2
= 1−ml2
if l posts 1.
To see that this is an equilibrium note that sellers will decrease their profits
by posting prices lower than p
2
and that both sellers are indifferent between
posting prices over the support.
To show uniqueness I first show that the equilibrium distributions don’t have
atoms in the interior of the support, then I show that they will share the same
support and that it is connected. Then given that they share the same support
and feature mixed strategies I show that the equilibrium support must satisfy
equation 2.14. Given that a pair of equilibrium strategies with the property of
being in the support [p
2
, 1] it is easy to see it implies that the pair (σh2 , σl2) will
satisfy 2.16 and 2.17 respectively.
Lemma: In equilibrium any strategy cannot have an atom in the interior of the
support.
Proof: Note that for any pair of distributions (σh2 , σl2), if one of them has an
atom of mass in the interior of the unit interval [0, 1] it is easy to use a standard
undercutting argument to show that it is profit maximizing for any seller to
deviate and post slightly lower prices than the atom. Posting prices equal to
0 is also not optimal because a seller can always make a profit by posting
the monopoly price 1 as max{mE2 ,mI2} < 1. Hence, in any equilibrium, the
distribution of prices will not be characterized by atoms.
Lemma: And in mixed strategy equilibrium the supports of the pair of distri-
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butions must be the same.
Proof: It suppose supp(σh2 ) 6= supp(σl2). Without loss of generality suppose
min{supp(σh2 )} = ph < min{supp(σl2)} = pl, then if h posts ph will yield strictly
lower profits than posting a p ∈ (ph, pl). Contradiction.
Therefore, an equilibrium must feature mixed strategies and a common support.
Lemma: The connected common equilibrium support is [p
2
, 1].
Proof: The common support must be connected otherwise it is easy to see it
wouldn’t be optimal for sellers to post in that support.
The support must include the monopoly price, otherwise the sellers will find
optimal to post the monopoly price over a price at the upper bound of the
support that is strictly lower than the monopoly price.
Suppose that the support of σh2 , σl2 is [p2, 1] with p2 < 1 − ml2, then seller h
will find it optimal to post the monopoly price rather than p
2
. If p
2
> 1 −ml2
to keep h indifferent between prices in the support will imply that seller l will
post 1 with an atom of probability strictly greater than zero which would imply
that h will not be indifferent between posting 1 and lower prices due to the tie
breaking rule. A contradiction.
5.1.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3
Proof. The equal profit condition in period 1 for prices in the interior of the
support [p
1
, 1] is:
v¯j1(p1, σ
−j
1 ,m1) =p1 ×m
j
1 + βv
j
2(m
j
2,m
−j
2 ) =
p×mi1 × (1− σ−j1 (p)m−j1 )+β
(
(1−m−j1 σ−j1 (p))vj2(mj2,m−j2 ) +m−j1 σ−j1 (p)vj2(mj2,m−j2 )
)
.
Solving the equation above for σ−j1 characterizes the pair of equilibrium price
distributions (σI1 , σE2 ) in the interior of the support,
⇒ σ−j1 (p)×m−j1 × p×mj1 + βm−j1 σ−j1 (p)(v2(mj2,m−j2 )− v2(mj2,m−j2 )) = (p− p1)m
j
1
⇒ σ−j1 (p)
[
m−j1 × p×mj1 + βm−j1 (v2(mj2,m−j2 )− v2(mj2,m−j2 ))
]
= (p− p
1
)mj1
⇒ σ−j1 (p) =
p− p
1(
m−j1 × p+ β
(
m−j1
mj1
)
(v2(m
j
2,m
−j
2 )− v2(mj2,m−j2 ))
) = p− p1
m−j1 (p+ ∆j(m1))
.
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Let j be the seller such that pj = max{pE, pI} if pE 6= pI . Then note that 2.20
implies that
lim
p↑1
σj1(p) < 1.
Therefore the distribution σj1 has an atom at 1. Hence a tie occurs with pos-
itive probability if the seller j’s competitor,−j, considers posting a price of 1.
However−j is indifferent between posting 1 and prices in the interior of the sup-
port because the tie breaking rule implies that −j sells the good with probability
one in case of a tie with j.
It is easy to see that present value from posting a price below p
1
will be lower
than posting p
1
and (σE1 , σI1) makes I and E indifferent between posting prices
in the supports of σI1 and σE1 , respectively. Therefore, equations 2.19 and 2.20
characterize a pair of equilibrium price distributions for the first period.
It remains to show that (σE1 , σI1) is the only distribution of prices consistent with
equilibrium. First, by analogous argument as in 2.2, the equilibrium distribution
of prices will not feature atoms in the interior of the support. And by analogous
argument the equilibrium will feature a common connected support.
It it is easy to see that if [p
1
, 1] is the support of equilibrium strategies then
(σE1 , σ
I
1) are the only distributions that make E and I indifferent among prices
posted in the support given the tie-breaking rule. It remains to show that [p
1
, 1]
is the only support consistent with equilibrium.
To see that note that for any upper bound lower than 1 it is easy to see a seller
would strictly prefer to post 1 over that lower bound. While for a lower bound
p < p
1
, would impossible to maintain the equal profit condition with posting 1
for both sellers.
And for a lower bound p > p
1
, it would imply that given the tie-breaking rule,
for one of the sellers it will not be possible to maintain the equal profit condition
between p and 1 for any distribution of prices with support [p, 1]: as posting
the monopoly price 1 would strictly dominate posting p for at least one of the
sellers.
The equilibrium is unique given the assumptions we have made including the
specific tie-breaking rule.
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5.1.4 Relaxing Independence of Discovery
I have assumed that discovery is independent. That is, the probability that
a buyer becomes aware of a seller j is independent of the buyer knowing the
competing seller −j. How does the model’s equilibrium change when we relax
this assumption? One simple way of relaxing this assumption is by assuming
that there are two types of buyers. A fraction α ∈ (0, 1) of the buyers are
“shoppers” (following Stahl (1989)) who can more easily discover sellers than
the other buyers. I assume that the probability that shoppers discover sellers
in a given period is Ξ > 1 times the probability that non-shoppers do. I call a
shopper by a buyer of type s and a non-shopper as ns. Discovery is independent
across shoppers: that is, the probability that a shopper discovers seller j is
independent of the shopper already knowing seller −j.
Let m = (m1,m2) be the pair of customer base measures. Let mjl be the
measure of j’s customers of type l ∈ {s, ns}. With the two types the law of
motion for mjl satisfies:
mjst+1 = (1− δ)mjst + Φ(qjt , 1−mjt)×
Ξ× (α−mjs)
Ξ× (α−mjs) + 1× (1− α−mjns) ,
mjnst+1 = (1− δ)mjnst + Φ(qjt , 1−mjt)×
1× (1− α−mjns)
Ξ× (α−mjs) + 1× (1− α−mjns) ,
where Ξ×(α−m
js)
Ξ×(α−mjs)+1×(1−α−mjns) and
1×(1−α−mjns)
Ξ×(α−mjs)+1×(1−α−mjns) are respectively the
fractions of new customers of types s and ns.
Let M jt be the set of customers of seller j in period t and let ζ
j
t be the fraction
of customers of seller j in period t of type s. Clearly ζjt = m
js
mj
.
Given that the period was arbitrary, a fraction ζ of mj will be shoppers while a
fraction 1− ζ will not. Hence the probability that a customer in mj is in m−j is
P (i ∈M−j : i ∈M j)
=ζjt × P (s ∈M−j : s ∈M j) + (1− ζjt )× P (ns ∈M−j : s ∈M j)
=ζjt × P (s ∈M−j) + (1− ζjt )× P (ns ∈M−j)
=ζjt ×m−js + (1− ζjt )×m−jns
=
mjs
mj
×m−js + m
jns
mj
×m−jns.
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While
P (i ∈M−j) = m
jt
α
6= P (i ∈M−j : i ∈M j).
In this environment the only change is on the probability that a current customer
of a seller will know the competing seller. Hence equation 2.2 becomes
P j(p, σjt ,mt) = 1−
(
mjst
mjt
×m−jst +
mjnst
mjt
×m−jnst
)
σ(p).
It’s clear that no major property of equilibrium changes besides the greater
difficulty in computing equilibrium.
5.2 Appendix to Chapter 3
5.2.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. Sellers of age 1 enter the market with customer base c at any period. In
symmetric equilibrium sellers with the same customer base post prices according
to the same distribution. This implies that the quantity sold by all sellers of age
1 is the same. The law of motion for the customer base implies that all sellers
of age 2 have the same customer base. Following the same argument, for any
period t, sellers of age a ∈ {1, . . . , t} have the same customer bases.
5.2.2 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. The proof is a verification that the operator T satisfies Blackwell’s suffi-
cient conditions for a contraction. Let c+(p, c) = c+Φ(q(p, σˆ, c, cˆ), c), to simplify
notation.
Let T be the operator defined by
T (v)(c) = sup
p∈(−∞,1]
γ(p, σˆ, c, cˆ) + β(1− α)v(c+(p, c)), (5.2)
for β(1 − α) ∈ (0, 1), for a function v ∈ F([0, c],R), where F([0, c],R) is the
space of functions mapping [0, c] into R.
CHAPTER 5. APPENDIX 114
Does T satisfy Blackwell’s sufficiency conditions for a contraction?
(Monotonicity) Let f : [0, c] → R, g : [0, c] → R such that f(c) ≤ g(c),∀c ∈
[0, c], then for all p ∈ R,
γ(p, σˆ, c, cˆ) + β(1− α)f(c+(p, c)) ≤ γ(p, σˆ, c, cˆ) + β(1− α)g(c+(p, c)),
⇒ sup
p∈(−∞,1]
(
γ(p, σˆ, c, cˆ) + β(1− α)f(c+(p, c))) ≤ sup
p∈(−∞,1]
(
γ(p, σˆ, c, cˆ) + β(1− α)g(c+(p, c))) ,
⇒T (f)(c) ≤ T (g)(c).
(Discounting) Let f : [0, c]→ R and b > 0, c ∈ [0, c], then
T (f + b)(c) = sup
p∈R
(
γ(p, σˆ, c, cˆ) + β(1− α) (f(c+(p, c)) + b)) ,
= sup
p∈R
(
γ(p, σˆ, c, cˆ) + β(1− α)f(c+(p, c)))+ β(1− α)b,
= T (f)(c) + β(1− α)b.
Therefore, T is a contraction and we can apply the contraction mapping theorem
implies that the value function v exists and is unique.
5.2.3 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof. Part (i). v is non-decreasing in c.
Let c, c′ ∈ [0, c] such that c′ > c. We know that v satisfies:
v(c) = sup
{pl}
∞∑
l=0
[β(1− α)]l γ(pl, σˆ, cl, cˆ), (5.3)
s.t. cl+1 = cl + Φ(q(pl, σˆ, cl, cˆ), c− cl),
c0 = c.
Since σˆ is not necessarily continuous, therefore γ is not necessarily continuous
and hence an optimal price sequence satisfying the problem 5.3 might not exist.
However, by the definition of v as the solution to 5.3 there exists a sequence
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{{pnl }l}n of price sequences satisfying:
lim
n
∞∑
l=0
[β(1− α)]l γ(pnl , σˆ, cnl , cˆ) = v(c),
where
cnl =
cnl−1 + Φ(q(pnl−1, σˆ, cnl−1, cˆ), c− cnl−1) if l ≥ 1,c if l = 0.
Let {{c′nl }l}n and {{cnl }l}n be the corresponding sequences of sequences of cus-
tomer bases with c′n0 = c′ and cn0 = c.
Clearly, for all l and n,
γ(pnl , σˆ, c
′n
l , cˆ) ≥ γ(pnl , σˆ, cnl , cˆ).
So, for all n,
∞∑
l=0
[β(1− α)]l γ(pnl , σˆ, c
′n
l , cˆ) ≥
∞∑
l=0
[β(1− α)]l γ(pnl , σˆ, cnl , cˆ),
⇒ lim
n
∞∑
l=0
[β(1− α)]l γ(pnl , σˆ, c
′n
l , cˆ) ≥ lim
n
∞∑
l=0
[β(1− α)]l γ(pnl , σˆ, cnl , cˆ) = v(c).
As v(c′) ≥∑∞l=0 [β(1− α)]l γ(pnl , σˆ, c′nl , cˆ) for all n by definition, therefore v(c′) ≥
v(c).
Part (ii). The function v is strictly concave in c.
By definition, v(0) is given by
v(0) = sup
{pl}
∞∑
l=0
[β(1− α)]l γ(pl, σˆ, cl, cˆ),
s.t. cl+1 = cl + Φ(q(pl, σˆ, cl, cˆ), c− cl),
c0 = 0,
clearly, for any pl, cˆ, σˆ and feasible sequence {cl}, γ(pl, σˆ, cl, cˆ) = 0. Hence
v(0) = 0.
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Let λ ∈ (0, 1) and c ∈ (0, c). Since v is non-decreasing and v(0) = 0 to show it’s
strictly concave in c it suffices to show that v(λc) > λv(c). Consider the case
cˆ = 0 the strict concavity of v in c follows trivially from the strict concavity of
Φ on q. For the case cˆ > 0, let {{pnl }l}n be a sequence of sequence of prices
satisfying
v(c) = lim
n→∞
∞∑
l=0
[β(1− α)]l γ(pnl , σˆ, cl, cˆ),
since v(c) satisfies 5.3 such a sequence of sequences exists and v(c) > 0 since
supp(σ) ∩ (0, 1] 6= ∅. Let {{cnl }l}n be the corresponding sequence of customer
bases.
Let {{cnl (λ)}l}n be a sequence of sequences of customer bases satisfying
cnl (λ) =
cnl−1(λ) + Φ(q(pnl , σˆ, cnl−1(λ), cˆ), c− cnl−1(λ)) if l > 0,λc if l = 0.
Since Φ is strictly concave in q and nonincreasing in c while γ is linear on c it’s
easy to see that for every n,
v(λc) ≥
∞∑
l=0
[β(1− α)]l γ(pnl , σˆ, cnl (λ), cˆ) > λ
[ ∞∑
l=0
[β(1− α)]l γ(pnl , σˆ, cnl , cˆ)
]
.
Note that by construction, λv(c) = limn λ
[∑∞
l=0 [β(1− α)]l γ(pnl , σˆ, cnl , cˆ)
]
. There-
fore v(λc) > λv(c).
QED.
5.2.4 Proof of Lemma 3.3
Proof. First note that v exists and if σ is continuous in c then the set {γ(p, σ, c, cˆ) :
p ∈ (−∞, 1)} is an interval (−∞, γ(c)] ⊂ (−∞, c] for c ∈ [0, c] and {0} for c = 0
while γ(p, σ, c, cˆ) and c+(p, c) are continuous on p. Therefore, for any customer
base c ∈ [0, c] there is an optimal sequence of prices {pk}k that solves the se-
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quential problem:
max
{pl}l
∞∑
l=0
[β(1− α)]k γ(pl, σˆ, cl, cˆ),
s.t.cl+1 = cl + Φ(q(pl, σˆ, cl, cˆ), c− cl),
c0 = c.
The proof is divided into two parts, first I show that v is continuous then I show
it is strictly increasing.
Part (i). The function v is continuous in c.
To prove continuity suppose v is not continuous so there exists a c and sequence
{cn}n in [0, c] with c = limn cn such that limn v(cn) 6= v(c).
Let {pk}k be the sequence of prices satisfying
v(c) =
∞∑
k=0
[β(1− α)]k γ(pk, σˆ, ck, cˆ),
where
ck =
ck−1 + Φ(q(pk−1, σˆ, ck−1, cˆ), c− ck−1) if k > 0,c if k = 0.
Let {cn} a sequence in [0, c] converging to c. Since γ is linear on c and c+ is
continuous on c,
lim
n
( ∞∑
k=0
[β(1− α)]k γ(pk, σˆ, cnk({pk}k), cˆ)
)
= v(c),
where {cnk({pk}k)} is the sequence of customer bases implied by {pk}k since
v(cn) ≥
∞∑
k=0
[β(1− α)]k γ(pk, σˆ, cnk({pk}k), cˆ)
for each n, then if limn v(cn) 6= v(c) implies
lim
n
v(cn) > v(c).
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Let {{pnk}k}n the sequence of sequences of prices satisfying
v(cn, a) =
∞∑
k=0
[β(1− α)]k γ(pnk , σˆ, cnk , cˆ),
where {cnk} is the sequence of customer bases implied by {pnk}k, taking a subse-
quence if necessary let p∗k = limn pnk , for each k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Since profits are
linear on the customer base and next period’s customer base is continuous on
present period customer base it follows that
lim
n
v(cn) =
∞∑
k=0
[β(1− α)]k γ(p∗k, σˆ, ck({p∗k}k), cˆ) > v(c)
which is a contradiction.
QED.
Part (ii). The function v is strictly increasing.
Since γ(p, σˆ, c, cˆ) is linear on c, for a continuous average distribution of prices σˆ
and pi ∈ ∆3++, it’s easy to see that there exists a p ∈ (0, 1] such that γ(p, σˆ, c, cˆ) >
0 for c > 0. It’s easy to prove that v is strictly increasing on c: for c, c′ ∈ [0, c]
such that c′ > c, let {pk}k be the sequence of prices satisfying
v(c) =
∞∑
k=0
[β(1− α)]k γ(pk, σˆ, ck, cˆ),
where
ck =
ck−1 + Φ(q(pk−1, σˆ, ck−1, cˆ), c− ck−1) if k > 0,c if k = 0.
Let {c′k} be the sequence of customer bases with c′0 = c′ and
c′k = c
′
k−1 + Φ(q(pk−1, σˆ, c
′
k−1, cˆ), c− c′k−1),
then it’s easy to see that
v(c′) ≥
∞∑
k=0
[β(1− α)]k γ(pk, σˆ, c′k, cˆ) >
∞∑
k=0
[β(1− α)]k γ(pk, σˆ, ck, cˆ) = v(c).
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QED.
5.2.5 Proof of Lemma 3.4
Proof. (i) To see that the support of σˆ is convex, suppose it’s not: so there is an
open interval not in the support of σˆ but in the convex hull of σˆ. It implies that
there is a p ∈ Conv(supp(σˆ)), p > p′ for some p′ ∈ supp(σˆ) and the quantity
sold under p is the same as p′. Laying out the argument more explicitly, there
is an interval (p, p) ⊂ Conv(supp(σˆ)) ∩ (supp(σˆ))C and where p ∈ supp(σˆ), it
follows that posting a p ∈ (p, p) yields the same quantity sold as posting p and
hence strictly higher payoffs. Which is a contradiction with σˆ being consistent
with equilibrium.
(ii) Consider two sellers with customer bases c, c′ such that c′ 6= c. Sup-
pose Int(supp(σˆ(c))) ∩ Int(supp(σˆ(c′))) 6= ∅, then the distribution of prices σˆ
must make seller with customer base c indifferent between posting prices in
Int(supp(σˆ(c))) ∩ Int(supp(σˆ(c′))), however, due to the concavity of v (Lemma
3.3) and strict concavity of Φ in respect to sales quantity, a seller with cus-
tomer base c′ 6= c will not be indifferent in posting prices in the same support
as a seller with customer base c. A contradiction with σˆ being consistent with
equilibrium.
To see that the seller with the larger customer base posts higher prices let c′ > c
and suppose that some price p in supp(σˆ(c′)) is strictly smaller than any price in
supp(σˆ(c′)). We know that σˆ is such that it makes seller c′ indifferent between
those prices which implies that combined with strict concavity of v and Φ in
the sales quantity that the seller with customer base c will enjoy higher payoffs
by posting p rather than prices in supp(σˆ(c′)). Which is a contradiction with σˆ
being consistent with equilibrium.
(iii) Let p be the upper found of the support, that is:
p = sup(supp(σˆ))
Where j ∈ [0, 1] indexes all sellers. Suppose that p < 1, then a seller j where pj
is arbitrarily close to p, if seller j chooses to post 1 instead of pj < 1 the quantity
sold decreases by an amount that is arbitrarily small for pj is arbitrarily close
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to p since σˆ is continuous. While profits per unit sold increases by at least 1−p,
therefore for some sellers j, posting 1 yields strictly higher payoffs than pj close
to p. A contradiction with σ being consistent with equilibrium.
5.2.6 Proof of Lemma 3.5
Proof. The proof is organized in steps. Let {σa}a be an equilibrium strategy
profile generated by the fixed point V (., {ca}a).
Step 1: For each cohort a, σa is atomless.
To note that σa is atomless suppose that it has an atom at some p > 0, then
sellers will have incentive to undercut by posting a price p−  for some  > 0.
Step 2: For cohorts a, b ∈ {1, . . . , t}, if a < b then the supports of σa and σb
have disjoint interiors and max(supp(σa)) ≤ min(supp(σb)).
To see that the supports of σa and σb have disjoint interiors note that for a
seller of cohort a to find optimal to post prices in the support of σa then σa
must satisfy an equal profit condition that makes sellers of a indifferent. Given
that Φ(q(p, σˆ, c, cˆ), c− c) is strictly concave in q, non-increasing and concave in
c and V (c, {ca}, a) is strictly concave in c, by an argument analogous to step 1
of the proof of proposition 3.2, sellers in b will not find optimal to post prices
in the support of σa.
To see that max(supp(σa)) ≤ min(supp(σb)) note that since Φ(q(p, σˆ, c, cˆ), c−c)
is strictly concave in q, non-increasing and concave in c and V (c, {ca}) is strictly
concave in c, if the support of σa includes prices strictly higher than prices in
the support of σb then, by an argument analogous to step 1 of the proof of
proposition 3.2, sellers in cohort b will find that posting prices in the interior of
the support of σa will yield higher profits than in the interior of the support of
σb, which is a contradiction.
Step 3: For each cohort a, the support of σa is connected.
Suppose that the support of σa is not connected then there is an open interval
(p, p) such that ∃p, p′ ∈ supp(σa) and p < p while p < p′. But Step 2 and the
equal profit condition implies that posting a price z ∈ (p, p) will yield strictly
higher profits than posting p.
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Step 4: The upper bound of the support of σˆ =
∑
a n
aσa is 1.
To see that note that if the upper bound was lower than 1 it’s easy to see that
sellers will find it strictly dominant to post 1 instead of the upper bound. A
contradiction.
Step 5: Then the profile of equilibrium strategies {σa}a is unique.
The upper bound 1, and the continuity, monotonicity of γ and V in c implies
that for each cohort a, for a given upper bound pa the equal profit condition
for prices in the support of the equilibrium strategy plus the fact the supports
are connected, disjoint and monotone increasing on the seller’s age implies in a
unique support [pa, pa] and in a unique distribution of prices σa that maintains
the equal profit condition. If the support [pa, pa] is determined, then [pa−1, pa−1]
is also determined, note that Step 4 implies that pt = 1 and following this
reasoning the profile of supports {[pa, pa]}a is determined and hence the profile
of equilibrium strategies {σa}a.
5.2.7 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof. The proof is divided into three parts. First I prove that {σa} is con-
sistent with the steady-state equilibrium. Then I show the equilibrium exists
by showing that there exists a value function v consistent with the equilibrium
strategies. Then I show that this equilibrium is the unique symmetric equilib-
rium. To simplify notation let c+(p, c) = c + Φ(q(p, σˆ, c, cˆ), c − c) be the next
period customer base of a seller who posts price p and has customer base c.
Part 1: The price posting strategies {σa}a are consistent with equilibrium.
Note that the profile of customer bases {ca}a implies in a cˆ =
∑
a n
aca > 0
and that σˆ is continuous and includes strictly positive prices in it’s support.
Therefore, Lemma 3.3 imply that v is a strictly increasing, strictly concave and
continuous function.
For a seller of age a, σa satisfies the following equal profit condition, for any
p ∈ (pa, pa):
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capξ(p, σˆ, cˆ) + β(1− α)v [c+(p, ca)] = capaξ(pa, σˆ, cˆ) + β(1− α)v [c+(pa, ca)] ,
(5.4)
= capaξ(pa, σˆ, cˆ) + β(1− α)v [c+(pa, ca)] .
Since v is non-decreasing from Lemma 3.2, it’s easy to see that pa > pa (as
P (pa, σ, cˆ) < P (pa, σ, cˆ)) and σa satisfies
lim
p↑pa
σa(p) = 1,
lim
p↓pa
σa(p) = 0.
Further since v is continuous, then σa is also continuous.
Therefore, since pa = pa+1, the supports of {σa} have disjoint interiors for any
two cohorts, hence it’s easy to check that σˆ(p) satisfies
σˆ(p) = ωa−1 + ωaσa(p),
for p ∈ [pa, pa] ⊂ [p, p], and so σˆ is also continuous on [pa, pa].
To see that the profile of strategies {σa} is consistent with equilibrium, note that
it’s obvious that no seller would find it advantageous to post a price p < p1 = p,
that is, strictly lower than the lower bound of the support of prices posted in
equilibrium since the quantity sold would be the same as posting p and profits
would be lower. It remains to show that each cohort will not find advantageous
to post prices outside of their supports.
Consider a pair of sellers, one of age a and another of age b with b > a. Note
that σa by satisfying equation 3.28 it implies that if a seller of age a is indifferent
between posting p ∈ [pa, pa) and pa. Then for a seller of age b > a, the fact
cb > ca and the strict concavity of the discovery function Φ(q(p, c), c) in c implies
that for such p ∈ (pa, pa),
c+(p, cb)− c+(pa, cb)
cb
<
c+(p, ca)− c+(pa, ca)
ca
.
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Note that v is strictly increasing and concave (by lemmas 3.2 and 3.3) implies
that for p ∈ (pa, pa),
v(ca) = capξ(p, σˆ, cˆ) + β(1− α)v [c+(p, ca)]
⇒ cap
{ ∞∑
k=0
pik(cˆ)
[
1− (ωa−1 + ωaσa(p))]k}+ β(1− α)v [c+(p, ca)]
= capa
{ ∞∑
k=0
pik(cˆ)
[
1− ωa−1]k}+ β(1− α)v [c+(pa, ca)] ,
(5.5)
⇒ β(1− α) {v [c
+(p, ca)]− v [c+(pa, ca)]}
ca
= p
{ ∞∑
k=0
pik(cˆ)
[
1− (ωa−1 + ωaσa(p))]k}− pa{ ∞∑
k=0
pik(cˆ)
[
1− ωa−1]k} ,
(5.6)
⇒ β(1− α) {v [c
+(p, ca), a+ 1]− v [c+(pa, ca)]}
ca
(5.7)
= p
{
exp
[−cˆ (ωa−1 + ωaσa(p))]}− pa [exp(−cˆωa−1)]
(5.8)
⇒ β(1− α)
{
v
[
c+(p, cb)
]− v [c+(pa, cb)]}
cb
< p
{
exp
[−cˆ (ωa−1 + ωaσa(p))]}− pa [exp(−cˆωa−1)] ,
(5.9)
⇒ cbp{exp [−cˆ (ωa−1 + ωaσa(p))]}+ β(1− αa+1)v [c+(p, cb)]
(5.10)
< cbpa
[
exp(−cˆωa−1)]+ β(1− αa+1)v [c+(pa, cb)] .
(5.11)
For p ∈ (pb, pb), by analogous reasoning,
v(cb) = cbp
{
exp
[−cˆ (ωb−1 + ωbσb(p))]}+ β(1− α)v [c+(p, cb)]
⇒ cap{exp [−cˆ (ωa−1 + ωaσa(p))]}+ β(1− α)v [c+(p, ca)] (5.12)
> capb
[
exp(−cˆωb−1)]+ β(1− α)v [c+(pb, ca)] . (5.13)
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Let b = a + 1 by induction it follows that sellers of age a will not find it profit
maximizing to post prices in [p, p][pa, pa] and the equal profit condition 5.4
implies that sellers of cohort a will be indifferent to prices in the support [pa, pa].
Since lima pa = 1, therefore [p, p] = [p, 1]. Hence, posting prices in [pa, pa] is
optimal for sellers of age a. Therefore, the profile of price posting strategies
{σa}a is consistent with equilibrium.
To see that q(ca) satisfies 3.26, it’s simple algebra:
q(ca) = ca
∫
ξ(p, σˆ, cˆ)dσa
= ca
∫
exp
[−cˆ (ωa−1 + ωaσa(p))] dσa
= ca exp(−cˆωa−1)
∫
exp(−cˆωaσa(p))dσa
= ca exp
[
−cˆ
(
ωa−1 +
1
2
ωa
)]
.
Part 2: Existence.
To show existence if suffices to show that a strictly increasing concave value
function v that is consistent with the equilibrium strategy profile and customer
base profiles exists. I show that by constructing an operator in the space of
strictly increasing concave functions and showing it is a contraction and hence
has a unique fixed point.
Let F be the space of functions on [0, c] that are strictly increasing and concave.
Let T be an operator that maps F into a functional space.
Consider a v ∈ F . Let {pa,v, pa,v} be a sequence with lima→∞ pa,v = 1 satisfying
pa,v = pa+1,v and pa,v satisfies
pa,vcaξ(pa,v, σˆ, cˆ)+β(1−α)v(c+(pa,v, ca)) = pa,vcaξ(pa,v, σˆ, cˆ)+β(1−α)v(c+(pa,v, ca)),
for each a. The operator T (v) satisfies the following conditions. For c ∈ [ca−1, ca)
for some a > 1, T (v) satisfies
T (v)(c) = pa,vcξ(pa,v, σˆ, cˆ) + β(1− α)v(c+(pa,v, c)), (5.14)
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for c ∈ [0, c] = [0, c1], T (v) satisfies
T (v)(c) = p1,vcξ(p1,v, σˆ, cˆ) + β(1− α)v(c+(p1,v, c)). (5.15)
Note that since v(c) is a strictly increasing concave function in c, then equations
5.14 and 5.15 imply that T (v)(c) is a strictly increasing and strictly concave
function in c, hence T maps the space of strictly increasing concave functions
in c into itself, that is T : F → F .
I want to show that T is a contraction. To show that it suffices to show that
T satisfies Blackwell’s sufficient conditions for a contraction: monotonicity and
discounting.
Monotonicity: Let f, g ∈ F such that f(c) ≥ g(c) for all c ∈ [0, c]. I want to
show that T (f) ≥ T (g), let c ∈ [0, c], {pa,f , pa,f} and {pa,g, pa,g}, then there is
some a such that either c ∈ [ca−1, ca) or c < c1, then
T (f)(c) = pa,fcξ(pa,f , σˆ, cˆ) + β(1− α)f(c+(pa,f , c))
≥ pa,gcξ(pa,g, σˆ, cˆ) + β(1− α)f(c+(pa,g, c)) (5.16)
≥ pa,gcξ(pa,g, σˆ, cˆ) + β(1− α)g(c+(pa,g, c)) (5.17)
= T (g)(c). (5.18)
where the inequality 5.16 follows from 5.10.
Discounting: Let f ∈ F and b > 0, for c ∈ [0, c],
T (f + b)(c) = pa,fcξ(pa,f , σˆ, cˆ) + β(1− α)[f(c+(pa,f , c)) + b]
= pa,fcξ(pa,f , σˆ, cˆ) + β(1− α)f(c+(pa,f , c)) + β(1− α)b
= T (f)(c) + β(1− α)b
< T (f)(c) + b.
Therefore, T is a contraction and hence has a unique fixed point. It’s easy to
check that the fixed point of T is a value function v that is consistent with
the profile of supports{[pa,v, pa,v]} for the mixed pricing strategies in the steady
steady equilibrium. Hence, the equilibrium exists.
Part 3: Uniqueness.
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Part 2, lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 imply that to show uniqueness it suffices to show
that a symmetric equilibrium with v continuous, strictly increasing and concave
must be characterized by a unique mixed price posting strategy profile. Thus, to
show that the strategy profile is unique first it must be shown that the average
distribution of prices σˆ is continuous which means that lemmas 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4
can be applied. If satisfied, these lemmas imply in uniqueness of the symmetric
steady-state equilibrium.
To see that in equilibrium σˆ must be continuous suppose σˆ it’s not continuous
(i.e. it has at least one atom). Then there exists a price pA > 0 such that
limp↑pA σˆ(p) < σˆ(pA).
In that case posting pA is not consistent with profit maximization. To see that
consider a seller posting a price pA −  with  > 0 instead of pA. Lowering the
price by  will yield an increase in quantity sold at least as large as the customer
base times σˆ(pA) − limp↑pA σˆ(p). Hence, lowering the price by  implies that
present period profits increases by at least
c
{
(pA − )[σˆ(pA)− lim
p↑pA
σˆ(p)]− σˆ(pA)
}
which is a positive change for  small enough and also that the future’s cus-
tomer base is higher with higher sales quantity. Note that Lemma 3.2 states
that v is always non-decreasing. A contradiction with σˆ being consistent with
equilibrium.
To show that in equilibrium each cohort a’s strategy σa satisfies equation 3.28
note that Lemma 3.4 states that any steady-state equilibrium strategy profile
{σa} satisfies the following properties: (i) convexity of the support, (ii) disjoint
interior of the supports for the strategies of sellers with different customer bases,
(iii) sellers with larger customer bases always post equal or higher prices than
sellers with lower customer bases and (iv) that the upper bound of the support
of σˆ is 1. Therefore, in equilibrium cohort a’s strategy σa satisfies conditions
3.28 and 3.27. Which implies that 5.4 holds.
Lemma 3.4 implies that lima↑∞ pa = 1 with 5.4 and a value function v implies
in an unique profile of price posting strategies {σa}a.
CHAPTER 5. APPENDIX 127
5.2.8 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof. Suppose that vt+1 continuous, strictly increasing and strictly concave
then the proof of existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium distribution of
prices in period t is analogous to the proof in proposition 3.2.
It only remains to show that for any sequence {vt}t converging to v if vt+1 is
continuous, strictly increasing and strictly concave then vt is also continuous,
strictly increasing and strictly concave.
To show that vt is continuous, strictly increasing and strictly concave note that
vt(c) = max
p∈A
γ(p, σt, c, cˆ) + β(1− α)vt+1(ct+1(p, c)) (5.19)
= γ(p(c), σt, c, cˆ) + β(1− α)vt+1(ct+1(p(c), c)),
where p(c) is the value maximizing p, it exists because vt+1 and γt are continuous
on c, clearly γt is continuous on c and γt is continuous on p. Since c ∈ [0, c],
it can be shown that vt(c) ≤ c1−β(1−α) for all c ∈ [0, c] and t ≥ 1. Hence, there
exists an p such that p(c) ∈ [p, 1] for all c ∈ [0, c] and t ≥ 1. Therefore by the
maximum theorem vt is continuous.
To see that vt is strictly increasing first check that γt is strictly increasing on
c hence if vt+1 is strictly increasing then vt is strictly increasing. Since v is
strictly increasing and lim vt = v, then there exists a T such that vT is strictly
increasing and by induction vt is strictly increasing for all t < T .
To check that vt is strictly concave note that v is bounded by v(c) and vt+k → v
as k →∞. Let {pk(ct), ck(ct)}∞k=t be the value maximizing price posting policies
and customer bases corresponding to each period k ≥ t. Substituting 5.19
iteratively and that limk→∞ βkv(c) = 0 we arrive at:
vt(ct) =
T∑
k=0
[β(1− α)]k γ(pk(ct), σˆt+k, ck(ct), cˆt+k) + [β(1− α)]T vt+T (ct+T (ct)),
=
∞∑
k=0
[β(1− α)]k γ(pk(ct), σˆt+k, ck(ct), cˆt+k), (5.20)
hence by analogous proof to Lemma 3.3, vt is strictly concave. Hence, vt is
continuous, strictly increasing and strictly concave.
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5.2.9 Proof of Theorem 3.3
Proof. To show that the equilibrium is unique it suffices to show that T maps
F [[0, c]×KN([0, c])] into itself, that it is a contraction and that it’s fixed point
implies in a unique symmetric strategy profile.
Note that γ(p, σˆ, c, cˆ) is concave and strictly increasing on c, V is concave and
strictly increasing on c and c+(p, c), equation 3.39 implies that T (V ) is strictly
increasing and strictly concave on c. To show that T is a contraction it suffices
to show that it satisfies Blackwell’s sufficiency conditions for a contraction. This
proof is analogous to the second step of the proof of proposition 3.2.
Finally, to show that the fixed point of T implies in a unique strategy profile note
that for V fixed point of T , then V is strictly increasing and strictly concave on
c. We can apply Lemma 3.5 which implies that a fixed point of T also implies
in a unique strategy profile for each customer base profile. Which concludes the
proof of Theorem 3.3.
5.2.10 Proof Lemma 3.6
Proof. First note that the average age of the active sellers is always strictly
increasing in t. Let aˆt be the average age of sellers that are operating in the
market in period t. It satisfies:
aˆt =
∑t
k=1 kn
k∑t
k=1 n
k
. (5.21)
Clearly, equation 5.21 is strictly increasing in t. The fraction of the population
of sellers who are active in the market,
∑t
k=1 n
k is also strictly increasing in
k. Hence, if the average customer base of active sellers is increasing then the
average number of sellers that buyers know is also increasing.
In symmetric equilibrium the customer bases of sellers are increasing with the
seller’s tenure in the market, however the state of the market is also changing.
I must show that a seller of age a ∈ {1, . . . , t} will have an equal or larger
customer base in period t + 1 compared to period t to show that the average
customer base of the sellers is increasing in t.
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The quantity sold by a seller of age a in period t,
qat = c
a
t exp
[−cˆt (ωa−1t + (1/2)ωat )]
= exp
[
−
(
a−1∑
k=1
cktn
k +
1
2
catn
a
)]
,
note that c1t = c for all t ≥ 1, hence q1t = c exp(−12cn1) is independent in t ≥ 1,
which implies that c2t is independent for t ≥ 2, hence
q2t = c exp
[
−
(
c1tn
1 +
1
2
c2tn
2
)]
is independent for t ≥ 2, therefore c3t is the same for all t ≥ 3, following this
reasoning qat is independent for t ≥ a. Therefore, cˆt is strictly increasing in
t.
5.2.11 Proof of Theorem 3.4
Proof. Suppose that AMt ≤ AMt+1 for some t. Lemma 3.6 implies that ct <
ct+1. The facts that ct < ct+1 and the definition of average markups 3.40 implies
that the average distribution of posted prices σˆt+1 is not first order stochastically
dominated by σˆt. Hence, there exists a p ∈ [pt, pt] such that σˆt(p) > σˆt+1(p).
Note that proposition 3.6 implies that that monopoly profits in t + 1 will be
strictly lower than in t. Therefore, it’s easy to see that in the equilibrium of a
static version (as in Burdett and Judd (1983)) of the pricing game that σˆt is first
order stochastically dominated by σˆt+1. If σˆt(p) > σˆt+1(p) for some p ∈ [pt, pt],
then as the static losses from posting lower prices are larger, higher dynamic
gains are needed to satisfy the equal profit condition therefore the dynamic
gains of posting lower prices must be higher in t than in t + 1. Additionally,
note that cˆt+1 > cˆt and equation 3.4 implies that the increase in customer base
growth of a seller with customer base c from being in period t posting the lower
bound of the support of σˆt, pt vis the upper bound of the support, pt is smaller
than the gain in customer base in period t + 1 from posting p
t+1
vis pt+1, that
is [
ct+2(pt+1, c)− ct+2(pt+1, c)
]
>
[
ct+1(pt, c)− ct+1(pt, c)
]
. (5.22)
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Equation 5.22 and the fact that the dynamic gains of posting lower prices must
be higher in t than in t+ 1, implies that the expected discounted profit stream
per customer of a seller in equilibrium must be strictly decreasing from t to
t+ 1. From the perspective of period t and t+ 1 future markups are the same
for periods after t+ 1, which in turn implies that AMt+1 must be substantially
higher than AMt+2 to incentivize sellers to post substantially lower prices in t
than in t + 1. To support such substantial higher price posting in t + 1 than
in t + 2 in turn implies that AMt+3 must be smaller than AMt+2 by also a
substantial degree. Following this reasoning, AMq −AMq+1 >  for some  > 0
for all q > t. Therefore, the average markup must diverge to minus infinity
to support an increase in average markups from t + 1 to t + 2 in equilibrium,
which contradicts the fact that the non-steady-state equilibrium converges to
the steady-state equilibrium (which occurs by construction).
5.2.12 Proof of Theorem 3.5
Proof. If the buyer knows at least one seller the buyer is going to purchase the
good. Thus, the realized surplus in the market in a given period is just 1 minus
the population of buyers who do not know a single seller, pi0t . Therefore, an
efficient profile of sales among sellers is such that it minimizes pi0t , which implies
that it maximizes the average size of the seller’s customer bases in each period.
Therefore, given a profile of customer bases {cat }a in period t, efficiency in
that period is obtained when the profile of sales quantities {qat }a maximizes∑t+1
a=1 n
acat+1, where cat+1 satisfies 3.35.
Note that sellers with smaller customer bases have greater potential for growth
than sellers with larger customer bases therefore the efficient distribution of
sales among sellers is such that buyers will always purchase from the smallest
seller that they know as long as the marginal increase in that seller’s customer
base is higher than the marginal increase in the larger seller’s customer base.
Note that in equilibrium between any two sellers, the seller with smaller cus-
tomer base will post lower prices than the seller with the larger customer base
with probability 1 and in equilibrium smaller sellers will always be smaller than
larger sellers (as cat < c
a+1
t , ∀a ∈ {1, . . . , t− 1}, ∀t ≥ 2). Thus, the marginal in-
crease in their next period customer bases to equilibrium sales is always strictly
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higher than for larger sellers which implies that the equilibrium allocation is
efficient.
5.2.13 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof. Let ωn,a be the cumulative customer share of seller cohorts up to age a
in the steady-state equilibrium corresponding to seller exit rate αn and upper
bound on customer base cn.
Note that limn cn =∞ implies that in steady-state equilibrium
lim
n→∞
lim
a→∞
can =∞. (5.23)
Let aˆn be the average seller age at n and cˆn be the average customer base of a
seller at n. I want to show that
lim
n→∞
cˆn =∞. (5.24)
As this condition implies that limn→∞ pi0n = 0.
Let  > 0 from equation 5.23 it’s possible to pick a sequence {an} such that
cann > .
Note that for ζ ∈ (0, 1) there is a sequence {Nn} such that
∑
a≥Nn αn(1−αn)n >
(1− ζ) for all n and is such that Nn →∞.
I want to show that for  > 0 and ζ ∈ (0, 1), ∃{an()} and {Nn(ζ)} such that
∃K ∈ N such that ∀n ≥ K,
an ≤ Nn.
If that’s true then it’s easy to see that 5.24 holds.
To show that 5.24 holds, construct a sequence {an} such that for each n ≥ 1,
an = min{a : can ≥ },
such an exists since can is strictly increasing and converges to∞, and a sequence
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{Nn} such that for each n ≥ 1,
Nn = min{N :
∑
a≥Nn
αn(1− αn)n > (1− ζ)}.
It’s easy to see that {Nn} is a non-decreasing sequence such that limnNn =∞
and limn an ≤ ∞.
Suppose that pi0n doesn’t converge to 0. WLOG assume that limpi0n = pi > 0.
Note that pi0n bounded below by pi implies that the probability of sale to a
customer of seller of age a will be at least as high as∑
k=0
pikn[1− ωn,a−1]k > pi0n ≥ pi.
Since the probability of a sale is bounded below by pi it implies that for  < c,
there exists a a such that ∀n, an ≤ a, and, as Nn converges to infinity, that
implies that ∃K ∈ N such that ∀n ≥ K,
an ≤ Nn.
Hence, condition 5.24 implies that pi0n converges to 0. A contradiction.
5.2.14 Proof of Theorem 3.6
Proof. The proof that the fraction of buyers who do not purchase the good from
any seller converges to zero follows trivially from limk cˆk = ∞ and pi0(.) being
a Poisson probability mass function.
In a sequence of steady-state equilibrium characterized by the sequence of cus-
tomer base profiles {{cak}a}k we know that very old sellers with a large enough
will have customer base close enough to ck will find it optimal to post price
arbitrarily close to 1, in which case the expected profits would be arbitrarily
close to ckpi0k as σˆk(1) = 1, while posting p ∈ [pi0k, 1), expected profits would
be strictly smaller than pck, since the equilibrium condition implies that for
a seller to find it optimal to post a price outside the lower bound of the sup-
port of σˆ the additional gains in future expected profits from customer base
accumulation from posting lower prices must be compensated by higher present
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profits from higher prices. This implies that σˆk(p) > 0 and therefore that
[pi0k, 1) ⊂ [pk, pk] = supp(σˆk).
Fix k and p ∈ [pi0k, 1). Note that cˆk →∞ as k →∞ hence
lim
k
Pk(1, σˆ
k) = 0.
Therefore expected profit margin per customer for seller of age a from posting a
price p ∈ [pi0k, 1) which are strictly lower than ξ(1, σˆk, cˆk) for a will also converge
to zero.
Note also that for cˆk → ∞ as k → ∞ implies that any p ∈ (pi0k, 1), σˆk(p) > 0
therefore
lim
k
exp
[−cˆkσˆk(p)] = 0.
Finally, that cˆk →∞ as k →∞ implies that limk pi0k = 0 and it follows that for
any p ∈ (0, 1)
lim
k
exp
[−cˆkσˆk(p)] = 0,
hence the distribution for prices of transactions converges in probability to 0.
5.2.15 Proof of Theorem 3.7
Proof. Theorem 3.6 implies that as cˆ → ∞, the equilibrium expected price for
transactions converges to 0. Hence, if cˆ→∞ then v(c)→ 0.
For any entering population of sellers an exit rate α ∈ (0, 1) implies that
v(c) ≤ v(c) ≤ c
β(1− α) ,
therefore, v(c) ∈
[
0, c
β(1−α)
]
.
Let ns = 0 and sequence of customer bases {ct}t such that c0 = c and ct+1 =
ct + Φ(ct, ct, 0) for each t ≥ 0. Then, with zero seller density the value of entry
is just posting the monopoly price and selling to all customers,
ventry =
∞∑
t=0
(β(1− α))t ct.
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Clearly, ventry is the upper bound of the value at entry.
From Lemma 3.4, we know that the expected price for equilibrium transactions
is monotone decreasing on cˆ and it is easy to see that in the steady-state equi-
librium cˆ is strictly increasing on ns. Therefore, if there exists a ns ∈ R+ such
that v(c) = e > 0, then it’s unique. If e ≥ ventry then ns = 0. Finally, theorem
3.6 implies that as ns →∞, v(c)→ 0, therefore if e > 0 then there exists ns > 0
such that v(c) < e.
5.3 Appendix to Chapter 4
5.3.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proof. I will show that the prices specified 4.18 are a competitive equilibrium,
and are the only equilibrium if q 6= 1.
Sufficiency: Let q < 1, if pW (l) = 1 for all l. Then demand for each variety l
will be [0, 1], as consumer i will be almost always indifferent between purchasing
variety i or not (randomizing between the two) so demand for each variety is
[0, 1], while all producers will supply q ∈ (0, 1) as prices are strictly greater than
zero. Hence, its an equilibrium.
Let q > 1, if pW (l) = 0 for all l then demand for each variety l will be 1, as
almost every consumer i ∈ [0, 1] will purchase a unit of variety i ∈ [0, 1], while
supply is given by S(l) = [0, q]. Hence, it is an equilibrium.
Necessity: Consider the case q < 1, I need to show that any pricing profile
different from pW (l) = 1 for all l ∈ [0, 1] is inconsistent with equilibrium.
Consider a profile of prices pW with pW (l) < 1 for some subset of varieties
Z ⊂ [0, 1] and pW (j) = 1, ∀j 6/∈ Z. Then, continuity of v implies that for some
consumers i near Z will find varieties in Z that yield higher utility than not-
trading, therefore xi is such that
∑
j∈Z xi(j) = 1, then it is easy to see that
X(l) ≥ 1 for at least some l ∈ Z, a contradiction with equilibrium.
Consider the case where q > 1 and a pricing profile such that pW (l) > 0 for
subset of varieties Z ⊂ [0, 1] and pW (j) = 0. As prices are strictly greater than
0, demand for some varieties in Z are, at most, 1, as consumers will not want to
CHAPTER 5. APPENDIX 135
purchase more than one unit of the consumption good and if multiple consumers
purchase the same good other varieties in Z will have demand less than 1, but
supply of any variety in Z will be equal to q > 1, a contradiction.
5.3.2 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. Part 1: Convergence in prices
Let Gn(x) =
∫ x
0
ajn/an, and first note that ajn → ∞ for every j ∈ [0, 1] and
max{ajn/aj′n : j, j′ ∈ [0, 1]} < A implies that an =
∫
ajn converges to infinity and
that the density of Gn in any subset point of [0, 1] does not converge to zero. As
an →∞ and Gn converges to a strictly strictly increasing cumulative distribu-
tion function, the expected ain converges to infinity and the expected valuation
for an arbitrary consumer i’s preferred variety among producers in Ain converges
to 1 as n → ∞. That is, as consumers becomes aware of more varieties, the
closer the expected valuation of the preferred variety is to 1. Second, note that
in equilibrium, s∗(j,an) ∈ [0, 1),∀j,∀n, as negative pricing is never consistent
with equilibrium: it is easy to see that a producer post negative prices then
its profits will be strictly negative since pi0(a) > 0 for any a ∈ R+ and pricing
above all consumer’s reservation price yields zero profits.
The proof proceeds by contradiction. I first consider the case where s∗(j,an)
converges to a symmetric pricing profile, that is limn→∞ s∗(j,an) = p∗ for all
varieties j. In an equilibrium where all producers post the same price, con-
sumers will purchase their preferred variety. Therefore, the reservation price
of the customers of a producer j converges in probability to 1. Which implies
that the population of consumers who purchases some variety also converges
to 1 if lima→∞ s∗(j,an) < 1. Which implies that the average quantity sold by
producers converges to 1 in such equilibrium if the equilibrium price converges
(taking a subsequence if necessary) to a number that is less than 1.
Suppose that q > 1 and suppose that p∗ > 0. Note that the average quantity
sold in equilibrium by producers converges to 1 which means that for some
producer j, the quantity sold converges to a quantity equal or smaller than 1 as
a → ∞, which is below capacity. If producer j consider reducing price posted
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p∗ by some  > 0 equation 4.15 implies that quantity sold is given by
a
j
nPn,j(p
∗ − , p∗)
= a
j
n
∫ 1
0
I{v(i,j)≥p∗−}(i) exp
[
−an
(
1−
∫ 1
0
I{v(i,j)≥v(i,j′)−}(i, j
′
)dGn(j
′
)
)]
di (5.25)
= a
j
n
∫ 1
0
I{v(i,j)≥p∗−}(i) exp
[
−an
(
1−
(∫ 1
0
[
I{v(i,j)≥v(i,j′)}(i, j
′
) + I{v(i,j)∈[v(i,j′)−,v(i,j′))}(i, j
′
)
]
dGn(j
′
)
))]
di
(5.26)
≥ ajn
∫ 1
0
I{v(i,j)≥p∗−}(i) exp
[
−an
(
1−
(∫ 1
0
I{v(i,j)≥v(i,j′)}(i, j
′
)dGn(j
′
) +
1
A
∫ 1
0
I{v(i,j)∈[v(i,j′)−,v(i,j′))}(i, j
′
)dj
′
))]
di,
(5.27)
where Pn,j has the n subscript as it changes for each n ∈ N, and as ajn/an >
1/A,∀n, the density of Gn is bounded below by 1/A > 0. As p∗ −  < 1 the
continuity of vi implies that v(i, j) > p∗ −  for all i in some neighborhood of j
and that the set {j′ ∈ [0, 1] : v(i, j) ∈ [v(i, j′)− , v(i, j′))} has strictly positive
measure if i 6= j, together with Gn having density higher than 1/A implies that
Pn,j(p
∗ − , p∗) > Pn,j(p∗, p∗). In words, the quantity sold increases as there is
a population of buyers in j’s customer base who prefer some other variety j′
among the a different varieties they know but the difference in reservation price
between those other varieties and j is smaller than . Note that taking n to
infinity, as implied by expression 5.27, the marginal log increase in quantity sold
will increase to infinity thanks to the power of “compound interest”. Therefore,
for n large enough producer j will have incentives to undercut the competition,
as the increase in sales will be larger than the decrease in profit margin, a
contradiction with equilibrium. Therefore s∗(j,an) does not converge to a price
higher than 0, hence, if the Nash equilibrium strategy profile converges to a
symmetric pricing profile it will converge to the price of 0 for every variety.
Suppose q < 1 and suppose that p∗ < 1. Note as the average quantity sold
in equilibrium by producers converges to 1 in symmetric equilibrium if p∗ < 1
then the demand for some producer j posting s∗(j,an) converges to a quantity
greater or equal than 1 as n → ∞, which is above capacity. Continuity of
v implies demand (that is ajaPn,j(p, s, a)) is continuous, hence, producers can
increase profits by increasing prices a contradiction with s∗(j,an) being Nash
equilibrium. Hence, in equilibrium, as a converges to infinity, in the limit the
producers cannot post a price below 1. Since p∗ ∈ [0, 1], therefore, if the Nash
equilibrium strategy profile converges to a symmetric pricing profile it will con-
verge to the price of 1 for every variety.
It remains to show that the case where s∗(j, a) does not converge to a symmet-
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ric pricing profile almost everywhere is not consistent with equilibrium. Note
that if s∗(j, a) converges almost everywhere to a symmetric pricing profile the
arguments above still applies.
Case 1: Suppose that q > 1. Consider the case where for a positive measure
of varieties Z ⊂ [0, 1], s∗(j,an) does not converge to 0, ∀j ∈ Z. Then (taking
subsequences if necessary) {s∗(j,an) : j ∈ Z} converges to a profile of prices
p∗(j) > 0,∀j ∈ Z. Since Z has positive measure there is a j in the interior of Z
such that inf{s∗(Bα(j))} > 0 for some α > 0, then by analogous argument as in
the symmetric pricing case (from equation 5.26), a small undercut by producer
j of the price p = inf{p∗(Bα(j))} will yield a marginal log increase in quantity
sold that increases to infinity as n→∞. Which implies that as n→∞, posting
a p < p ≤ p∗(j) yields higher profits than posting p∗(j). A contradiction with
s∗(j,an) being Nash equilibrium for every n.
Case 2: Suppose that q < 1. Consider the case where for a positive measure
of varieties Z ⊂ [0, 1], s∗(j,an) does not converge to 1, ∀j ∈ Z. Then (taking
subsequences if necessary) {s∗(j,an) : j ∈ Z} converges to a profile of prices
p∗(j) < 0,∀j ∈ Z. Since Z has positive measure there is is a j in the interior of
Z such that sup{p∗(Bα(j))} < 1. It is easy to see that as ajn/an > 1/A,∀n for
producers j in Bα(j), demand for their output will exceed capacity as n→∞.
Continuity of v implies demand (that is ajaPn,j(p, s, a)) is continuous, hence,
producers in Bα(j) can increase profits by increasing prices a contradiction
with s∗(j,an) being Nash equilibrium.
Part 2: Convergence in allocation
To see that the equilibrium allocation converges for almost every variety to
the competitive equilibrium allocation first consider producers. As equilibrium
output converges to 1 almost everywhere if q > 1, and to q if q < 1, then
equilibrium output trivially converges almost everywhere to Y .
Converge in probability in the consumption profile follows from the fact that as
ajn → ∞ for all j as n → ∞, then for any subset of varieties Z with positive
measure, the probability a random consumer i is aware of a variety in this
subset converges to 1. Consider a consumer i ∈ [0, 1], continuity of v and it
being single-peaked in v(i, i) implies that for a  > 0 small enough, an open
-neighborhood B of i is such that v(i, x) > v(i, z), ∀x ∈ B(i),∀z ∈ B(i).
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Therefore, as n → ∞ then the probability that i’s preferred variety in Ai is in
B converges to 1. As prices converge to the same price almost everywhere, the
probability that individual consumer’s chosen variety is in B or not-trading
converges to 1. Therefore, the equilibrium consumption profile converges in
probability to a competitive equilibrium consumption bundle.
5.3.3 Proof of Theorem 4.2
Proof. First note that if p > p then profits will be always lower than at the
monopoly price p, if p < 0 then profits will be strictly negative as pi0(a) > 0.
Then any candidate equilibrium price is in p ∈ [0, p].
Let Φj be the best response correspondence of producer j, it is given by
Φj(p
′) = arg max
p∈[0,p]
Πj(p, p
′),
note that conditions 1 and 2 imply, given equation 4.15 that Φj(p′) = Φj′(p′),∀j, j′ ∈
[0, 1], so we can write Φ(p′) as the best response of all producers to p′.
A symmetric equilibrium is a fixed point of Φ : [0, p] → [0, p]. Note that [0, p]
is a compact set, since v is continuous then Λji and Λjij′ are both continuous
which implies that ξj is continuous, hence by the Maximum Theorem, Φ(.) is a
non-empty upper-hemicontinuous correspondence.
As v is continuous and piecewise concave, it is easy to show that Λji and Λjij′
are concave on X,X ′ such that Λji(x) > 0,∀x ∈ X and Λjij′(x) > 0,∀x ∈ X ′
respectively. As ∫ 1
0
I{v(i,j)≥x}(i)di = Λji(x),∫ 1
0
I{v(i,j)−v(i,j′)≥x}(i, j′)dj′ = Λjij′(x),
if P nj (p, p′) > 0 for all p, p′ ∈ (0, p), and n > 0, then P nj is concave on [0, p], and
therefore Pj is concave on p ∈ [0, p].
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Suppose p0, p1 ∈ Φ(p′), with p1 > p0, let p˜ = αp0 + (1− α)p1, then
p˜Pj(p˜, p
′) = [αp0 + (1− α)p1]Pj(p˜, p′)
= αp0Pj(p˜, p
′) + (1− α)p1Pj(p˜, p′)
> αp0Pj(p0, p
′) + (1− α)p1Pj(p1, p′) (5.28)
= p0Pj(p0, p
′),
where inequality 5.28 is a consequence that p1 > p0, that Pj(p0, p′) ≥ Pj(p1, p′),
and
Pj(p˜, p
′) ≥ αPj(p0, p′) + (1− α)Pj(p1, p′).
Therefore Πj(p˜, p′) > Πj(p0, p′) = Πj(p1, p′), a contradiction with p0, p1 ∈ Φ(p′),
therefore Φ(p′) is single valued. Hence Φ is a continuous function. Since Φ is a
continuous function that maps a compact set into itself by Brouwer’s fixed-point
theorem it has a fixed point which is the symmetric equilibrium.
5.3.4 Proof of Theorem 4.3
Proof. Case 1: The capacity constraint q is not binding in equilibrium.
Let Φ : [0, p] ⇒ [0, p] be the best response correspondence when the capacity
constraint is not binding, it satisfies
Φ(p) = arg max
p∈[0,p]
pP (p, p′). (5.29)
Clearly, a price p∗ = Φ(p∗) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
To characterize Φ note that equation 4.21 implies that the derivative of P n at
the point p = p′ does not exist but there are left and right derivatives and they
satisfy
∂−P n(p, p′)
∂p
|p=p′= 0, (5.30)
∂+P
n(p, p′)
∂p
|p=p′= −2
λ
. (5.31)
Note that the left derivative is larger than the right derivative. This implies
that the gain in probability of sale from a marginal decrease in price at p′ is
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lower than the loss from a marginal increase in price. In equilibrium p = p′,
the inequality 5.30 implies that the marginal increase in profits from decreasing
price are always negative with p = p′ so in the equilibrium first order condition
that holds is the right derivative.
As P n is continuously left differentiable then ξ is continuously left differentiable.
Note that an interior solution p∗ to 5.29 satisfies
∂+Π(p, p
′)
∂p
|p=p∗= 0, (5.32)
as the right hand side derivative always exists for ξ and is smaller than the left
hand side if p = p′. Which implies that if the return in profits from decreasing
the posted price when it is above the competitors’ price is zero then the returns
from decreasing the price below the competitors’ is strictly negative.
Solving 5.32 for p∗ yields the interior solution
p∗ =
λ
2a
(5.33)
therefore, Φ is single valued for interior best responses.
It remains to rule out corner solutions that might occur together with an interior
solution, which occurs if a is not too large or small. Posting 0 yields zero profits
while posting p ∈ (0, p) always yields strictly positive profits, so 0 cannot be a
best response. It only remains to find conditions such that the monopoly price
p is not a best response when equation 5.32 is satisfied for p′ = p∗. In the case
where
∂−Π(p, p)
∂p
|p=p≥ 0,
then the equilibrium is clearly the monopoly price, which occurs if a is relatively
small. The case where
∂−Π(p, p)
∂p
|p=p< 0
can be problematic since it implies that the monopoly price is not an equilibrium
but it is not necessarily true that a price p∗ satisfying equation 5.32 with p′ = p∗
is also an equilibrium.
To rule out this case consider a candidate interior equilibrium p∗ ∈ (0, p) that
satisfies 5.32, consider the profits from posting p∗ compared to profits from
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posting the monopoly price
Π(p∗, p∗) = ap∗P (p∗, p∗)
=
λ
2a
[1− exp(−a)],
Π(p, p∗) = apP (p, p∗)
=

(
1− λ
2
)
exp(−2a) if p− p∗ > λ/2(
1− λ
2
)
[exp(2a)− exp(−a)]. if p− p∗ ≤ λ/2
If p− p∗ ≤ λ/2 then the marginal gain in lowering prices is higher than posting
the monopoly price p, then trivially profits from posting p∗ are higher than p.
Therefore if p∗ is close enough to p it is an equilibrium.
If p − p∗ > λ/2 then a sufficient condition for p∗ to be a Nash equilibrium is
that a that satisfies
λ
2a
[1− exp(−a)] >
(
1− λ
2
)
exp(−2a). (5.34)
Let a that satisfies
λ
2a
[1− exp(−a)] =
(
1− λ
2
)
exp(−2a),
for a > a a unique Nash equilibrium exists given by 5.33.
Let a such that p− p∗ = λ/2, solving for a,
a =
λ
2(1− λ) .
Then for a < a the symmetric Nash equilibrium exists and is unique, given by
p∗ = min
{
p,
λ
2a
}
.
Case 2: The capacity constraint q is binding.
As the quantity sold by producers must be equal or lower than q in equilibrium,
the producers price above the monopoly price to discourage potential customers
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from purchasing.
To compute demand for p∗ > p, then the quantity sold by a producer in equi-
librium is given by
aP (p∗, p∗) = P (v(i, j)− p∗ ≥ 0|v(i, j) ≥ v(i, j′),∀j′ ∈ Ai)[1− pi0(a)], (5.35)
where P (v(i, j) − p∗ ≥ 0|v(i, j) ≥ v(i, j′), ∀j′ ∈ Ai) is the probability that j’s
contract is preferred by i over not trading conditional on it being preferred over
all other contracts that i is aware of. Let δ(p) be the distance between i and j
that makes i indifferent between trading with j and not trading 1.
Let F n be a cumulative distribution function that describes the probability that
the valuation of the highest valuation consumer is above x conditional on the
consumers being aware of n different producers. As producers are distributed
uniformly F n is given by
F n(x) = 1−
[
1−
(
1− x
λ
)]n
.
Then,
P (v(i, j)− p∗ ≥ 0|v(i, j) ≥ v(i, j′),∀j′ ∈ Ai) =
∞∑
n=0
pin(a)F n+1(p∗)
= 1− exp
(
−1− p
∗
λ
a
)
.
In equilibrium with binding capacity constraint the equilibrium price satisfies
p∗
aP (p∗, p∗) = q,
solving for p∗ yields
p∗ = 1− λ
a
(log(1− exp(−a))− log(1− exp(−a)− q)) .
1Given by δ(p) = 1−pλ
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5.3.5 Proof of Theorem 3.5
Proof. Feasibility:
Physical feasibility and zero net balance are properties of equilibrium.
To see that the F ∗ is incentive compatible note that reported consumer type
θ implies that the consumer consumes the bundle (j,−s∗(j)), of variety j and
transfers −s∗(j), that maximizes utility among bundles in A(θ)×{−s∗(j) : j ∈
A(θ)}, so the consumer has no incentive to lie.
Efficiency:
There is only one possible deviation from physical pareto efficiency in the equi-
librium: if the consumer i does not purchase his or her preferred variety in Ai
(as the surplus is from a transaction is v(i, j)). Otherwise aggregate surplus is
automatically maximized.
Consider the situation where aggregate surplus is not maximized in equilib-
rium. That means there is some set of consumers I of positive measure such
that for i ∈ I, i’s preferred variety in Ai is j but i does not purchase from
producer j, whose capacity constraint is not binding under F . Therefore either
the consumer does not purchase any variety (v(i, j) < s∗(j)) or the consumer
purchases from another competitor (v(i, j) − s∗(j) < v(i, j′) − s∗(j′)). In the
first case consider a mechanism F ′ that implements trade between i and j, in
this mechanism i receives a transfer which satisfies −t(θ(i)) < s∗(j), that im-
plies that all other consumers who consume j’s variety will also receive the same
(higher) transfer in this mechanism, otherwise this mechanism would not satisfy
incentive compatibility (described in equation 4.27).
In the second case consider a mechanism F ′ that makes i trade with j instead of
j′, then transfers t′ to i trading with j should satisfy t′ ≥ v(i, j′)−v(i, j)−s∗(j′),
so −t′ < s∗(j), that implies that all other consumers who consume j’s variety
will also receive the same (higher) transfer in the mechanism F ′, otherwise F ′
would not satisfy incentive compatibility.
As F implements the allocation that follows from profit maximizing price post-
ing strategies, in both cases, the net balance constraint implies either that the
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profits of the set of such producers j decreases or that some other set of decision
makers will have to pay for these higher transfers to j’s customers. So a feasible
mechanism F ′ that implements trade between i and j does not pareto dominate
F .
